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Liberia: Elections and Human Rights
Liberia: Elections and Human Rights
Date distributed (ymd): 020205
Document reposted by Africa Action
Africa Policy Electronic Distribution List: an information
service provided by AFRICA ACTION (incorporating the Africa
Policy Information Center, The Africa Fund, and the American
Committee on Africa). Find more information for action for
Africa at http://www.africaaction.org
+++++++++++++++++++++Document Profile+++++++++++++++++++++
Region: West Africa
Issue Areas: +political/rights+ +economy/development+
+security/peace+
SUMMARY CONTENTS:
This posting contains excerpts from (1) a speech to the annual
conference of the Movement for Democratic Change in Liberia, by US
Assistant Secretary of State Robert Perry, (2) a letter in reply to
the speech by former interim Liberian president Amos Sawyer, and
(3) the section on Liberia from the 2002 report by Human Rights
Watch. Links to the full texts of each are also provided, as well
as an additional listing of links to other recent documents on
Liberia.
Note: The items excerpted in this posting, with the exception of
the Human Rights Watch report, were first posted on the Friends of
Liberia (FOL) listserv. For more information on the FOL and its
listserv see http://www.fol.org
or write to grayjk@vt.edu
+++++++++++++++++end profile++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
US Assistant Secretary of State Robert Perry
January 19, 2002
Address to conference of Movement for Democratic Change in Liberia
The Perspective, January 21, 2002
[Excerpts only; full text available at
http://www.theperspective.org/uspositionon2003.html]
The United States strongly endorses a national reconciliation
process for Liberia facilitated by the ECOWAS and non-governmental
organizations such as the Carter Center, International Republican
Institute, National Democratic Institute, and International
Foundation Election Systems. ...
It is important for Liberia - and for the entire region - that the
democratic opposition, which remains outside Liberia, is assured
that it is safe to return home. Security guarantees must enable the
opposition to conduct political activity and to interact freely
with the Liberian people. With credible guarantees, opposition
leaders should seize the opportunity to demonstrate that they are
prepared to compete for a popular mandate to lead a democratic
Liberia. ...
Freedom of the press, nationwide media access and transparency are
critical to ensure that elections are free and fair. We believe
that the government of Liberia recognizes that it needs to
reconstitute a truly independent Election Commission, and ensure
that all Liberian citizen opposition figures can run for office
without harassment or restriction based on their recent residence.
The Perspective January 24, 2002
Former Interim President, Dr. Sawyer, Responds to the US Government
[excerpts only; full text available at
http://www.theperspective.org/drsawyer.html]
Note by editor of The Perspective: Since he left Liberia about year
ago, after the militiamen of President Taylor attempted to murder
him and his colleague, Conmany B. Wesseh of the Center for
Democratic Empowerment, former Interim President, Dr. Amos Sawyer,
has been silent. ... Now, in response to proposals for elections
and reconciliation in Liberia put forward by the United States
Government, Dr. Sawyer wrote to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs, Amb. Robert Perry.
Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Perry
Dear Mr. Perry
... Let me first express my appreciation that you were
kind enough to engage Liberians by providing us with the views of
the US government as to how we can utilize a process of democratic
elections to transcend our current predicament. ... Please allow me
to offer a view as a means of deepening the discussion.
Conception of elections as an exit from a violent crisis and an
initial instrument to launch or energize a process of
democratization is obviously not new. This was the principle upon
which the Abuja Peace Agreement of 1996 was based. I have no doubt
that this approach can be successful once its basic assumptions are
carefully addressed. These assumptions have to do with such basic
requirements as a level playing field, etc. My sense is that those
assumptions were not fully addressed in 1997 nor were the
conditions "on-the-ground" promotive of an immediate role for
elections in the process of conflict resolution and peacebuilding.
Let me hasten to say that the latter part of this comment, i.e.
having to do with the role of elections in the settlement of the
conflict, is a view I have arrived at through hindsight.
There are two points to be made: First, there has been nothing
encouraging in the behavior and performance of Mr. Taylor to give
hope that he will allow, contest or accept the results of free and
fair elections in 2003. Instead, there is ample evidence that his
every act is now calculated to set the context for negotiating
domestic and international acceptance of the results of rigged
elections. Muzzled media, stacked elections commission and
judiciary, human rights activists on-the-run, state security forces
often indistinguishable from irregular militiamen are among his
"bargaining chips." The pattern is well known because it was played
out several times during the search for peace, 1990 to 1997. A
rancorous and protracted negotiating process will ensue and at the
end of the day, opposition political parties and pro-democracy
civil society organizations, under pressure from the international
community, including mediating NGOs such as the Carter Center and
NDI, will be called upon to accept conditions that are sub-optimal
for elections. At the end of the voting, further bargaining will
take place to determine how many seats the opposition "won" and how
many seats are truly essential to ensure an effective opposition
voice in the Legislature. Under international pressure, Mr. Taylor
will be all too happy to make what are essentially minimalist
concessions because as soon as such concessions are made, the
international community will declare that the Liberian democratic
process which began with the post-conflict elections of 1997 is now
in its advanced stage of consolidation. As all the observers go
home, Mr. Taylor will resume his reign of repression and
gangsterism. The Carter Center and others will then resume their
work trying to keep local human rights activists and others out of
jail. If this seems to be a bit melodramatic it is because we have
seen this scenario played out so frequently that we have had time
to study its nuances.
The second point is fundamental; it has to do with the role of
elections as an exit from conflict in Liberia. Liberia's wounds are
deep. Layers of painful historical memories and at least two
decades of violent conflicts and wars have left deep wounds that
the Taylor government has not cared to soberly acknowledge, let
alone seriously address. Elections are themselves inherently
conflict-ridden; when conducted in an already charged environment,
they can be combustible. And when you consider that the purpose for
holding them is to decide the political leadership of a highly
centralized political order that is already constitutionally skewed
in favor of and culturally dominated by the president, the stakes
become dangerously high and elections become elevated to a zero-sum
game-perhaps a game of life and death. The elections of 1997 must
have taught us that in Liberia, reconciliation and healing cannot
begin with elections and presidential authority, under
circumstances of conflict can become a weapon for retribution and
repression. ...
What is the way forward, you may ask? I see three distinct but
related requirements: first, the ending of war in the north and the
creation of an environment conducive for dialogue among Liberians.
Clearly such environment must contain democratic space. My sense is
that such environment cannot be created under the leadership of Mr.
Taylor. ... The record is replete with atrocious acts that
constitute Crimes Against Humanity, Violations of the Laws or
Customs of War and Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of
1949. The stark reality is that both Liberia and the larger Mano
River basin area will remain in the throes of conflict as long as
Mr. Taylor is president of Liberia and a formula for voting him out
through elections over which he presides as president of Liberia is
incapable of allowing the Liberian people a peaceful way to reclaim
their future.
The indictment of Mr. Taylor for complicity in criminal breach of
humanitarian law in Sierra Leone will provide an opportunity for
Liberians with the assistance of the international community to
create an appropriate environment in which Liberians of all
persuasions can begin in earnest the dialogue to save their country
and design a framework for reconstituting order for lasting
democratic peace and sustainable development. I am convinced
sufficient evidence can be adduced to get an indictment-that is, if
principles applied to the tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda are to be applied in Sierra Leone. Please note that my point
here regarding the indictment of Mr. Taylor is individual-specific.
I perceive the National Patriotic Party and the
Government of Liberia as entities distinct from Mr. Taylor. As a
political party, the NPP should play a role in framing decisions
having to do with the political future of Liberia. Obviously,
indictments should be sought on an individual basis for all
Liberians who are similarly complicit with respect to the
atrocities perpetrated in Sierra Leone. ...
An unfortunate characteristic of contemporary international
strategies for resolving violent conflicts in Africa-and I suspect
elsewhere, is that the urgency of ending violence often increases
the stakes of warlords and armed bands-groups whose value is
derived in conflict and increases with sustained conditions of
insecurity. The Liberian people, with the use of their resources
and with the assistance of the international community, must send
a clear message that the days of warlords and armed bands are over.
A resolute approach to comprehensive disarmament and demobilization
with subregional and international involvement will be an
appropriate signal. Liberians must be prepared to pay a significant
portion of the bill.
The second stage is for Liberians to constitute a temporary
governance mechanism and construct a framework for the
reconstitution of order to ensure lasting peace, reconciliation and
democratic self-governance. Clearly, this will require considerable
thought, dialogue and consultations at local, national,
sub-regional and international levels, ... How do we derive the
temporary governance mechanism and how do we make the transition
from Taylor? These and related issues can be the subject of broad
consultations. A starting point can be the ECOWAS-sponsored
reconciliation talks to which you referred in your remarks. My
sense is that the Abuja Agreement under which the elections of 1997
were held constitutes an appropriate point of departure; ...My
point here is that there is a legal, political and historical basis
for a return to Abuja. Forces such as LURD must be brought to the
table.
Third, in view of the enormous human tragedy that befell Liberia
and the international circumstance that underpinned that tragedy,
there is a need for the international community to make a long-term
commitment to Liberia; ...
Needless to say, these are evolving thoughts and they are
controversial. I put them forward at this time as Liberians and
others in the international community are grappling with dilemmas
that face Liberia in the wake of possible elections in 2003. ...
Sincerely, Amos Sawyer
http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/africa7.html
Human Rights Watch World Report 2002
Liberia
HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS
Continued violence threatened to plunge Liberia back into civil war
after nearly five years of shaky transition to peace. Fierce
fighting continued to rage in the country's north since the start
of a rebel incursion in July 2000, the fifth serious outbreak of
violence since the 1997 elections that ended the civil war. The
fighting and repression blocked recovery efforts with the nation's
economy in tatters, 80 percent of the workforce unemployed and 80
percent illiteracy. Basic services such as health care,
communications, electricity, and the public supply of drinking
water remained extremely limited. Public and private institutions
deteriorated amid widespread corruption and fear.
Fighting between government forces and the rebel group, Liberians
United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), intensified in
northern Lofa County. Amid the violence, widespread human rights
abuses took place against civilians, including women and children.
Liberian government troops and rebels alike detained, tortured, or
killed hundreds of civilians, raping women and girls at will, and
forcing men and boys to fight. Reports by Amnesty International
found that government security forces--especially the
Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU), a security force accountable only to
President Taylor--detained, tortured, or executed more than two
hundred civilians suspected of supporting rebels, raping some of
them. The government denied these allegations and took no steps to
investigate, punish, or end the abuses. In April 2001, President
Taylor called up 15,000 former fighters from the faction he had led
during the civil war to combat the growing rebel threat. As of
September, fighting had spread southward to within sixty miles of
the capital, Monrovia.
Responding to the rebel action, government repression of civil
society continued to intensify. President Taylor's government
functioned without accountability, independent of an ineffective
judiciary and legislature that operated in fear of the executive.
Ethnic Mandingo citizens, whom the government indiscriminately
accused of supporting the rebels, faced growing discrimination,
arbitrary arrests, and violence based solely on their ethnicity. In
March, state security troops stormed the University of Liberia in
Monrovia, assaulting and arresting unarmed students meeting to
raise legal fees for detained journalists. More than forty students
were reportedly tortured and female students raped in the raid by
the ATU and the Special Operation Division, a special police unit.
More than fifteen student leaders from the University of Liberia
went into exile in May following the justice minister's public
claim that rebel collaborators operated from their campus. In
August, in an attempt to allay growing criticism, President Taylor
freed three of thirteen prominent ethnic Krahn leaders imprisoned
on treason charges since 1998, pardoned exiled opposition leaders,
and announced an amnesty for rebels who disarmed.
Press censorship and arrests of journalists continued, as President
Taylor and other high-ranking officials blamed them for negative
international publicity. ...
With most Liberians dependent on radio for their news, government
silencing of independent radio broadcasts deprived them of
information. In August, President Taylor banned all radio stations
but the three currently licensed--his private Liberian
Communications Network and two others that only operated
infrequently. At the same time, he refused to lift a ban on
Veritas, a station of Liberia's Roman Catholic Church, and the
independent Star radio.
The violence was part of a growing subregional struggle over
control of diamonds and other resources. In 2001, President Taylor
shifted his commercial focus from diamonds to logging, relying on
the same men who organized the arms-for-diamonds trade to export
timber and ship weapons from Monrovia to Sierra Leone. ...
Divisions and tensions in the subregion deepened as the internal
conflicts within Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea continued to
spill across the borders. Guinea and Liberia accused each other of
supporting armed anti-government rebels, and the Sierra Leonean
government accused Liberia of providing support to the Sierra
Leonean rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).
The insecurity and violence in the subregion displaced thousands of
Liberians. Humanitarian agencies estimated in July 2001 that more
than 40,000 persons had been newly displaced in Lofa County since
April. ...
DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS
Following the escalation of fighting in Lofa County and a stinging
December 2000 U.N. report on Liberian support of Sierra Leonean
rebels, the government intensified attacks on human rights groups.
Liberian security forces harassed, arrested, and tortured perceived
critics, and human rights activists continued to flee the country
in fear of government reprisals. Despite the threats, a small but
dedicated human rights community continued to work in Liberia.
The leader of the Catholic Church's Justice and Peace Commission,
a key human rights defender, said in March that he had received
threats from "prominent individuals" in retaliation for a report
critical of the government's human rights record. The commission's
premises, which had been the object of previous attacks by security
forces, were burglarized a few months later. Despite the climate of
fear, human rights organizations persisted in their activities. By
contrast, the government's National Human Rights Commission was
inactive. ...
Additional Recent Documents and Sources
Global Witness
Liberia: The Logs of War
http://www.oneworld.org/globalwitness/liberia/liberia.htm
Extensive reports from late 2001 on the role of timber exports in
fueling war in Liberia and the surrounding region.
Human Rights Watch
No Questions Asked: The Eastern Europe Arms Pipeline to Liberia
Briefing Paper, November 15, 2001
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/liberia1115.htm
Allaboutliberia.com
http://www.allaboutliberia.com
Regularly updated news, editorials, opinion; based in Liberia;
generally defends Liberian government against dissidents and
critics.
The Perspective
http://www.theperspective.org
Regularly updated news, editorials, opinion, based in Georgia;
includes range of Liberian views critical of Liberian government.
Catholic Justice and Peace Commission fears
The News (Monrovia), January 11, 2002
http://allafrica.com/stories/200201110306.html
http://allafrica.com/liberia
Current news on Liberia from a variety of sources
Reed Kramer, "Liberia: A Casualty of the Cold War's End,"
Africa
News Service (Durham), July 1, 1995
http://allafrica.com/stories/200101090216.html
Extensive background article on the role of the U.S. and the
roots of conflict in Liberia.
This material is being reposted for wider distribution by
Africa Action (incorporating the Africa Policy Information
Center, The Africa Fund, and the American Committee on Africa).
Africa Action's information services provide accessible
information and analysis in order to promote U.S. and
international policies toward Africa that advance economic,
political and social justice and the full spectrum of human
rights.
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