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Sudan: Peace Process
Sudan: Peace Process
Date distributed (ymd): 020408
Document reposted by Africa Action
Africa Policy Electronic Distribution List: an information
service provided by AFRICA ACTION (incorporating the Africa
Policy Information Center, The Africa Fund, and the American
Committee on Africa). Find more information for action for
Africa at http://www.africaaction.org
+++++++++++++++++++++Document Profile+++++++++++++++++++++
Region: East Africa
Issue Areas: +political/rights+ +security/peace+
SUMMARY CONTENTS:
This posting contains two recent documents from the International
Crisis Group (ICG) advocating a revitalized peace process in Sudan,
with significant international engagement. The first is the
executive summary of a short report released last week; the second
the introduction to a book-length report released in January. Both
reports are available in full on the ICG web site at:
http://www.crisisweb.org
+++++++++++++++++end profile++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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Capturing the Moment: Sudan's Peace Process in the Balance
International Crisis Group
http://www.crisisweb.org
Khartoum/Nairobi/Brussels, 3 April 2002
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Sudan's window of opportunity threatens to become a missed
opportunity if the peace process is not revitalised in the near
future. Escalation of fighting around the oil fields, increasing
use by the government of helicopter gunships against civilian as
well as military targets, and indecision surrounding the nature of
wider international engagement all put at risk Sudan's best chance
for peace since the latest phase of civil war began nearly
nineteen years ago. The parties continue to signal that they are
ready to negotiate seriously. The international community, and in
particular the United States, must seize this opportunity to
revitalise the peace process before the two sides re-commit
themselves to resolving Africa's longest conflict on the
battlefield.
A government helicopter gunship attack which resulted in the
killing of at least two dozen women and children lined up to
receive food in the remote southern village of Bieh highlighted
yet again the war's terrible cost. The tragedy, however, served as
an impetus for progress on one of U.S. Special Peace Envoy John
Danforth's proposed humanitarian confidence-building tests a
protocol focused on the protection of civilians. Widespread
condemnation from human rights organisations, relief agencies, the
UN, and the international community forced Khartoum to accept
international monitors for the agreement on the protection of
civilians, which both parties had signed by late March 2002. The
incident also accelerated implementation of one of his other key
agreements: a local cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains. The parties'
willingness to accept all four of Danforth's tests clears the way
for the U.S., United Kingdom and Norway to work as an informal
"troika" with regional states in an effort to move beyond the
Danforth initiative to a more serious negotiating process that
addresses the underlying causes of the conflict.
A series of agreements reached between the Sudan People's
Liberation Army (SPLA) and other groups in both the North and
South indicate that the opposition to the government has grown
more united during the past few months. Most significantly, the
SPLA reached an understanding with the Sudan People's Democratic
Front (SPDF) that ended a damaging decade-long split and resulted
in the return of a number of key Nuer commanders. This has
increased the SPLA's ability to attack oil infrastructure but has
led in turn to a major government offensive to secure areas of oil
production and exploration. The SPLA also merged with the
northern-based Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF) and concluded political
agreements with former Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi's Umma Party
and Hassan al-Turabi's Popular National Congress (PNC) party.
As Senator Danforth prepares to make his final recommendation to
U.S. President George Bush, the implications, both positive and
negative, of his initiative should be understood fully. The
cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains has alleviated the terrible
suffering the Nuba people have endured in the past decade. In
addition, it has enhanced the warring parties' perception of the
U.S. as a crucial mediator and raised hopes for a larger, more
comprehensive peace. However, the cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains
has also allowed the opposing parties to divert their forces to
the oil fields, leading to an increase in civilian suffering in
western Upper Nile. Furthermore, Danforth's strict adherence to
humanitarian tests has exposed an unwillingness to shed
reprehensible war tactics, particularly on the part of the
government, whose comparative advantage on the battlefield is
rooted in the use of helicopter gunships and high altitude bombing.
But it has not extracted a better understanding of the
adversaries' commitment to a viable peace process.
An international retreat from the peace process would represent
capitulation to hard-line elements in Khartoum that are opposed to
a settlement. International efforts to construct a meaningful
process and achieve a comprehensive agreement should instead
intensify. That represents the most realistic hope for addressing
the human rights crisis at its roots as well as facilitating a
democratic transition in Sudan.
This report recommends and provides a blueprint for such
intensified efforts by the informal troika (U.S., UK, and Norway),
working with the key regional actors (Kenya and Egypt), to point
an alternative way forward that is consistent with the new global
emphasis on a partnership between Africa and the broader
international community.
RECOMMENDATIONS
TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF NORWAY, THE U.S., AND UK (THE "TROIKA"):
1. Secure the agreement of the key regional heads of state,
particularly President Moi of Kenya, and work closely with the
IGAD countries and Egypt to construct a partnership approach to
negotiations, based on the Declaration of Principles and the
Egyptian-Libyan Joint Initiative principles.
2. Appoint a full-time envoy to represent the troika and work in
cooperation with an IGAD counterpart to coordinate and conduct
negotiations.
3. Support and finance a technical team to provide inputs to
negotiators on legal, security, and other matters.
4. Designate high-level representatives to participate in an
international contact group to coordinate negotiating strategy.
5. Work for the creation of a wider group of countries and
multilateral organisations to coordinate the creation of
incentives and pressures and their deployment with the opposing
sides to the conflict.
6. Pave the way for a future democratic transition by increasing
assistance to democratic structures and institutions, supporting
implementation of inter-communal peace agreements, building the
capacity of civil administration in opposition controlled areas,
and bolstering civil society organisations, independent media, and
professional associations in Khartoum and other parts of the
country.
TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE IGAD COUNTRIES:
7. Work with the troika to establish a partnership approach to the
peace process.
8. Give the current IGAD Special Envoy full-time status, and
ensure that he frequently consults and reports to IGAD capitals.
9. Expand participation in negotiations to include not only the
government of Sudan and the SPLA, but also Northern entities such
as the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and the Umma Party, and
create a channel for the views of civil society to be heard as
well.
10. Designate a high-level representative to participate in an
international contact group to coordinate negotiating strategy.
TO EGYPT:
11. Work with the troika countries and Kenya to create a
meaningful contact group that will coordinate negotiating
strategy.
12. Lend support to the unified mediation process.
God, Oil and Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan
Brussels, 10 January 2002
The International Crisis Group (ICG) works to prevent and contain
deadly conflict through a unique combination of field-based
analysis, policy prescription and high-level advocacy. Few
countries are more deserving of such attention than Sudan, where
the scale of human suffering has been mind numbing, and where the
ongoing civil war continues to severely disrupt regional stability
and desperately inhibit development. ICG launched a Sudan project
in 2001 because we felt the country was at a crossroads, and that
now was the time when concentrated attention by the international
community could make a decisive difference.
As this report shows, a small window for peace has opened. The
reasons for this include the shock effect of the 11 September
terror attacks in the United States (U.S.) and their aftermath on
policy debates within the Khartoum government; the military
calculations of the government and its main opposition, the Sudan
People's Liberation Army (SPLA) insurgency; a difficult economic
situation; and the increasing desire of the Khartoum authorities
to escape international isolation and enjoy their new oil wealth.
Importantly also, the U.S. government, by appointing distinguished
former Senator John Danforth as Special Envoy, is showing some
willingness to become more engaged.
Progress, nonetheless, will not be easy. This report makes clear
that the Sudan situation is far more complex than normally portrayed in the media,
or by advocates of particular causes. It is a
struggle, to be sure, between a northern government that is
largely Arab and Muslim and a southern insurgency that is largely
black and significantly Christian , but it is also increasingly a
contest between a non-democratic centre and hitherto peripheral
groups from all parts of the country. It is a contest over oil and
other natural resources , but also one about ideologies, including
the degree to which a government's radical Islamist agenda can be
moderated and a rebel movement's authoritarianism can embrace
civilian democracy.
The Sudanese government faces stark choices, brought into sharp
relief since 11 September. It can build on the progress that has
been made on counter - terrorism and commit itself to negotiate
peace seriously. Or it can try to pocket the goodwill it has
gained and intensify the war while remaining shackled to the
ideology that was the inspiration of its 1989 coup.
The Sudanese opposition faces difficult choices and challenges of
its own . The SPLA can remain a relatively limited rebel group,
with a restricted geographic base and a low-risk minimalist
partnership with its allies in the National Democratic Alliance,
including a number of northern political parties. Or it can deepen
its commitment to a hearts and minds campaign in the south and its
cooperation with National Democratic Alliance partners around a
credible peace agenda.
Among the main conclusions we reach, and recommendations we
advance, are these:
- A comprehensive peace may be possible but only if the
international community for the first time makes its achievement
a significant objective, and commits the necessary political and
diplomatic resources;
- There will be no success if the parties can continue to play one
initiative off against another, which means the major existing
efforts -the Egyptian - Libyan Joint Initiative , and that led by
Kenya in the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) -
must either be unified or a single new peace process created;
- A unified peace process should be built around the vital element
of IGAD's Declaration of Principles, namely self-determination,
recognising all the room this leaves for creative negotiation on
context, detail and timing;
- A unified peace process needs to be energised from outside: the
ideal team to coordinate both incentives and pressures for the
parties to negotiate seriously would include the U.S.,
indispensably, and key Europeans - ideally the UK representing the
European Union (EU) joined by Norway - with a meaningful degree of
buy-in from key neighbours and other concerned states such as
China, Malaysia and Canada;
- Concerned members of the international community should pursue
vigorously and concurrently four major interests in Sudan: stopping
the war, laying the ground - work for democracy, protecting human
rights and winning cooperation in the fight against terrorism;
and,
- The top priority should be a comprehensive peace, grounded in
the restoration of democracy, which is the circumstance most
likely to bring both fundamental human rights improvements and
guarantees against backsliding on terrorism .
ICG developed this report , as always, through extensive fieldwork.
The primary author, Africa Program Co-Director John Prendergast,
made three trips between June and November 2001 and conducted many
scores of interviews in Sudan - both Khartoum and wa r - t orn
areas of the south - as well as in Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Kenya, Europe and North America. Many others on the ICG team
helped with writing and production, including Mirna Galic, Regina
Dubey, Philip Roessler, and Macgregor Duncan. ICG Senior Adviser
John Norris played a major role in the editing process, supported
by ICG Vice President (Programs) Jon Greenwald and, at the
production stage , by Research Analyst Theodora Adekunle and
Francesca Lawe-Davies. I thank them all for invaluable
contributions. This book-length report is not the ICG's last word
on Sudan. It will be followed by a series of further, shorter,
field-based reports as we stay engaged with future developments .
We hope very much that an end to Sudan's agony is near, and that
this report will help the international Policy community to
accelerate that process.
Gareth Evans President
This material is being reposted for wider distribution by
Africa Action (incorporating the Africa Policy Information
Center, The Africa Fund, and the American Committee on Africa).
Africa Action's information services provide accessible
information and analysis in order to promote U.S. and
international policies toward Africa that advance economic,
political and social justice and the full spectrum of human rights.
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