Get AfricaFocus Bulletin by e-mail!
Print this page
Note: This document is from the archive of the Africa Policy E-Journal, published
by the Africa Policy Information Center (APIC) from 1995 to 2001 and by Africa Action
from 2001 to 2003. APIC was merged into Africa Action in 2001. Please note that many outdated links in this archived
document may not work.
|
Africa: Policy Outlook
AFRICA ACTION
Africa Policy E-Journal
March 10, 2003 (030310)
Africa: Policy Outlook
(Africa Action document)
This posting contains Africa Action's annual Africa Policy Outlook
for 2003. It should be read in conjunction with the Africa Action
report issued in January ("Africa Policy for a New Era: Ending
Segregation in U.S. Foreign Relations"), available at
http://www.africaaction.org/featdocs/afr2003.htm
The Africa Policy Outlook is also being published by
Foreign Policy In Focus (http://www.fpif.org).
+++++++++++++++++end summary/introduction+++++++++++++++++++++++
Africa Policy Outlook 2003
In 2003 U.S. policy toward Africa will be driven almost exclusively
by geopolitical considerations related to Washington's war plans
against Iraq, and by its geostrategic interests in African oil.
In a dangerous replay of the cold war, the U.S. is likely to ignore
Africa's priorities, placing military base rights above human
rights. The war against AIDS, by far the most important global war
effort and an urgent priority especially for Africa, will continue
to suffer from a lack of resources. An American war on Iraq would
also have a major negative impact on the global economy with dire
consequences for African development. In 2003, U.S. unilateralism
is likely to be directly at odds with African interests in building
multilateral approaches to its greatest challenges, from HIV/AIDS
to international trade rules and peacekeeping.
Last year African efforts toward building greater political
and economic unity were often offset by failure to provide
collective leadership on its most pressing challenges. The African
Union replaced the 39-year-old Organization of African Unity as a
framework for stepped-up cooperation across the continent. The new
Union, as it is expected to evolve out of a process of accelerated
integration, is seen as more ambitious than the European Union.
Africans welcomed the prospect of new commitments to unity. But
many have raised the fear that African leaders are still unwilling
to act more decisively as a bloc within international affairs, and
equally unwilling to promote regional economic and political
integration at the expense of nationalist interests.
Under South African leadership, the African Union embraced the New
Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) as a plan for
cooperation between African states, donor countries, and
multilateral organizations. But critics charged that NEPAD
adopted the failed economic policies and programs of the World Bank
and rich-country governments while failing to lay the basis for the
democratic participation of African people. Moreover, the framework
initially failed in its major objective of winning substantially
increased resources from the G-8 donor countries in terms of new
economic aid, debt relief or increased investment. NEPAD avoids any
mention of Western obligations to support development in Africa and
thus does not mention reparations.
The most dramatic failure for both African governments and world
leaders last year was in combating HIV/AIDS. Despite the
ever-louder chorus of warnings and promises, neither the rich
countries nor most African governments moved beyond a snail's pace
in responding to the emergency. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB,
and Malaria received only a fraction of the resources needed. The
South African government stalled on providing antiretroviral drugs
to people living with HIV/AIDS. And both grassroots and government
health programs around the continent continued to be crippled by
lack of resources.
In early 2003, instead of giving priority to the fight against
AIDS, the U.S. stood on the brink of war in Iraq, a prospect that
cast a looming shadow over every other issue. In January Nelson
Mandela called on the world to "condemn both Blair and Bush and let
them know in no uncertain terms that what they are doing is wrong."
At the meeting of the African Union in early February, President
Thabo Mbeki of South Africa warned that war in the Gulf region
could trigger an economic meltdown in Africa and set development
back more than three decades. But Washington's lack of regard for
African opinion was illustrated earlier by the perfunctory
cancellation of President George Bush's projected January visit to
five African countries.
At the end of January, President Bush surprised many by accepting,
for the first time, the need to supply antiretroviral drugs and by
promising additional resources for Africa to fight AIDS. But if the
U.S. fails to at least triple its spending on AIDS this year, the
gesture will be seen in retrospect as simply a public relations
adjunct to the push for war on Iraq. Early signs were not
encouraging.
What Policy Direction?
In 2003, African countries must cope with the HIV/AIDS pandemic and
its root causes while dealing with a myriad of other problems
greatly exacerbated by this health crisis. It is a staggering
prospect. The chances of success will be fundamentally affected by
how much attention the world pays to Africa, and by whether rich
countries contribute their share to addressing these global issues
centered in Africa. The level of world attention, as well as
Africa's internal capacity to act, will in turn be affected by
whether the United States starts a war this year.
Africa's priorities have been fairly consistent in recent years,
defined in part by the huge and unavoidable challenges of HIV/AIDS,
poverty and conflicts. There is also broad consensus among African
and international nongovernmental organizations, most international
agencies, and many African governments on what needs to be done. In
January, Africa Action released "Africa Policy for a New Era:
Ending Segregation in U.S. Foreign Relations" This report
(available at http://www.africaaction.org/featdocs/afr2003.htm)
reflects and summarizes this emerging consensus, and provides our
formulation of positive directions for policy. The policy agenda
for the U.S. government can be summed up in a few words:
- Provide adequate resources for a serious war against AIDS,
including affordable life-saving drugs for those who need them.
- Cancel Africa's unsustainable and largely illegitimate debts.
- Support efforts by African diplomats and civil society to resolve
conflicts, manage peace negotiations, and build peace.
- Support efforts to move beyond formal elections toward increased
participation and accountability for both national and
multinational institutions
- Invest development resources in health, education, and other
sectors that build African human resources, and in communications
and transportation infrastructure necessary to make human resources
economically productive.
Although there may be debate on details, African and international
civil society groups are virtually unanimous in favor of such
common-sense proposals. Similar views have significant support
among opinion makers in international agencies and African
governments. On some issues there have even been breakthroughs,
such as President Bush's belated acknowledgment that affordable
antiretroviral treatment is imperative.
Yet the resources to implement such an agenda are not available,
and rich countries - particularly the United States - do not accept
that providing these resources is both an obligation and a
necessity for building common security in today's world. For their
part, African governments still give more weight to pleasing donors
and preserving their power than to meeting popular demands to
address critical needs.
In Bush's Washington, when priorities are measured by resource
allocation, war on Iraq comes first on the de facto agenda. This
is followed by the U.S. push for free trade, designed to promote
the interests of U.S. corporations. Africa's urgent needs to fight
AIDS and promote human development are far down on a long list
of other priorities. Other rich-country governments as well as
African governments are trying to slow Washington's rush to war,
and they criticize the Bush administration's refusal to engage with
multilateral responses to global problems. But with varying degree
of nuance, they also buy into the imposed "Washington consensus"
that places faith in free-market fundamentalism as the key to
development - the discredited belief that opening borders for the
free flow of trade and investment will eventually provide countries
with the resources to meet their peoples' needs.
Popular pressure has forced African leaders and even President Bush
to make new promises. The pressure to deliver on those promises
will continue, regardless of events in Iraq. It is impossible,
however, to deny the stubborn reality: to the extent that
distraction, denial, and dogmatism prevail, constructive efforts to
address Africa's needs this year will be diminished or crippled.
On issue after issue, the real test is not rhetoric but actions.
Following is a summary of questions to ask during the year,
along with preliminary indicators of what answers are emerging on
U.S. policy in particular.
HIV/AIDS, Health, and Human Security
In January 2002, writing in The Nation, Africa Action director
Salih Booker noted that South African president Thabo Mbeki and
U.S. president George Bush epitomized "the two greatest impediments
to the fight against AIDS: denial and disregard." More than a year
later, the South African government is still vacillating on its
commitment to provide treatment for HIV/AIDS through the public
sector. And, despite President Bush's pledge of $10 billion in new
"emergency" funds to fight AIDS in Africa, the administration even
tried to block the Congressional decision in February to provide an
additional $150 million from this year's budget to the Global Fund
to fight AIDS.
The more one examines the fine print of the president's plan, the
more gaps appear. As Africa Action and other activist groups
quickly pointed out, the president's proposal, despite its
"emergency" label, provided no new money for HIV/AIDS this year.
The $10 billion in new money would start small in 2004, with much
less than $1 billion in 2004 and with no guarantee that it would
not be edged out of future budgets by rising costs of war in Iraq
or other priorities pushed by powerful lobbyists. The New York
Times has also noted that the increase in AIDS funds comes partly
by cutting nearly $500 million from international child health
programs. "The White House should not be forcing the babies of
Africa to pay for their parents' AIDS drugs,"the February 17
editorial concluded. And while the president's promise was for
additional funds for "Africa," his budget proposals count all money
spent worldwide toward his pledge.
An equally important question is how the money will be spent. While
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS is facing bankruptcy, the president's
proposal calls for only $200 million a year for the fund,
essentially freezing U.S. contributions at the level of previous
years. The bulk of the new funds apparently will be channeled
either through the notoriously cumbersome USAID bureaucracy or
through some new bilateral mechanism yet to be established - a
further reflection of this administration's preference for "going
it alone."
To the extent that such U.S. unilateralism prevails this
year, the global response to AIDS will be further weakened and
delayed. Some activists also fear that distribution of the funds
may be used to advance right-wing religious agendas (e.g. the
international "gag rule" preventing support for many reproductive
health programs). or as leverage for other U.S. diplomatic aims.
Although President Bush acknowledged that affordable antiretroviral
drugs are necessary, as of early March it remained highly
doubtful that U.S. policy would in fact help countries to import
such drugs or build manufacturing capability. A common-sense
approach would be for rich countries and the Global Fund to work
closely together to help African countries import drugs from
Brazil, India, and Thailand and begin treating people immediately.
Instead, U.S. trade representatives were still blocking even an
agreement in principle on implementation of the 2001 Doha agreement
that called for loosened patent rules to facilitate such exports.
Negotiators freely admitted to journalists that the U.S. resistance
to generics was being driven by the pharmaceutical company lobby.
The response to the AIDS pandemic will be the most telling
indicator of U.S. and global response to African priorities. If
past patterns prevail, congressional debate on the U.S. budget for
fiscal 2004 may well continue into early 2004. Yet the Global Fund
does not have sufficient funds for a third round of proposals in
October 2003. The next summit of the G-8 will be held in June in
France. The question is whether AIDS will even be on the agenda,
and, if so, whether it will bring only new promises or real
resources.
The level of response to AIDS also reveals and reflects the
priority given by the "international community" to health and human
development more generally. Countless international conferences
have affirmed the need for additional resources, for partnership
and participation, and for independent evaluation of results not
dominated by bilateral political agendas. Yet all indications are
that U.S. policy is moving in the opposite direction.
The Development Deficit
The United Nations estimated Africa's economic growth rate in 2002
at 2.9 percent, higher than the world average of 1.7 percent. But
with more than 38 million people threatened with famine at year's
end, and the continued escalation of the AIDS pandemic undermining
capacity to respond at all levels, growth figures were deceptive.
Families struggling to survive and governments hard-pressed to meet
the minimum demands of their societies could find little comfort in
such a report.
In recent years, U.S. economic policy toward Africa has revolved
around the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), now possibly
to be supplemented with plans for a new worldwide aid program
called the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). While AGOA centers
on expanding trade opportunities and the MCA focuses on development
assistance, both initiatives feature implementation through
bilateral agreements between the United States and selected
countries, and unilateral determination by Washington of
procedures, criteria, and evaluation of results. While they may
deliver some benefits to a small subset of recipients, neither
initiative responds to civil society demands for reform of the
international aid system. Indeed, they move in the opposite
direction.
President Bush has asked for $1.3 billion in 2004 for the
MCA, $300 million less than originally promised. The 10 to 15
countries expected to qualify include only three African countries:
Uganda, Senegal, and Ghana. Eligibility will be based on 16
indicators, six for "governing justly," four for "investing in
people," and six for "promoting economic freedom." Inclusion of
indicators for "investing in people" is a concession to the need
for human development, but all indicators are based on data
provided by a narrow range of institutions: 10 indicators from
the World Bank, 2 from the International Monetary Fund, 2 from
Freedom House, 1 from Institutional Investor magazine, and 1 from
the Heritage Foundation. No African institutions are even
considered relevant for assessing African conditions.
It is likely that Washington will continue to pursue this
unilateral approach, while minimizing its participation in
multilateral efforts to deal with African development issues.
Despite its concessions to donor perspectives, the NEPAD approach
to rich countries pursued by African leaders, with the support of
Canada, Britain, and some other European countries, finds little
backing from the White House or other U.S. agencies.
The U.S. approach forces each African country to compete with its
neighbors in negotiating its relationship with Washington and its
access to resources or trade concessions under different U.S.
government programs. President Bush may or may not fulfill his
pledge to reschedule a visit to the continent for later this year.
Whether he does or not, high-level attention in Washington to
African priorities such as further debt cancellation, adequate
funding for multilateral institutions at the global and African
levels, and reduction in rich-country agricultural trade subsidies,
is likely to be minimal.
War, Peace, and Human Rights
Despite inadequate levels of international support, African
countries made several significant advances toward peace in 2002,
reducing the overall level of conflict from the previous year.
Angola and Sierra Leone moved beyond war to reconstruction. African
leaders and the United Nations kept fragile peace processes alive
in Sudan, Burundi, and Congo (Kinshasa). The cease-fire held on the
Ethiopia-Eritrea border. In September, however, Cote d'Ivoire
erupted into conflict that continued into the new year, and
insecurity persisted in many other countries during 2002.
On the democracy front in 2002, Kenyans celebrated as the 24-year
reign of Daniel arap Moi ended with December elections that were
largely peaceful. In Zimbabwe, however, Robert Mugabe stayed in
power with elections that were widely critiqued as not free and
fair. Despite suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth,
political and economic crisis in that country continued to escalate
during the year. Seventeen other African countries held
presidential or parliamentary elections in 2002. In almost all
countries, however, civil society and opposition groups pointed to
huge gaps between the promise and the practice of democracy.
In 2003, as in the previous year, the principal factors in
resolving or aggravating conflict will be the actions of African
parties to conflict, neighboring states, and the pressures of
African civil society and public opinion demanding peace. Similar
factors will determine the extent to which elections are free and
fair, and whether human rights are defended against abusive rulers
or other violent forces.
Particularly influential both for their own sake and for their
influence on neighboring countries will be the outcome of elections
in Nigeria, the fate of peace processes in Sudan, Congo (Kinshasa),
Burundi and Cote d'Ivoire, and the extent to which the new Kenyan
government can begin to meet the high expectations of voters.
Angola too faces enormous challenges in delivering on expected
peace dividends. And Zimbabwe's stability is threatened not only by
AIDS and famine, but by the escalation of internal repression and
the failure of outside parties to force the government to moderate
its stance.
Yet U.S. engagement with security and democracy issues in African
countries is more and more driven by geopolitical considerations,
in a dangerous replay of Cold War disregard for African concerns.
Increased U.S. interest in projecting military force into the
Persian Gulf has led to a massive increase in the U.S. military
presence in the Horn of Africa, and efforts to form alliances with
African governments according to their perceived value in the
framework of the "war on terrorism". In West and Central Africa,
U.S. policy makers are focusing on the strategic value of oil. This
focus raises the same issue of whether issues of human rights and
resolving internal conflict will be neglected in key countries such
as Nigeria and Angola.
Resolution of the conflicts in Sudan and Congo (Kinshasa) and
support for democracy in Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and Kenya should be
among the highest priorities for U.S. political engagement in
Africa. Rhetorical support for these goals already forms part of
U.S. policy. The question is whether this will be accompanied by
additional diplomatic attention and resources for multilateral and
civil society actors engaged with these issues.
As in the economic sphere, there may be positive U.S. contributions
in these areas, at the initiative of some U.S. officials
specializing in African affairs But the chances that these
contributions will grow and bear fruit will be slim indeed if the
current drive towards war in Iraq continues.
The U.S., the World, and Africa
Africa's issues, as summarized above, are indeed global issues -
HIV/AIDS, human development, new models for economic growth, peace,
and democracy. World-wide consciousness of the HIV/AIDS pandemic
has even forced its way into the pages of a U.S. President's state
of the union address. In practice, however, priorities are being
set by another agenda, a war agenda. 2003 will be a particularly
decisive year in determining whether Africa and the world can build
momentum for a change of course.
+++++++++++++++++++++Document Profile+++++++++++++++++++++
Date distributed (ymd): 030310
Region: Continent-Wide
Issue Areas: +political/rights+ +economy/development+
+security/peace+ +US policy focus+
The Africa Action E-Journal is a free information service
provided by Africa Action, including both original
commentary and reposted documents. Africa Action provides this
information and analysis in order to promote U.S. and
international policies toward Africa that advance economic,
political and social justice and the full spectrum of
human rights.
|