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Sudan: Peacekeeping without Peace?
AfricaFocus Bulletin
Oct 24, 2004 (041024)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
Last week's decision to expand the contingent of Africa Union
peacekeepers in Sudan's Darfur region to more than 3,000 is the
most substantial step yet towards an international presence that
could deter continuing violence against civilians by government-sponsored
militia. This measure is seen by almost all commentators
as a necessary if not sufficient response to the crisis. Like the
increased international humanitarian aid that has arrived in Darfur
in recent months, however, it is unlikely to have more than a
modest impact without simultaneous new advances on stalled peace
negotiations.
Talks on Darfur under the auspices of the African Union resumed in
Abuja, Nigeria this weekend. Negotiators from the Sudanese
government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)
met earlier this month in Naivasha, Kenya, but no new progress was
reported, on finalizing the agreement between the two. Most
observers believe that the Sudanese government is stalling on both
sets of talks, calculating that the international community will
tire of the issue instead of escalating pressure. Meanwhile, a UN
spokesperson noted that cease-fire violations in Darfur increased
in September and early October.
This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains several recent short updates and
commentaries on current developments in the conflicts in Sudan.
Also of related interest is a commentary by Mahmood Mamdani in the
Oct 7 issue of Pambazuka News (see
http://www.pambazuka.org/index.php?id=24982), which includes a
strong denunciation of simplistic accounts of the Darfur conflict
as "Arab vs. African."
Additional commentaries and updates can be found at the Sudan
Tribune website at http://www.sudantribune.com.
For earlier issues of AfricaFocus Bulletin on Sudan, see
http://www.africafocus.org/country/sudan.php
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African Union to send more peacekeepers to Darfur
Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)
http://www.irinnews.org
[This material comes from IRIN, a UN humanitarian information unit,
but may not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations or
its agencies.]
Addis Ababa, 21 Oct 2004 (IRIN) - The African Union (AU) agreed on
Wednesday to boost the number of peacekeepers in Sudan's troubled
Darfur region and to send in a civilian police force, Said Djinnit,
head of the AU's Peace and Security Council, told reporters in the
Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa.
The deployment of the armed force, which would number 3,320, was
expected in a matter of weeks, he said. The one-year mission, he
added, would be made up of 2,241 troops, of whom 450 would be
military observers and 815 civilian police. There would also be 164
support staff.
"Both the size and mandate of the mission have been strengthened to
be able to better assist the parties honour their commitment and
work together with renewed commitment and determination to achieve
lasting peace in Darfur," Djinnit said. "We are talking about weeks
to have the enhancement of people on the ground."
The AU appealed to its member states to provide "financial and
logistical" support as well as troops and police for deployment in
Darfur.
"The size of the mission is appropriate, given the level of where
we are in the peace process, given the conditions in which we are
operating, and given the mandate and task of the mission," Djinnit
added.
The announcement by the AU came on the eve of the planned
resumption of peace talks on Darfur in the Nigerian capital, Abuja.
Djinnit added that the Peace and Security Council had urged the
warring factions at the peace talks to show "commitment and spirit
of compromise" to end suffering.
The expanded force would be funded to the tune of US $220 million,
mainly by the European Union peace fund and the United States.
Currently some 300 Rwandan and Nigerian troops are in Darfur to
protect 80 observers already on the ground.
Djinnit said the force would have three main functions - monitoring
and observing, confidence building and contributing to a secure
environment, ensuring aid can get through.
The 53-member African Union describes the new mission as a
"peacekeeping operation". It is mandated to "protect civilians
under imminent threat," although the protection of civilians is the
primary responsibility of the government of Sudan.
Djinnit told reporters that the exact rules of engagement for the
AU force had yet to be drawn up. The force would also investigate
violations of the humanitarian ceasefire and provide a visible
military presence to stop armed groups like the government-allied
Janjawid militias from attacking civilians.
Jean Hilaire Mbeambea, whose country, Cameroon, currently holds the
rotating chair of the 16-strong AU Peace and Security Council, said
"mass suffering" was still taking place in the region. However,
speaking after a daylong meeting at the AU headquarters in Addis
Ababa, he stressed it was not genocide.
"Abuses are still taking place," Mbeambea said. "There is mass
suffering, but it is not genocide."
The conflict in Darfur between the Sudanese military supported by
Janjawid militias, and rebels fighting to end alleged
marginalisation and discrimination of the region, has displaced
about 1.45 million people and sent another 200,000 fleeing across
the border into Chad. The UN has called the situation one of the
world's worst humanitarian crises.
In London on Tuesday, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan urged
support for AU efforts to bolster its monitoring and protection
presence there. He called on all sides to respect the ceasefire and
take measures to protect civilians, even before the arrival of AU
troops.
Excerpt from Justice Africa Briefing
11 October 2004
http://www.justiceafrica.org/bulletin.htm
Next Steps
37. Sudan needs a comprehensive political solution. The foundation
for this should be Naivasha, which has the substance and political
clout needed. The mechanism for this should be that the talks
include moving to implementation without delay. Implementation
should include detailed steps for a Constitutional Convention and
the formal declaration of regional autonomy and power sharing for
Darfur and Eastern Sudan, using as a model the agreements made for
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. However, any political framework
announced for Darfur should be the starting point for negotiations
at Abuja, not regarded as a fait accompli.
38. As soon as the final protocol is signed, President Bashir
should issue a Republican Decree that affirms the Naivasha
agreements as part of Sudanese law, brings the power-sharing,
wealth-sharing and security arrangements into immediate effect, and
appoints John Garang as First Vice President.
39. Meanwhile, extensive preparation is needed for the next round
in Abuja. The mediators need to do their own research and thinking
to define what they mean by Janjawiid (or abandon any usage of the
term) and what a credible process of providing security and
ensuring disarmament would look like. The key issues needing
immediate progress need to be fixed in advance by intensive shuttle
diplomacy between the parties, leaving the Abuja meeting itself for
the formalities of finalizing the humanitarian and security
protocols, and beginning work on the social and political issues.
40. International calls for regime change are frankly
irresponsible. If the government of Sudan is to change, it should
do so through the democratic or peaceful efforts of the people of
Sudan, not through external intervention. A foreign-led effort to
remove the current GoS is far more likely to lead to chaos and
intensified civil war, than to peace and democracy.
Sudan's Dual Crises: Refocusing on IGAD
International Crisis Group
http://www.crisisweb.org
Africa Briefing 05 October 2004
Overview
As the Darfur crisis understandably preoccupies the international
community, inadequate attention is being paid to ending Sudan's
21-year old civil war between the Khartoum government and the
mainly southern insurgency led by the SPLA (Sudan People's
Liberation Movement/Army). The peace process mediated by the
regional organisation IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on
Development), looked close to finality in June 2004 but is now at
risk. The draft agreement negotiated at Naivasha contains
provisions that can assist a political solution in Darfur. The two
sets of issues are closely related and need to be dealt with
equally and urgently. However, unless current dynamics change, and
the UN Security Council puts more pressure upon Khartoum to
conclude the IGAD agreement, war could soon resume across the
country.
If the government chooses to delay conclusion of the peace
agreement when the IGAD negotiations resume on 7 October, the six
protocols already signed but not yet in force may well begin to
unravel -- under pressure from regime hardliners and intellectuals
in the North who argue that too many concessions were made to the
SPLA (Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army), and from elements
within the SPLA who never trusted the regime to keep its word and
believe it has been weakened by Darfur. If this happens, new fronts
in a war that has already cost two million lives are likely to
emerge in the Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile and the east.
If the government chooses cooperation, peace in Sudan could be
secured before the end of the year. Wrapping up the IGAD (Naivasha)
agreement would lay the groundwork for further understandings with
the umbrella opposition group, the National Democratic Alliance
(NDA), and, more importantly, provide models for a Darfur
resolution and begin the process towards democratisation and
national elections.
However, indications are the regime is leaning toward further
intransigence. The signals it is sending on IGAD are mixed at best,
suggesting it is stalling in an effort to persuade the
international community to relax its Darfur demands. Khartoum also
has obstructed the deployment of a sizeable African Union (AU)
force with a specific mandate to protect civilians in Darfur, while
its effort to link disarmament of Janjaweed militia to the
cantonment of the Darfur rebels helped stymie recent AU-mediated
talks. While Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail, adopted a
conciliatory approach before the Security Council on 29 September
2004, pledging cooperation with an AU force, there remains much
ambiguity about what that will mean in practice.
Khartoum appears to calculate that commercial and sovereignty
considerations will ensure that most countries and international
institutions will apply no more than rhetorical pressure. It
encourages the perception that if serious pressure is applied, it
would be counter-productive, giving advantages to putative
"hardliners" or even causing the regime to crack, leaving a failed
state in its wake. These tactics have served the regime well since
it seized power in 1989.
The lesson of those fifteen years, however, is that when the
government has been the target of serious pressure with a specific
objective, it has modified its behaviour. It is a pragmatic regime
that will do what it has to in order to survive, including choosing
cooperation rather than attempting to impose unilateral solutions.
The international community should act on a number of fronts to
achieve a comprehensive solution to Sudan's multiple and
interconnected problems, one that deals equally with the IGAD peace
process and Darfur. The Security Council should give itself further
leverage on Darfur by moving quickly to deploy the first elements
of the International Commission of Inquiry it established by its
resolution of 18 September 2004. If there is not concrete progress
on its Darfur demands by the end of October, especially the AU
protection force, the Council should impose an arms embargo on the
Sudanese government, an assets freeze on companies owned by the
ruling party that do business abroad, and a travel ban on senior
Sudanese officials.
Diplomatic pressure must simultaneously be escalated to produce a
swift conclusion on the IGAD (Naivasha) process. The Security
Council needs to state clearly that if the parties do not make
progress when they resume the IGAD negotiations on 7 October and
fail to conclude a final agreement by the end of the year, it will
assess responsibility and take appropriate decisions. Other issues
must also be addressed, particularly the complications presented by
the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), the brutal Ugandan insurgency
whose depredations have often been supported by Khartoum in pursuit
of its war aims in the South.
Ultimately, the regime must understand that meaningful penalties
can only be avoided or removed if it acts quickly and
constructively on both the IGAD agreement and Darfur. It should not
be allowed to pick and choose which issues, or parts of issues, it
wishes to move on, playing these off against others. This is the
moment for it to decide its path -- and firmness in New York and
key capitals is necessary to inform its choice.
Darfur: Mandate and Size of AU Ceasefire Commission Must Be
Expanded
Refugees International
http://www.refintl.org
October 19, 2004
Contacts:
Sarah Martin and Mamie Mutchler, ri@refugeesinternational.org or
202.828.0110
The African Union (AU), with the encouragement of the member states
of the United Nations Security Council, has placed monitors and a
small force to protect them in Darfur, Sudan to monitor the April
8 Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the two
Darfur-based rebel movements, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and
the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). At present AU monitors are
responding daily to allegations of breaches of the ceasefire, many
of which comprise attacks on innocent civilians. During the week of
October 2, a Ceasefire Commission (CFC) team was patrolling in
South Darfur when it saw Government of Sudan helicopters flying in
formation. The team members turned off the road and followed the
direction from which the planes were coming. Within minutes they
came across a village which had just experienced an attack. The
monitors witnessed 50 armed militia, known popularly as the
Janjaweed, retreating on camels and horses. In their wake the
village was burning and civilians had been shot.
Observers agreed to talk to Refugees International on the grounds
of complete anonymity. "You could see the strafing on the ground
where bombs had been thrown from the helicopters. One farmer had
been shot in the back while he was tending his crop. If these
civilians had been carrying guns that might have justified an
attack. But they weren't. At this point we're tired of responding
to calls to just count dead bodies. It makes you very angry."
"These attacks were clearly orchestrated between government forces
and the armed militias. It wouldn't be possible to synchronize
movements without close coordination. We have the ability to check
the air traffic times for planes departing and landing from the
local airport, and can provide double confirmation that these
flights took place."
In the light of such incidents, members of the CFC admitted to RI
that the April 8 agreement has been breached so often that in
reality there is no ceasefire in a war that has claimed over 50,000
lives and left 1.5 million internally displaced persons without
permanent homes, completely dependent upon international
humanitarian assistance.
With or without a real ceasefire, expanding the mandate and size of
the AU mission appears to be the only politically feasible means of
providing protection to civilians in war-torn Darfur. While
monitors are currently able to investigate attacks after the fact,
and at times come across an attack which is underway, they have no
power to intervene and no mandate to stop the fighting or even to
keep a fragile peace between the warring parties and innocent
civilians.
In his second report to the UN Security Council on October 4, 2004,
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sudan, Jan
Pronk, recommended the speedy deployment of a "sizeable" AU force
with an expanded mandate to include ensuring protection of the
rights of internally displaced persons in their areas of origin;
ensuring the safety of displaced persons in the camps and the safe
and voluntary return of displaced persons and refugees to their
areas of origin; monitoring the behavior and actions of the
Sudanese government police; and disarming fighters, including the
Popular Defense Forces and the Janjaweed militia. SRSG Pronk
concluded his paragraph on the AU mandate by stating, "If one or
more of these tasks remain unfulfilled, an unstable situation,
unsustainable peace, or even no peace at all will result."
The lack of women on the AU CFC teams has made investigating
gender-based violence difficult. "Without a woman on the team, the
women of Darfur are often reluctant to talk to us so we have to
read between the lines," a source in the AU confirmed. While rapes
are not considered a violation of the ceasefire, nonetheless AU CFC
teams have been collaborating with the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights monitors to document human rights
cases.
Logistics are handicapping the AU. AU missions need more vehicles,
more accommodations, and more communication equipment for the staff
they currently have. This problem will only intensify if more
troops are deployed. There are also reports that the Government of
Sudan has been delaying AU equipment in customs in Khartoum.
Yet, despite logistical difficulties, the Ceasefire Commission
itself is holding together. Under the April 8 Agreement,
representatives from all three fighting forces and foreign
ceasefire monitors are part of a panel which decides ultimately
whether a breach of the agreement has occurred. Although final
determinations can take several weeks, and are often disputed by
the party that received the allegation against it, reports are
made, and the monitors are able to carry out their work without
active obstruction.
Many non-governmental organizations feel that the presence of AU
monitors, and their accompanying protection force, is also useful
in deterring attacks against civilians in some areas, and helps
maintain humanitarian access. However, both the AU and the
international humanitarian agencies admit that this presence alone
is not sufficient to stop the ongoing attacks against civilians, or
to stem the waves of civilians forcibly displaced from villages and
homes that arrive daily in IDP camps throughout Darfur.
Therefore Refugees International recommends that:
- The Government of Sudan, SLA and JEM forces maintain the April 8
Ceasefire Agreement. All parties to the agreement must live up to
the provisions of common Art. 3 of the Geneva Conventions and
refrain from attacking innocent civilians.
- At the meeting of its Peace and Security Council on October 20,
the AU agree to broaden the mandate of its force in Darfur to
include the protection of civilians and the disarmament of both
pro-government militia and rebel forces, as recommended by SRSG
Pronk, and that the number of personnel be increased to enable the
force to carry out this expanded mandate.
- The Government of Sudan make a credible effort to disarm the
armed militias, known as the Janjaweed.
- The United States and the European Union increase their logistics
support to the AU monitors. In addition, they should put pressure
on the government of Sudan to ensure that equipment is expedited
through customs.
- The African Union, with support from the United States and the
European Union, send female military observers to increase their
capacity to document violence against women.
AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with
a particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
Bulletin is edited by William Minter.
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