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Sudan: Enough is Enough
AFRICA ACTION
Africa Policy E-Journal
August 14, 2003 (030814)
Sudan: Enough is Enough
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Sudan peace talks resumed on August 11 in Nairobi, despite strong
government opposition to the framework presented by mediators.
Observers say the peace process is now at a critical stage, and
advance will depend on strong and coordinated pressure from outside
parties, particularly the troika of the US, UK, and Norway. With
little international attention now focusing on Sudan, analysts say
that the U.S. is sending "mixed signals." If pressure for peace is
not enough over the next months, the war may again escalate
significantly. US leverage (or its absence) will be critical ,
analysts agree.
This posting contains several documents on the current situation:
a press release from the International Crisis Group, a joint
statement by Sudanese Catholic and Episcopal Bishops, and the
latest review by Justice Africa, For additional background see the
sources cited and the Sudan page of Human Rights Watch:
http://www.hrw.org/africa/sudan.php
For current updates see http://allafrica.com/sudan and
http://www.irinnews.org/webspecials/sudan/default.asp
+++++++++++++++++end summary/introduction+++++++++++++++++++++++
International Crisis Group - Media Release - August 8, 2003
Five Minutes to Midnight in Sudan's Peace Process
[Media Contacts Katy Cronin (London) +44-(0)20-7981 0330
media@crisisweb.org Francesca Lawe-Davies (Brussels) +32-(0)2-536
00 65 Jennifer Leonard (Washington) +1-202-785 1601 ICG reports and
briefing papers are available on our website:
http://www.crisisweb.org ]
Nairobi/Brussels, 8 August 2003: The round of negotiations that
opens on 10 August likely is make or break for peace in Sudan.
After fourteen months of the process sponsored by the East African
organisation IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development),
the combatants must make hard choices in the coming weeks. As
importantly, however, the countries facilitating the process need
to make clear the benefits of peace and the penalties of more war,
notably the U.S., which has caused confusion by inconsistent
statements. If this best chance for peace in twenty years is
missed, the arms build-up on both sides suggests the war will
become more deadly and destructive than ever.
In early July, the mediators presented a draft framework document
that proposes solutions for the remaining issues and forms part of
a larger set of proposals that have emerged from the process to
date. The Sudanese government immediately rejected the framework,
while the opposition Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLA)
noted reservations but allowed that it could serve as the basis of
further negotiations.
It is crucial for the mediating countries from the region and the
official observers (U.S., UK, Norway, Italy, the African Union and
the United Nations) to get fully behind the process and the IGAD
proposals. Specifically, the U.S. and Egypt should provide clear
and consistent messages that the IGAD framework represents the sole
basis for a workable agreement.
Sustained U.S. pressure on the parties is the single most important
factor needed at this point. Regrettably, recent public and private
statements by American officials and the lack of high-level U.S.
public support for IGAD's proposals have sent potentially damaging
mixed signals. Egypt needs to recognise that the IGAD proposals
provide the only realistic chance for sustaining Sudan's unity
peacefully and that it can best work for that outcome by supporting
rather than criticising them.
"IGAD's proposals are the first comprehensive attempt at real power
sharing since Sudan's independence", said John Prendergast, Special
Adviser to the President of the International Crisis Group.
"Through them, a united, peaceful Sudan is possible. That is what
makes Khartoum's wholesale rejection so short-sighted. IGAD's
framework prioritises unity, and an agreement along the proposed
lines will give sustainable peace a chance. The Arab League's
strong support for unity will be compromised if its members -
particularly Egypt - do not weigh in with Khartoum to support an
approach that is built on promotion of unity through real power
sharing and equal rights. Greater pressure from those governments,
but also from the U.S. and others, is a prerequisite".
The SPLA is also in a difficult position. Many Southern Sudanese
would like an agreement that allows them to vote on independence as
soon as possible. The SPLA must show leadership in supporting an
outcome that makes unity realistic through genuine power sharing at
the centre. Otherwise, resumed war is highly likely.
"Although a lesser agreement would be a welcome respite for the
people of Sudan", said ICG Analyst David Mozersky, "any agreement
that blatantly promoted the eventual independence of the South
would likely be derailed by elements in Khartoum, causing the war
to restart. Meaningful power sharing in the central government is
the only recipe for long-term peace and stability".
The parties should be supported in amending or trading off any
parts of the IGAD proposals on which they can agree, but the basic
thrust of the framework document needs to be maintained. Any crack
in the international community's unanimity would allow the parties
to back away from an attainable peace and condemn Sudan to further
years of war and famine.
ENOUGH IS ENOUGH: THE WAR MUST STOP
THE CATHOLIC AND EPISCOPAL BISHOPS OF SUDAN
C/o Provincial Liaison Office, P. O. Box 604 Khartoum, Sudan
Email: ecsprovince@hotmail.com
We the Catholic and Episcopal Bishops of Sudan, meeting in Lweza,
Kampala, Uganda, from 27th July to 2nd August 2003 for a seminar
on Transforming Sudanese society from a culture of war to a
culture of peace, affirm the Inter-Governmental Authority on
Development (IGAD) peace process for Sudan under the leadership
of Kenya as the only viable peace process. It has achieved a
great deal and provides a glimpse of hope and optimism to the
people of Sudan. We welcome the progress that has been made to
date, but we note with concern the current diplomatic impasse in
response to the Draft Framework for Resolution of outstanding
issues arising out of the elaborations of the Machakos Protocol.
The Government of Sudan stated that the proposal was "unfair,
contradictory and unfit to constitute a basis for negotiation",
while the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army said that it
would discuss nothing but this draft when talks resume. These two
positions are diametrically opposed to each other, and we urge
all interested parties to maintain the integrity of the Machakos
Protocol and not to allow the process to collapse.
We, as church leaders, are on the ground with the people
throughout Sudan and we experience the pain, trauma and yearnings
of the grassroots. We speak on behalf of the voiceless and seek
to articulate their legitimate concerns. We believe that these
concerns and fears have not been adequately addressed and have
not been incorporated fully into the peace process. The people of
Sudan demand a peace that is just, democratic and enduring, a
peace that will guarantee their security and human rights and
allow them to determine their own political future. We are aware
of the deep level of mistrust and indeed broken trust within
Sudan. While we welcome international pressure on the warring
parties to encourage them to conclude a peace agreement, we
caution that undue haste could result in an agreement that is not
sustainable. We therefore call for credible international
assurances of the implementation of the agreement and the
security of all the Sudanese people, regardless of their
political, ethnic or religious affiliation.
We express our sincere gratitude for the international political
will which has brought the process so far forward. We affirm the
role of the Troika (USA, UK and Norway) in leading international
support for the IGAD process, and Italy and Switzerland for their
cooperation with the Troika. The international community has
increasingly played a practical role in addressing human
suffering in many parts of the world, such as the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Kosovo and Sierra Leone. This is a clear
responsibility under the UN Charter. However Sudan has not yet
received the same level of attention and intervention as other
countries. While we welcome the initiatives which have already
taken place, we urge the international community to play a
decisive role at this critical stage in the Sudanese peace
process. In particular we recognize the special role of the USA
in global security, the UK's historic connections with Sudan, and
Norway's leading role in peace-making, and call on them to exert
further effort in ensuring the success of the IGAD process.
We appreciate the care and confidentiality needed to build
confidence in negotiations about sensitive and complex issues,
but we are concerned that the ownership of the process and its
outcome is not shared by all stakeholders. Experience in other
conflicts has shown that without inclusivity and transparency
there can be no just and lasting peace. We therefore call for the
inclusion of civil society and all military and political
factions, and for the free dissemination of information regarding
the peace process.
Enough is enough. The war must stop. War is not an option. Peace
must prevail. The threat to resume the war in the event of a
setback in the IGAD process is totally unacceptable and should
not be countenanced by any party. The people of Sudan totally
reject a return to war. They urgently need a just and peaceful
solution to the conflict. The international community must stand
in solidarity with the people. Nations and international
organisations must ensure that credible sanctions will be
instituted against any party that might resort to war and that
the people of Sudan will be adequately protected.
For our part, we, as Sudanese Church Leaders, commit ourselves
and our churches to participate at every level in the formulation
of a new Sudanese society with social structures which mediate
grace; to the development of civil leaders and democracy
education for our people; to continued advocacy for the cause of
peace; and to serve as agents of healing in our communities. We
call on all parties in Sudan as well as all people of good will
throughout the world to support and assist us in building a just
and lasting peace in our beloved country.
1st August 2003
Signed by the Catholic and Episcopal Bishops of Sudan
Together with the Secretaries of SCC and NSCC
Prospects for Peace in Sudan
Briefing
July-August 2003
Justice Africa (http://www.justiceafrica.org)
7 August 2003
Overview
1. The Sudan Peace process is in a crucial stage after the GoS
rejected the draft framework for resolution of outstanding issues
arising out of the elaboration of the Machakos Protocol presented
by the Mediators at the Sixth round of Talks at Nakuru, Kenya, on
12 July. Problems were not unexpected, but the vehemence of the
GoS denunciation was surprising. The SPLA has accepted the
mediators' proposals as a basis for negotiation, unsurprisingly
as they are close to the position it has itself articulated.
There is both a substantive and a rhetorical gulf between the
parties.
2. Khartoum's rhetoric of rejection could not be matched by any
political alternative. The multilateral strategy of the mediators
has resulted in solid regional and international support for the
IGAD peace process, so that Khartoum has nowhere to turn. The GoS
has succeeded in drawing attention to its concerns, and perhaps
reassuring some of its internal constituents that it has not
forgotten them, but it has no alternative but to return to the
peace talks in August. The principal issue of substance now is,
in what areas will the mediators bend to Khartoum's concerns? And
will any such compromises jeopardise the SPLA's readiness to
agree?
3. Meanwhile, the failure of the last round of peace talks has
created unpredictability in the peace process. The parties could
be uncompromising and the peace momentum could be lost by
protracted wrangling on procedural matters. The IGAD mediators
and the troika should not underestimate the possibility of the
GoS abandoning the peace process if it is assured of a solid
internal front. The GoS could still pursue talking at IGAD as a
tactic to buy time. If the peace is to be consummated in the next
month or so, major leverage will have to be exerted on the
parties, which primarily implies a stepped-up high-level U.S.
involvement.
The GoS Walks Out and Back In?
4. The GoS rejected the IGAD draft framework document as
unbalanced unworkable and impossible to implement. Meanwhile, the
SPLA accepted the draft proposal as a framework for further
discussion, noting its reservations. The GoS announcement not
only stalled the peace process, but also meant that opportunities
to explore the parties' red lines in the session could not be
pursued.
5. The mediators' strategy in presenting a framework document to
the parties, without first having briefed them on its contents
and obtained some indication that the negotiations would be able
to proceed, proved to be a tactical error. President Bashir's
capacity to negotiate depends upon sensitive political
calculations and manoeuvre in the fraught political environment
of internal GoS politics, is limited. The mediators' approach of
negotiating around a blind draft may have expedited the convening
of the talks, by minimising pre-talks consultations and the
opportunities for prevarication that accompany them, but in this
case the gamble did not pay off.
6. Having walked out of Nakuru, the GoS stunned many observers
including the Sudanese people with the vehemence of its outburst
that included strong statements by the President of the Republic
Omer el Beshir. The GoS delegation not only rejected the document
as basis for discussion but called it unbalanced, biased and
major departure from the Machakos Protocol. The GoS further
challenged the credibility of the mediators especially the IGAD
Special Envoy General Sumbeiywo. President Beshir even said that
IGAD could go to Hell, or soak the draft and drink if, the
mediators insisted on its discussion.
7. The GoS asked for a completely new draft proposal before
resuming the talks, and stated that it cannot accept the 'Nakuru'
document as basis for discussion leading to final agreement. It
will therefore attend the coming round armed with that position.
A busy round of diplomacy ensued and vigorous attempts to salvage
the peace process are underway, with the mediators pushing for
the GoS to accept discussion on the basis of an amended document
rather than one redrafted from scratch. The parties have
provisionally agreed on 11 August as the date for resumption on
the peace talks, probably in the Mount Kenya Safari Club. This
date may slip, but the mediators are determined that it should
not slip by much.
8. JA June briefing warned that despite the optimism, the IGAD
Secretariat with the full involvement and support of
international backers should put in place 'Plan B' for both
parties in the case of the breakdown of the talks. Thus far, a
diplomatic 'Plan B' appears to be working, to ensure that
Khartoum comes back to the negotiating table. (A resumption of
the war in the middle of the rainy season would also not be a
logical military move for the GoS.) The need for a humanitarian
'Plan B' still exists, including fall-back provisions for the
protection of civilians in the war zone until the parties resume
the talks where they stalled.
Points of Substantive Disagreement
9. The GoS delegation's comments and remarks on the draft
framework for resolution of outstanding issues arising out of
elaboration of the Machakos Protocol provide clues to the GoS
position. Important outstanding issues objected to by the GoS
fall into three areas, namely, the national capital, power
sharing and security arrangements. Surprisingly, the GoS document
is silent on the three contested areas of Abyei, Nuba Mountains
and Southern Blue Nile.
10. Justice Africa in this July in this briefing would like to
depart from its usual style and present highlights of the GoS
position and attempt to clarify important areas pertaining to the
Sudanese agreements relevant to the next and hopefully final
round of peace talks. In this response, we rely on the GoS
response to the leaked draft and statements made in the
international and Sudanese Arabic press.
State and Religion: The National Capital
11. The GoS document states its position as follows:
"The Machakos Protocol declares with great confidence and
relief: "Further record that within the above context, the
parties have reached a specific agreement on the Right of
Self-determination for the people of South Sudan, State and
Religion etc "And also it states under National Government:
"3.2.2 National enacted legislation having effect only in respect
of the states outside Southern Sudan shall have as its source of
legislation Sharia and the consensus of the people.
"See also the mechanism proposed by the Machakos Protocol for
the revision of currently enacted legislation in 3.2.4 (I)&(ii).
"Yet, despite these clear provisions, the drafter of this
document, under 3.0 Seat of the National Government and National
Legislature went on to prescribe a number of provisions 3.1, 3.2,
3.3, 3.4, 3.5, & 3.6, that neither refer to the above stated
specific agreement in the Machakos Protocol, or at least
acknowledge its existence and binding nature, some of the
enumerated provisions indeed violate the specific agreement or
try to revise it in a manner that would be described as sneaky,
and in light of discussions with the people we believe to be
responsible for the framework and our well known position on the
matter, and assurance by the resource person in the presence of
the Special Envoy, that agreed (and signed) provisions shall not
be tampered with, we feel that the creditability of the whole
process is now seriously challenged. Any draft that in effect
brings the binding nature of the Machakos Protocol in question is
not going to enjoy support on our part, and shall not, we firmly
believe, be initiated by the secretariat, or be encouraged, or
endorsed by the friends of the peace process, otherwise the very
foundation of this peace process will crumble, particularly as we
know that the other great achievement of the Machakos Protocol
Right to Self-Determination can be rendered as ridiculously
meaningless, as State and Religion has been thanks to this
unbalanced draft, that can be achieved through tactics similar to
the ones used in achieving this present dubious feat, and
everybody, who knows anything at all about the situation in Sudan
know that the internal and external detractors who helped set the
stage for this brazen retreat from a signed commitment, are as
negative about self-determination, as they have shown to be about
state and religion."
12. The GoS outburst was on the proposal by the mediators
regarding the Seat of the National Government and National
Legislature: The draft proposal reads:
"The national capital shall be a symbol of unity that should
reflect the diversity of the nation. Khartoum city shall be the
Capital of the Republic of the Sudan. A district within the city
of Khartoum, within which buildings and offices of the national
government are situated, as well as the site of the National
Parliament, shall be known as the capital district of the Sudan.
This district shall be precisely designated by the parties during
the Pre-Interim Period. . All existing legislation applicable to
the District shall be reviewed by the Joint Committee of both
Houses of the National Legislature."
13. This proposal undoubtedly treats the issue of the capital in
a manner that makes unity attractive for Southern Sudanese.
Unfortunately, in the current Sudanese political context the
proposal is seen by the Islamist and considerable number of
Northerners as a charter for 'secularism', leaving it open to the
accusation of 'profaning the national capital with vice' and
similar.
14. The draft proposal also impugns the political legitimacy of
the Islamist government by acceding a portion of the capital to
be a Sharia Free Enclave. This appears to be the red line that
the GoS would not cross even if that meant walking away from the
peace process. Acceptance of such a proposal amounts to political
suicide by the National Congress Party. Having mobilised its
supporters and allies to defend the faith and the nation from the
'crusaders' and 'imperialists', to surrender on such a
fundamental point, and then subject the government to the verdict
of the electorate, would leave the NCP squeezed between the
Popular Congress of Hassan al Turabi and the sectarian parties.
15. Did the Machakos Protocol settle the issue of the national
capital? There is disagreement on this, not only among observers
but also among those directly engaged. Undoubtedly, Machakos
settled the issue of relation between religion and state in
Northern Sudan. But this leaves ambiguity as to whether the
national capital in a 'one country two systems' formula is
politically as well as geographically part of the North. This a
genuine ambiguity with good arguments to be made on either side.
16. Responsibility now falls on the GoS to come up with a formula
better than the one offered by the mediators. The issue of the
national capital could not be wished away by simply walking out
of the peace process. It is a critical focus for tradeoff.
Security Arrangements
17. The GoS responded to the mediator's proposals in the
following manner:
"The two delegations have not got the same opportunity to engage
in preliminary discussions as they have got in the other areas.
"In the context of a united Sudan, there shall be a single united
National Army Force (NAF). "All armed forces shall be integrated
in the National Armed Force (NAF) before the end of the interim
period according to agreed arrangements."
18. The GoS further called its proposal of single army as
'representing a middle ground subject to further negotiations.'
19. Security arrangements for Southern Sudanese and the SPLA
represents the bottom line that could lead to the breakdown of
the peace talks. Fortunately, the GoS position on single army
during the interim period, while a logical claim for most
countries, is not consistent with recent Sudanese history,
including especially its peace engagements with Southern armed
groups. This is a simple case of double standards, and either
negotiating in bad faith or trading on the mediator's natural
preference for a single army and their lack of detailed knowledge
of Sudanese recent history. The GoS positions in previous
agreements with southern armed groups are as follows:
20. The Khartoum and Fashoda Peace Agreements of 1997 were very
specific about the status of the forces during the interim
period. This matter is dealt with under Chapter Six of these
agreements:
- Article 8(i) stipulates: "The South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF)
shall remain separate from the National Army and be stationed in
their locations under their commands,"
- Article 8 (iii) also states that: "The size of the Sudanese
Armed Forces in South Sudan shall be reduced to peace time level
once peace is established."
21. Furthermore, the security
arrangements were codified by the GoS into law known as "The
Southern States (Peace and Transitional Measures) Act, 1997".
This deals with the status of the forces, Joint military
Technical Committee, The Cease-fire Military Committee, the
General Amnesty Committee, etc. In particular, Article 60,
sections (1) and (2), restate the above quoted provisions. Six
years after the Khartoum and Fashoda Agreements were signed, the
SPAF, SSDF and SPLA (United) remain as three separate armies in
Sudan.
22. The GoS should therefore be reminded and asked to respect
previous agreements it had signed with other Southern armed
groups. Subsequently, this inconsistency raises questions to the
GoS commitment to the IGAD peace process, Southern referendum and
its result. It is also logical that the SPAF and SPLA armed
forces cannot be unified before a final decision on the unity of
Sudan is made by the Southern Sudanese in the referendum.
Power Sharing
23. On this issue, the GoS argues as follows:
"The attempted resolution by the framework of the issue of the
power sharing fails completely to recognize that the principle of
power sharing shall apply both to the National Government and the
RGOSS [Regional Government of Southern Sudan] and the states in
Southern Sudan, it pays attention only to the demands of the SPLM
as regards its (and not the South's) share in the National
Government, to the complete elimination of any accommodation of
the National Congress Party in the Government of the Southern
region. "The post of the Deputy Chairman of the RGOSS should go
to the other signatory to the agreement, using the same logic the
framework takes for granted at the national level. The same goes
for posts of governors in the Southern region. The framework is
also silent about any percentages here as well as in the
executive branch and state legislatures in South. This is a
betrayal of the idea of inclusiveness the framework talks so
often about, and it continues the trend of failing the cause of
unity as above, and on top of that it follows the SPLM's
unwillingness to recognize that many Southerners are members of
the National Congress Party and other parties.
"The so-called adjustment of the number of the states in the
South is given to the Regional Assembly of South Sudan as a
legislative function without any attempt at justification, and
furthermore the percentage representing the South in the council
of states, is fixed at a certain percentage in violation of the
principle of equal representation of all states in the Federation
(4.5)
"The framework employs an appeasement approach, that ignore the
totality approach when it comes to the qualitative representation
in the National cabinet, as it says nothing about the
incompatibility of the constitutionalisation of a defense
ministry for the South with the opening up of all cabinet posts
at national level for the SPLM (4.7.1)
"The framework is hopelessly oblivious of the danger that the
obstinate lack of recognition of the non SPLM Southerners could
pose to the sustainability of the peace."
24. In this case, the GoS objections have some substance. It is
true that the IGAD Draft proposal made no mention of the
inclusion in the RGOSS of southern political parties other than
SPLM.
25. The GoS has embarked on a mobilisation campaign of among
Sudanese political and militia groups inside Sudan, arousing
anti-peace agreement sentiments by highlighting the draft's
omission of the inclusiveness principle for power sharing in
Southern Sudan. Many Southern Sudanese share the GoS concern and
the importance of Southern Sudanese political groups
inclusiveness in RGOSS and Legislature. Many Southerners are also
aware that the GoS campaign of inclusiveness is intended to
divide Southern ranks regarding the peace process. GoS concern is
clearly focused on its supporters in Southern Sudan, and not
others.
26. It is recommended that the principle of power sharing
percentages formula agreed by the parties to be applied to the
National Government and Legislature should also apply to RGOSS.
The percentages should be reversed so that the SPLM takes the
highest percentage. Taking the proposed percentage of IGAD's
Draft Framework the following percentages are suggested: 50%
SPLM, 25% National Congress and 25% other Southern Sudanese
political parties and Movements. These percentages hold for both
the Executive and the Legislature in Southern Sudan including
states level until elections are held during the interim period.
The percentages of participation in the GOSS should be agreed
upon by the parties as part and parcel of the peace agreement not
to be left for a later stage. The inclusion is necessary to
promote democratic practice and build consensus in Southern
Sudan.
27. The debate over posts may turn out to be more a matter of
principle than reality. The SPLA will face considerable
difficulties in finding sufficient skilled and experienced
personnel to fill all of its quotas in both National and Regional
Governments.
28. The GoS also complained of the Vice President having powers
that could tie the hands of the President, or in other words veto
powers. This is not correct. The draft proposal mentioned three
areas mentioned where the President must have the consent of the
Vice President, namely: 1) declaration of states of emergency; 2)
appointments that the President is required to make in terms of
the Peace Agreement etc.; and 3) summoning, adjourning, or
proroguing the National Legislature. These are all central to the
implementation of the peace agreement. It cannot be left in the
hands to the President alone as one party to the agreement.
Smooth implementation of the Peace Agreement needs both parties
to agree on such vital matters of the state functions
29. The GoS continues to argue for more than one Vice President.
No plausible argument is advanced by the government to justify
this demand apart from being the 'norm' in Sudan. It is
transparently an attempt to provide a position for Ali Osman
Mohamed Taha. The peace settlement need not accord with the
recent practice of two Vice Presidents, because there are only
two parties to the Peace Agreement. It is therefore logical that
the two parties to the agreement should divide the Presidency:
The National Congress takes the Presidency and the SPLM takes the
Vice Presidency. The GoS concern that the Presidency should not
revert to his deputy if he is unavailable has been taken care of.
Providing an additional position of second Vice President creates
an unnecessary and unfair inequality of power at the top.
The Marginalised Areas
30. Surprisingly, the GoS is silent on the draft framework's
position for resolution of the three contested areas. The
document is reservedly balanced on the three areas. It advocates
a referendum for Abyei before the elections to be held towards
the end of the first half of the Interim Period, while proposing
that Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile should be autonomous
regions within Northern Sudan, with the power to decide their own
legal systems. Details for the regions' budgetary allocations are
spelled out, along with a general specification that the regions
are entitled to a proportional share of the North's allocation of
governmental posts. Pending elections, the constitutional post
appointments (Governor) are approved by the Presidency.
Khartoum's omission of any mention of these areas can be read
either as an implicit acceptance of the mediators' compromise
position, or sticking to a very hard line, which refuses to
acknowledge the legitimacy of any internationally-mediated
negotiations over these areas, and reserves the option of raising
objections in the forthcoming round and pulling out again.
31. Many Nuba people are concerned that the Nakuru formula will
leave them in a vulnerable position. There is no reference to the
future of the SPLA fighters in the marginalised areas, and the
President's power of appointing the Governor may be a point of
contention.
The North
32. One of the factors propelling Khartoum's alarm over the peace
process is fear of democratisation and its implications. This was
dramatically brought home by the elections at the Khartoum
University Student Union, in which the government list was
soundly defeated, coming third behind a combined opposition list,
and an Islamist rival. It obtained just 20% of the vote compared
to 51% for the NDA list. Khartoum University politics have long
been regarded both as a bellwether of national politics, and as a
stronghold of the National Islamic Front. During the 1990s,
Hassan al Turabi had argued that the Islamists had built up such
a strong following in Sudan that they could afford to relax their
military grip and move towards democracy, confident that they
would win. An uncertain hypothesis even when the Islamists were
united, this is being shown to be highly questionable with the
Turabi faction in opposition.
33. In a future election, it seems probable that regional
identities will play a strong role in influencing voting
patterns. The NCP sees much of the Islamist constituency it built
up over the last decades slipping away, either back to the
traditional sectarian parties, or to emergent regional blocs such
as the rebels in Darfur. For this reason, the DUP and NCP are
being pushed closer together, as they share much of the same
constituency.
34. The GoS has been beating the drum of fear of separation in a
bid to rally the Northern forces together. The GoS describes the
'Nakuru Document' as a charter for the separation of Southern
Sudan, and has called upon all Northern parties to defend the
unity of the country. It further called for a National Consensus
Charter between the NCP and the Northern opposition parties. This
was met with scepticism by a number of parties, notably the Umma
Party of Sadiq el Mahdi. The NCP is still intensifying its
efforts on this.
Darfur
35. The conflict in Darfur continues and intensifies, with the
GoS apparently determined on a military solution. There were
tentative openings of a negotiation process, which succeeded in
obtaining the release of the captured Air Force general, Ibrahim
Bushra Ismail, but no more. The GoS refuses to extend any
political recognition to the SLA, insisting that they are merely
brigands. The SLA insists that it is a political movement and
should be treated as such.
36. However, with the rebellion firmly based in the traditional
leadership of much of the region, the GoS approach can only
deepen the problem. The SLA rebels have attacked two important
garrisons in north-western Darfur, Tina and Kutum, and claimed to
have captured them. The rebel's ability to operate over such
large distances in short periods of time demonstrates their
support among the Zaghawa people of the area. Meanwhile, the
fighting in one of Sudan's poorest and most food insecure areas
is creating immense hardship. Darfur has long suffered from high
levels of banditry, and it is likely that the rebellion has also
seen a breakdown in law and order.
37. There is no military solution to the insurrection in Darfur.
The GoS must recognise that this is a political problem.
Evidently it would not be appropriate to privilege the SLA over
other political parties represented in the region, simply because
it has taken up arms. But a roundtable conference including
representation from all political forces, including the SLA, will
be necessary at some point. The only issue is, how long the
fighting will be allowed to continue and at what human cost
before such negotiations begin.
The South
38. There are currently no ongoing activities on the
South-South grass-roots dialogue process. The need for a Southern
leadership consultation that can include the non-SPLA armed
groups, and address the questions of internal reconciliation in
the South, remain as pressing as before.
39. Many Southern political forces and civil society groups not
in government supported the 'Nakuru Document', with an emphasis
on inclusiveness regarding power sharing in Southern Sudan.
40. Justice Africa received a clarification form the UNPC-T
organisation committee (Task Force) on our para 14 of the June
Briefing. They took offence at some JA comments and in particular
the impression of non-inclusiveness, hijacking NSCC process and
questions raised regarding the conference. JA would like to
reiterate that its comments were not baseless. It is correct that
some stakeholders in Upper Nile including the SSLM expressed
their exclusion from the Upper Nile Peace Conference and even
issued a press release to that effect. JA does not agree with nor
endorse much of the content of SSLM's press release. It is also
correct that there were disagreements among the partners
regarding the Upper Nile Peace Conference. JA did not describe
the Upper Nile Conference as a failure but acknowledged that
whatever the concerns and doubts it was a step towards dialogue
in the footsteps of Wunlit and Liliir.
41. JA would like to unreservedly apologise for any offence its
comments (June Briefing) regarding Upper Nile Peace Conference
might have caused. No offence was intended as JA holds the
members of the UNPC-T committee and the Inter-Denominational
Committee and all peace activists in high regard. JA has no
intention to undercut or trivialise any peace- building effort
and expresses solidarity with all peace efforts in Sudan,
especially South- South dialogue at all levels.
The Region
42. As it announced its withdrawal from the IGAD peace talks, the
GoS pre-emptively announced that it anticipated Egyptian support
for its unity stand. Immediately, Khartoum called upon Cairo for
solidarity. However, it has been disappointed: Egyptian support
has not gone beyond the rhetorical level of calling for 'more
balanced' proposals. Evidently, Cairo sees the Machakos-Nakuru
process as Sudan's best chance for unity. Africa's other regional
powers, such as South Africa, concur. Despite having established
cordial relationships with its other neighbours (excepting
Eritrea), the GoS has nowhere to turn in the region for an
alternative.
43. The GoS has reluctantly admitted that some of its officers in
Juba have been involved in continuing to support the LRA in its
operations in Uganda. The Ugandans provided proof of this,
compelling Khartoum to concede.
The United States
44. Senator Jack Danforth, the U.S. Special Envoy, visited Sudan
in mid-July, in a significant step to increase his visibility and
involvement. His meeting with John Garang was described by the
SPLA as 'candid and frank', pointing to the Senator's readiness
to stand up to the SPLA leader and insist on an accelerated
progress towards a settlement. Reportedly, his meetings with the
Khartoum leadership were less tough.
45. The Sudan Peace Act has passed through Congress. This
condemned the GoS for abuses including slavery, and set a
deadline of 21 October for peace. Should this date be reached
without a peace settlement, and the fault is deemed to lie with
the GoS, then the Administration should revert to the previous
policy of isolating and condemning Khartoum. This will entail
imposing sanctions, or to be precise, maintaining the
still-existing U.S. sanctions, and providing an additional $100
million annually to Southern Sudan. As the U.S. is already
committing some $180 million to humanitarian and development
programmes in the South, this would make Southern Sudan into one
of the biggest beneficiaries of American largesse in Africa.
46. Evidently, Washington continues to speak with different
voices. While Senator Danforth continues to have the confidence
and backing of President Bush, the U.S. approach of pressing for
a quick peace will prevail. Should there be no agreement by
September or October, it is likely that the pro-peace momentum in
the Administration will begin to evaporate. However, will this
mean that the U.S. adopts a new policy of aggressively backing
the SPLA, in effect supporting a clandestine separatist war? The
high cost, slender military prospects and lack of strategic U.S.
interest should militate against such a choice. Should the
Administration follow this track, it would be purely for
ideological reasons.
47. The dominant role of the U.S. is deeply alarming to the GoS,
which fears that America will be the guarantor of the peace
process, and that Washington politics will remain in hock to the
religious right. Having long resisted formally involving the UN
in the Sudanese conflict, the GoS is now considering the virtues
of a much more active UN role in monitoring the agreement.
Conclusion
48. Time is running out for a settlement. The 'holistic' approach
taken by the mediators is approaching its logical conclusion,
which is that the remaining differences between the parties will
be bridged chiefly by imposing a compromise. If this is to
succeed, it will require a combination of diplomatic finesse and
leverage. While the diplomacy will involve a number of actors
including the Kenyans, British and Norwegians, the leverage can
only come from the U.S., and in the U.S., from a higher-level of
political engagement, to administer a short, sharp bout of
political pressure.
49. The seventh round of the Sudanese peace talks is the most
crucial. It will be a test of the firmness and even-handedness of
the IGAD Secretariat and its international partners. It is
important to continue to speak with one voice and ensure that no
party can walk out of the peace process with impunity. The
seventh round must also fix a realistic deadline and clear road
map for the conclusion of the peace talks. The cessation of
hostilities agreement will expire at the end of September.
50. The difficulties of the last month underline that achieving a
settlement is only half the climb. Implementing the agreement
will be complicated, protracted and difficult business.
+++++++++++++++++++++Document Profile+++++++++++++++++++++
Date distributed (ymd): 030814
Region: East Africa
Issue Areas: +political/rights+ +security/peace+ +US policy focus+
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