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Liberia-Sierra Leone: Consolidating Peace?
AfricaFocus Bulletin
Dec 12, 2004 (041212)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
"The [multilateral] interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone are
failing to produce states that will be stable and capable of
exercising the full range of sovereign responsibilities on behalf
of their long-suffering populations. This is essentially because
they treat peacebuilding as implementing an operational checklist,
involving [quick] fixes to various institutions and processes" -
International Crisis Group
In its new report released last week, the International Crisis
Group criticized donors for delaying promised funds for
reconstruction. It also argued that long-term commitments from the
international community, as well as from politicians and citizens
in the countries, were needed for strategies to address structural
factors likely to lead to new conflict.
This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains a summary article on the report
from the UN's Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), and
the press release and executive summary of the report from the
International Crisis Group (ICG). The full report is available on
the website of the ICG (http://www.crisisweb.org).
++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++++++++
Liberia-Sierra Leone: International community needs to commit for
long haul to stop return to war
Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)
http://www.irinnews.org
[This material from IRIN may not necessarily reflect the views of
the United Nations or its agencies.]
Dakar, 9 Dec 2004 (IRIN) - Liberia and Sierra Leone risk tipping
back into conflict if the international community does not commit
for the next 15 to 25 years with a fresh approach to restore
security and civil freedoms, according to leading think tank, the
International Crisis Group.
"The interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone are failing to
produce states that will be stable," the ICG said in a report
published on Wednesday. "A fresh strategy is needed if both are not
to remain shadow states, vulnerable to new fighting and state
failure."
The ICG criticised donors for not handing over promised and much
needed-funds and said that post-war efforts were veering off
course, as UN peacekeepers simply ticked off the standard elements
in a one-size-fits-all recipe for peace.
"There is no simple and quick nation-building conveyor belt. If the
cycle of 'collapse, partial recovery, new collapse' is to be
avoided, the international community needs to stay patiently
involved with both countries for a generation, not for a brief
post-conflict transition capped off by a first election," the
Brussels-based group warned.
Both Sierra Leone and Liberia witnessed brutal civil wars that
spanned the 1990s and the images of young and often drugged-up
combatants toting machetes and guns and mutilating innocent victims
touched a nerve around the world.
The new ICG report, entitled "Rebuilding Failed States"
(http://www.crisisweb.org), called for action to be taken by the
United Nations, the British and American governments, international
donors, and politicians and citizens in both West African countries
to consolidate a real and meaningful peace.
It said judicial institutions needed not only to be repaired but
reformed, new armies needed to be trained properly to win back the
trust of civilians who often saw them as tainted.
Ordinary civilians should be pushing through to the frontlines of
politics, and economic resources, be they diamonds and timber or
government funds, should be put beyond the reach of criminals.
Sixteen months of peace for Liberia
Liberia's 14-year conflict finally drew to a close when the warring
parties signed a peace deal in August 2003. Now a transitional
government, made up of the three armed factions that fought the war
and civilian society groups, is working to lead the country to free
and fair elections in October 2005.
But infrastructure in the heavily-forested nation remains
shattered, with roads still impassable and no power grid or water
and sewerage systems in the capital, Monrovia.
Western diplomats have already blasted obstructional elements
within Liberia's interim government who are more bothered about the
personal gains they can pocket as "gatekeepers" to various offices,
than about moving the country forward. The ICG said next year's
polls would be a crunch test.
"Many observers fear that the presidential election in October 2005
will be seen as an all-or-nothing affair, with the losers
thoroughly excluded from power and thus left contemplating
resumption of war," the report said.
Hoards of idle former fighters and hidden caches of arms which
escaped a UN-led disarmament programme would provide a prime
recruiting pool, and so the ICG urged foreign donors to stump up
immediately the US$ 42 million needed to reintegrate ex-combatants
and help them adjust to civilian life.
The money is part of US$ 276 million that was promised by donors
but has yet to be paid. The funds for ex-combatants are crucial,
especially given the outcome of a flawed disarmament and
reintegration programme in 1997 during a pause in Liberia's civil
war.
"The result was... continued pillage and abuse of the population
and ultimately a resumption of civil war," the ICG noted. "Donors
who promised money in February 2004 must disburse it immediately if
Liberian ex-combatants are not to be let down again."
The group also urged the United Nations Security Council to
maintain timber sanctions on Liberia until after the elections,
despite pleas from Liberia's interim leader, Gyude Bryant, to lift
the embargo. And the international community should take over the
collection of revenues from ports, airports, customs and raw
materials exports, to make corruption more difficult, the ICG said.
It called for no time to be wasted. "The clock is ticking for
Liberia. After the October elections it will be much more difficult
to take innovative approaches, as it already is in Sierra Leone."
Sierra Leone turmoil further in past
Sierra Leone is further along the peace path. Fighting ended almost
three years ago and elections have already been held. President
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was overwhelmingly re-elected in May 2002, four
months after the war was officially declared over.
Although peacekeepers from the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)
have restored security across the country, they have delayed
pulling out of the former British colony completely.
"Fears that the peace would not hold have prompted a decision to
maintain a residual force of 3,500 soldiers and military observers
until at least the end of June 2005," the ICG noted.
With Sierra Leone still mired at the bottom of the UN's Human
Development Index and citizens not expected to live much beyond
their 34th birthday, the outlook is bleak.
And the ICG says the efforts put into security, now have to be
matched in the economic and political spheres where the sparks that
caused the decade-long civil war have not been firmly extinguished.
To do this, a long-term commitment is essential.
Residents in the capital Freetown bemoan the fact that living
conditions there have barely improved, that travelling elsewhere in
the country is difficult because roads are so dire and that
corruption still plagues the country.
Many normal state functions, particularly the provision of
healthcare, are being carried out by non-governmental organisations
and not the government.
"Institutions are focused on finding new sources of donor revenue,
rather than managing at hand in a way that would develop autonomy
and self-sufficiency. Policy is driven by what donors will fund,"
the ICG report said.
The consequences of either Sierra Leone or Liberia sliding back to
war would be disastrous for an-already turbulent West African
region.
Cote d'Ivoire, once the regional powerhouse, is currently reeling
from the latest cycle of violence in its two year crisis. And
analysts say Guinea, which shares borders with both Liberia and
Sierra Leone, could ignite any day as the country crumbles under
President Lansana Conte.
Liberia & Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States
Dakar/Brussels, 8 December 2004: The international interventions in
Liberia and Sierra Leone are failing to produce stable sovereign
states. A fresh strategy is needed if both are not to remain
vulnerable to new fighting and state collapse.
Liberia & Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States, the latest report
from the International Crisis Group, says peacebuilding in both
countries is off track because it is treated as a straightforward
matter of implementing a checklist of operational processes and
does not tackle underlying political dynamics. Deeper -- and much
longer -- engagement is required.
"The international community needs to make fifteen- to 25-year
commitments to security and civil freedoms in Liberia and Sierra
Leone", says Suliman Baldo, Crisis Group's Africa Program Director.
"It needs to invest the time to allow new political forces to
develop".
A year after the inauguration of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL),
the situation is improved, but peace is fragile. Monrovia has no
power grid, no sewage or water systems, and no land line
telephones. Crime is a major problem, and outside major towns and
principal roads, UNMIL exercises little control. Civilians are
still subject to abuses by ex-combatants, who continue illegal
extraction of gold, rubber and timber.
Sierra Leone, culturally, historically and geographically linked,
has already had its elections, but the UN mission (UNAMSIL) that
was scheduled to withdraw all peacekeepers by December 2004 will
remain until at least the end of June 2005 for fear peace would not
otherwise hold.
In both cases the operational checklist includes deployment of
peacekeepers; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of
fighters; repatriation of refugees; judicial and security sector
reform; and elections, as virtually the final step. Those are all
necessary measures but more is needed, and the time frame of two to
five years is unrealistically short.
A more radical strategy is required in both countries. After
restoring security, the international community should more quickly
give greater political responsibility, while simultaneously
targeting its interventions to help build non-political and
professional law enforcement and judicial institutions to establish
the rule of law, protect civil rights and foster a public space
within which citizens can hammer out their own solutions. In
Liberia, where it is still possible, the international community
should adopt a long-term revenue-collection trusteeship or
management system that would simultaneously finance much of its
engagement, take incentives away from spoilers and give the state
significantly more money.
"These approaches can only succeed within a much longer time
frame", says Mike McGovern, Crisis Group's West Africa Project
Director. "Liberia and Sierra Leone took decades to decay, and it
will take decades to restore sustainable security and political and
economic structures".
The new Peacebuilding Commission proposed by the UN High-level
Panel on 2 December 2004 could be the institutional vehicle to
implement such long-term commitments.
Contacts: Andrew Stroehlein (Brussels) +32 (0) 485 555 946 Jennifer
Leonard (Washington) +1-202-785 1601
Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States
Africa Report N 87 8 December 2004
Executive Summary and Recommendations
The interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone are failing to
produce states that will be stable and capable of exercising the
full range of sovereign responsibilities on behalf of their
long-suffering populations. This is essentially because they treat
peacebuilding as implementing an operational checklist, involving
fixes to various institutions and processes, without tackling
underlying political dynamics. At best, Liberia is on the path
Sierra Leone entered upon several years earlier. A fresh strategy
is needed if both are not to remain shadow states, vulnerable to
new fighting and state failure. The international community needs
to make genuinely long-term commitments -- not two to five years,
as at present, but on the order of fifteen to 25 years -- to enable
new political forces to develop.
In both countries the operational checklist includes deployment of
peacekeepers; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR)
of fighters; repatriation of refugees; and judicial and security
sector reform; with elections as virtually the final step. The time
frame -- two to five years -- is too short. Individuals with
criminal pasts are treated as viable political interlocutors. The
judicial and law enforcement institutions never functioned
effectively, and thus their repair without reform is no solution.
New national militaries are untested, and their adherence to
constitutional order uncertain. Voices from civil society who could
catalyse real change tend to be marginalised, while the economy is
left vulnerable to criminal capture.
A more radical strategy is needed. After restoring security, the
international community should more quickly give greater political
responsibility, while simultaneously targeting its interventions to
help build non-political and professional law enforcement and
judicial institutions to establish the rule of law, protect civil
rights and foster a public space within which citizens can hammer
out their own solutions. In Liberia it should also assume
responsibility for revenue collection from ports, airports,
customs, the maritime registry and export of timber and diamonds:
because the collection of revenues is presently obscured from the
beginning, it is easy to engineer corruption. But once funds begin
entering the treasury transparently, it should be up to Liberians
to decide how to use them, though international monitors, as part
of independent and public oversight of procurement, should still be
available to help civil society prevent gross abuse.
The same problem exists in Sierra Leone, but this prescription
probably cannot be applied because its elected government is
already in place and unlikely to give up so much control. Stop-gap
measures there focus on trying to insert accounting mechanisms at
the final stages of the revenue process, by which time much has
already disappeared. However, the long-term security sector
commitment has already been promised by the UK. Other steps needed
are to protect freedom of press and expression better, to give the
Anti-Corruption Commission prosecutorial powers, and to establish
a public complaint mechanism applicable to newly-elected district
governments.
The proposed approaches can only have a chance of succeeding within
a much longer time frame than the international community has
hitherto been willing to envisage. Liberia and Sierra Leone took
decades to decay, and it will take decades to restore sustainable
security and political and economic structures. The new
Peacebuilding Commission proposed by the High-Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change, which reported to the UN
Secretary-General on 2 December 2004, could be the institutional
vehicle needed to implement the long-term commitments required in
these countries, and many others around the world.
Recommendations
With Respect to Liberia:
To International Donors:
1. Pay quickly outstanding pledges for reconstruction ($276
million), especially the $42 million UNMIL needs to jump-start
reintegration of ex-combatants who have been disarmed and
demobilised.
2. Shift the focus of reintegration programs toward education and
agriculture, including infrastructure (roads, processing equipment)
that will support agricultural production.
3. Give greater political and operational support to civil society.
4. Fund independent oversight of government procurement as domestic
professional auditing capacity is built.
5. Provide long-term funds based on implementation of a national
strategy for law enforcement and justice sector reform.
To the International Contact Group on the Mano River Basin:
6. Convene a working group to prepare the political, technical and
administrative modalities of a mechanism to assume responsibility
for revenue collection for a projected fifteen to 25-year period,
including an oversight board with mixed international and Liberian
composition but controlled by the former and supported by a team of
experts (forensic accountants) and international customs officers.
7. Work with Liberian civil society leaders to organise a national
roundtable conference to develop consensus on a national strategy
to be pursued after the October 2005 elections.
To Liberian Civil Society:
8. Promote discussion between Gios and Mandingos to reduce the
threat of ethnic violence.
To the National Transitional Government of Liberia:
9. Enact legislation to guarantee all citizens (including youths
and women) equal access to land use and to prevent rights to such
use acquired by working and improving land from being revoked by
traditional authorities.
To the United Nations Security Council:
10. Maintain timber and diamond sanctions until after the 2005
elections, then subordinate these sectors to the new revenue
collection mechanism.
To the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO):
11. Extend military observers' tours to one year, the entire period
to be spent at a single site, so as to increase their ability to
gather useful information.
To UNMIL:
12. Take more coercive measures to collect weapons now that the
official DDR deadline for turning them in has passed.
13. Develop a program of targeted disarmament/ development projects
for ex-combatants and the communities into which they are
reintegrated based on the "StopGaps" program in Sierra Leone.
To the Government of the United States:
14. Give a long-term (fifteen to 25-year) "over the horizon"
security guarantee to Liberia similar to that given by the UK to
Sierra Leone.
15. Provide incentives for Liberians resident in the U.S. to
participate in rebuilding their home country, for example by not
interrupting green card or citizenship application processes if
they leave the U.S. to participate in rebuilding, investment, and
governance initiatives.
16. Target financial crimes committed by members of the U.S.-based
Liberian diaspora, and block U.S. bank accounts in such cases.
With Respect to Sierra Leone
To International Donors:
17. Shift the focus of development funding to programs directed
toward education and agriculture, including infrastructure (roads,
agricultural processing equipment) and increase funding to security
sector reform, especially in order to build barracks for army and
police.
18. Give greater political and operational support to civil society
and train district councillors in basic accounting and
administrative skills to facilitate their ability to work
transparently.
19. Provide long-term funds based on implementation of a national
strategy for law enforcement and justice sector reform.
To the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO):
20. Extend military observers' tours to one year, the entire period
to be spent at a single site, so as to increase their ability to
gather useful information.
To the Government of Sierra Leone:
21. Give prosecutorial powers to the Anti-Corruption Commission on
a temporary basis (five to ten years), provide it adequate
financial and human resources, and move quickly to implement a
comprehensive reform of the judicial system.
22. Publish all budgets from ministry level downward, using the
model of the Local Government Act of March 2004, require candidates
for public office to declare their assets both before and after
assuming office, and assure freedom of the press, speech and
association.
23. Work with donors to promote agriculture, first assuring
self-sufficiency in rice production, and then shifting toward
greater diversification, higher productivity, and local value-added
processing.
24. Enact legislation to guarantee all citizens (including youths
and women) equal access to land use and to prevent rights to such
use acquired by working and improving land from being revoked by
traditional authorities.
25. Establish effective control over diamond resources, applying
Kimberly process procedures.
To the Government of the UK:
26. Confirm the long-term "over the horizon" security guarantee to
Sierra Leone for a 25-year period.
Dakar/Brussels, 8 December 2004
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providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with
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