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Note: This document is from the archive of the Africa Policy E-Journal, published by the Africa Policy Information Center (APIC) from 1995 to 2001 and by Africa Action from 2001 to 2003. APIC was merged into Africa Action in 2001. Please note that many outdated links in this archived document may not work.


Africa: Economic Report on Africa, 1 Africa: Economic Report on Africa, 1
Date distributed (ymd): 020807
Document reposted by Africa Action

Africa Policy Electronic Distribution List: an information service provided by AFRICA ACTION (incorporating the Africa Policy Information Center, The Africa Fund, and the American Committee on Africa). Find more information for action for Africa at http://www.africaaction.org

+++++++++++++++++++++Document Profile+++++++++++++++++++++

Region: Continent-Wide
Issue Areas: +economy/development+

SUMMARY CONTENTS:

This two-part posting contains the overview section from the annual Economic Report on Africa 2002, released last month by the Economic Commissionon Africa, based in Addis Ababa. The report, containing data through 2001, is "cautiously optimistic," noting that Africa was the only developing region to see faster growth in 2001 than in 2000. The carefully worded report acknowledges, however, that this macroeconomic growth hides wide disparities among countries and is, in any case, not sufficient to meet goals of reducing poverty.

Critical observers may also raise questions about possible changes in the prognosis given global economic developments this year and the continued spread of the AIDS pandemic, as well as about the assumptions about economic policy and the validity of the indicators used in the report. Nevertheless, this is an important and substantive document on Africa's economic prospects.

In addition to a continental overview, the report presents detailed case studies of seven countries in different regions of the continent: South Africa, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Nigeria, Morocco and Guinea.

For the full report, see http://www.uneca.org/era2002

+++++++++++++++++end profile++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Overview-tracking performance and progress

Africa grew faster than any other developing region in 2001, reflecting better macroeconomic management, strong agricultural production, and the cessation of conflicts in several countries. But Africa's average GDP growth of more than 4% in 2001 masks wide disparities among countries. Moreover, economic growth remains fragile, and at current rates of progress Africa will not achieve any of the Millennium Development Goals set by the United Nations.

Still, there are many reasons for cautious optimism about Africa's medium-term prospects-including the opportunities created by the U. S. African Growth and Opportunity Act, the European Union's "Everything but Arms" initiative, the New Partnership for African Development, and the launches of the Doha Development Round and the Africa Union. Ultimately, though, Africa's future depends on how it addresses economic and political governance, resolves civil conflicts, and responds to the need for deeper economic and social reforms.

Africa was the only developing region to see faster growth in 2001

Forecasts made soon after the September 11 attacks predicted that economic growth would stagnate in Africa because of lower commodity prices, reduced foreign direct investment, and diminished private capital flows. But the global slowdown has had a much less pronounced impact on Africa than expected. Output has remained relatively strong. Africa's overall GDP growth is estimated to have increased to 4.3% in 2001 from 3.5% in 2000.

Changing commodity prices provide mixed blessings for Africa. Commodity prices are the main channel for transferring external weaknesses to most African economies. Global nonoil commodity prices recovered 2% in 2000 after dropping sharply in 1998 and part of 1999, but prices remained below 1996-97 levels. Moreover, the World Bank's price index for primary commodities from low-and middle-income countries has fallen steadily since 1995.

Terms of trade show no signs of improving in 2001-02. In the first 11 months of 2001 the prices of primary commodities fell in response to the strong downturn in global economic activity. Lowered growth expectations for the world economy after September 11 accentuated weak demand, while supply remained high and the dollar (the currency in which most commodities are priced) stayed strong. In September 2001 average commodity prices were 17% below their cyclical peak of one year earlier.

African exports to the United States jumped. U. S. imports from Africa have grown considerably in recent years, from about $1.5 billion a month in 1999 to $2.3 billion a month in 2000. African exports received a further boost with the January 2001 implementation of the U. S. African Growth and Opportunity Act. Although total U. S. imports fell between January and June 2001, imports covered by the act increased sharply-suggesting that these African exports may be insulated from the U. S. economic slowdown.

Africa's emerging markets experienced a sharp increase in private capital flows. Unlike emerging markets in other regions, those in Africa-Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, South Africa, and Tunisia-were not hurt by the September 11 attacks. In fact, between 2000 and 2001 net private flows to these countries nearly doubled, from $4.9 billion to $9.5 billion. In addition, net equity investment jumped from $5.2 billion to $9.3 billion, mainly reflecting large-scale deals in Morocco and South Africa. Net direct equity grew from $3.5 billion to $4.8 billion, driven by privatizations in Algeria and Morocco. And despite weaknesses in global equity markets, net portfolio equity flows shot from $1.7 billion to $4.5 billion. Net outflows are likely in 2002, however, as risk-averse investors avoid emerging equity markets. Elsewhere in Africa, stock markets had mixed performance in 2001.

Private credit flows to Africa's emerging markets increased slightly, from a net outflow of $400 million in 2000 to an inflow of $200 million in 2001. Still, for a group that includes Africa's largest economy-South Africa-this is an extremely modest amount relative to flows to other regions and to Africa's needs.

Africa has seen a shift in foreign direct investment. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is the most important source of external finance for developing countries-more important than commercial loans, portfolio investment, and official development assistance. Africa's share of FDI in developing countries dropped from 25% in the early 1970s to just 5% in 2000. South Africa is by far the continent's most important source of FDI. Since 1994 South African FDI in other African countries has averaged $1 billion a year.

Aid to Africa remains low and volatile. Aid to Africa increased from just under $1 billion in 1960 to $32 billion in 1991. But by the end of the 1990s aid had fallen to almost half the 1991 level. (Here aid is defined as gross official development assistance-whether grants or concessional loans-from multilateral and bilateral sources.)

Aid from the countries that make up the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has been extremely volatile, rising from $1.3 billion in 1970 to $23.4 billion in 1991-then falling to $11.8 billion in 1999. Aid from multilateral organizations has been less volatile, increasing from $0.4 billion in 1970 to $9.5 billion in 1994 and then falling to $6.6 billion in 1999. Aid from Arab countries hardly changed, increasing from $0.1 billion in 1970 to $0.3 billion in 1999.

African economies grew faster than expected. In 2001 just 16 African countries experienced GDP growth of less than 3%, down from 27 countries in 2000. The number of countries with growth rates exceeding 3% increased from 26 in 2000 to 37 in 2001, and 3 more countries are expected to join this group in 2002. Thus most African countries appear to be converging towards growth rates above the "traditional" 3%-with positive implications for poverty reduction.

Africa's average per capita income grew an estimated 1.9% in 2001-better than the 0.7% increase in 2000 but still not sufficient to achieve the Millennium Development Goal of cutting poverty in half by 2015. In 2001, 30 African countries achieved per capita income growth above 1.5%, and in 2002 this number is expected to increase to 32. Still, raising per capita income remains the biggest challenge for African governments and their development partners.

Economic policies have focused on boosting growth and reducing poverty

Driven by a desire to rapidly reduce poverty, economic policies in Africa in 2000-01 sought to promote macroeconomic stability and higher growth and to improve the delivery of social services. Many governments revived stalled structural reforms such as deregulation and external liberalization. The main themes of economic policy included creating an enabling environment for producers, investors, and employers and improving governance and public finances.

Fiscal policy. In many African countries fiscal policy is now focused on minimizing domestic debt and freeing resources for private sector activity by reducing fiscal deficits and making tax administration and government spending more transparent. But because of higher social spending, among other things, overall fiscal policy was expansionary in 2000.

Monetary policy. To lower inflation, many African governments adopted tight monetary policies in 2000-01. Central banks were compelled to manage broad money supplies by deepening interbank money markets through more regular issues of treasury bills and more effective open market operations.

Exchange rate policy. Exchange rate realignment remained a key challenge, particularly in countries with flexible exchange rates and loose monetary policies. In Africa, where CFA countries have long enjoyed fixed exchange rates through an institutional arrangement with the French government, the 1997-98 East Asian crisis revived a long-standing debate on the merits of flexible and fixed exchange rate systems. CFA countries have preferred fixed exchange rates to promote stables prices, but other countries have relied on managed floating rates.

Prospects for 2002 look favourable

The outlook for African economies in 2002 is shaded by the global slowdown, particularly as it affects South Africa-the continent's largest economy. But South Africa's outlook for 2002 is positive, because strong economic fundamentals and a stable macroeconomic environment should allow continued robust expansion over the medium term. Despite increased uncertainty about global economic prospects in the wake of the September 11 attacks, international investors are not writing off emerging markets as an asset class but instead are viewing countries on their own merits.

The three large North African economies-Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, which account for 25% of Africa's GDP-provide the greatest potential benefits for Africa in 2002. Macroeconomic conditions are favourable in all three countries: inflation is low, external reserves are adequate, debt has been reduced to more acceptable levels, and substantial progress has been made on structural reforms (particularly privatization and price decontrol).

With oil prices likely to stay below $20 a barrel this year, African countries are expected to grow by an average of 3.4% in 2002. Thanks to booming oil revenues, real GDP growth in Equatorial Guinea-Africa's fastest-growing economy-continues to be extremely high, at around 65% in 2001. Prospects for continued growth look good with the resolution of a territorial dispute between Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria.

Performance among non-oil exporters is also expected to improve in 2002, reflecting reduced political instability and increased agricultural output. Lower oil prices and a modest recovery in the prices of some key commodities, such as cocoa and cotton, should ease import constraints for several non-oil exporters. In many countries, moderating political instability or the cessation of violence should improve investor and consumer sentiment, and the resumption of official development assistance to some countries will support higher public spending.

African countries present striking contrasts in performance and prospects

The seven countries featured in the report have achieved tremendous progress in some dimensions of well-being and little in others. An important lesson from these seven country studies is how closely related different facets of well-being are. The studies show that lack of progress in some elements-such as those relating to governance-hinders progress in others.

Lessons from Southern Africa - building human capital and promoting good governance are crucial for well-being. Compare South Africa, the continent's largest economy, with Zimbabwe, where impressive progress in reducing poverty and improving health and education in the 1980s has been reversed in recent years.

For South Africa the economic outlook is encouraging. The economy weathered the global slowdown better than most other emerging market economies-from Asia to Latin America. Low external borrowing, depreciation of the rand, and sound financial sector supervision and regulation contributed to the economy's resilience. And thanks to stronger export competitiveness, the country managed to improve its external accounts.

South Africa's macroeconomic fundamentals were robust in 2001. The government met its key fiscal and monetary policy targets. Inflation remained within the target band, and interest rates fell. But South Africa has been unable to transform its impressive gains on the macroeconomic front into high, sustained economic growth. Real GDP growth has stalled below 3% for the past several years, too slow for robust job creation in a country where unemployment remains around 20%, posing a major development challenge.

Moreover, the South African labour market is highly segregated. Unemployment rates differ sharply between the skilled and the unskilled, groups that are clearly divided along ethnic lines. Further exacerbating the situation, new jobs are created in sectors requiring specialized skills, such as the export and financial sectors, while jobs are disappearing in older sectors depending mainly on low-and semi-skilled intensive labour. Difficulty in finding workers with appropriate skills is becoming a major constraint to growth.

South Africa's integration into the global economy has made science and technology education a growing priority. The move from labour-intensive to knowledge-based production depends on technologically sophisticated production procedures, in agriculture as well as in industry. Thus developing human capabilities is essential to accelerate growth and poverty reduction. The key is education that reflects the demand for skilled labour. The South African government has recognized the importance of improving education standards, and fiscal stability is opening the door to large increases in social spending-particularly in education and health-that should boost the economy's long-term growth potential.

By contrast, the situation in Zimbabwe is dire. An estimated 75% of the population lives in poverty. Unemployment is high and growing. And inflation and the balance of payments are worsening. The economy contracted by an estimated 7.3% in 2001 and is expected to shrink by another 5.0% in 2002. Moreover, the 2002 budget leaves little room for optimism. The budget gives no indication that the authorities will allow market forces to determine interest rates and the value of the local currency. And it provides no timetable for lifting the price controls that are exacerbating shortages of consumer goods and driving large parts of industry and commerce into insolvency. Instead, the government appears to be persisting with the strategies that have contributed to the economic crisis.

Poor weather conditions have contributed to the serious decline in agricultural production in Zimbabwe. But land invasions were the straw breaking the camel's back. They not only contributed to the poorest growth performance by agriculture in several years (-9.5% in 2001). They also sparked distress calls in manufacturing and the financial sector as international confidence in the economy waned, export receipts slumped, and capital inflows tapered off. Growth of manufacturing output decelerated by 5% in 2001, and tourism continued its downward trend as Zimbabwe became the only African country to record a decline in international visitors in 2000.

Economic measures adopted to deal with the crisis in production have proved to be unsatisfactory. As the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe attempted to control inflation by curtailing monetary expansion, the government continued its runaway fiscal spending supported by massive borrowing from the central bank. This policy not only has fuelled inflation but also has crowded out the private sector's access to credit, leading to further deterioration in employment opportunities for ordinary citizens. Export competitiveness declined as the real exchange rate appreciated with the high inflation rate and fixed nominal exchange rates, while rising production costs stifled manufacturing activity.

Zimbabwe faces a crisis of governance that has effectively put a stop to economic progress. The best opportunity for averting a deepening of the crisis and a worsening of the living conditions of ordinary Zimbabweans lies in improving governance, adopting sound economic policies, and minimizing political alienation and maximizing pluralism. Whether Zimbabwe seizes this opportunity is largely in the hands of the government.

[continued in part 2]


This material is being reposted for wider distribution by Africa Action (incorporating the Africa Policy Information Center, The Africa Fund, and the American Committee on Africa). Africa Action's information services provide accessible information and analysis in order to promote U.S. and international policies toward Africa that advance economic, political and social justice and the full spectrum of human rights.

URL for this file: http://www.africafocus.org/docs02/eca2002a.php