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Congo (Kinshasa): Peace or Stalemate
AfricaFocus Bulletin
Dec 4, 2005 (051204)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
The Democratic Republic of the Congo is preparing for a referendum
on an new constitution on December 18, part of a long peace process
scheduled to lead to an elected government by June of next year.
Nevertheless, the transition to peace and stability in the country
is precarious. According to the International Crisis Group,
"Reunification has been plagued by government corruption and
mismanagement, failure to reform the security sector, the ongoing
threat of the Rwandan Hutu insurgency FDLR based in the eastern
Congo, and a weak UN peacekeeping mission (MONUC) that is not
adequately protecting civilians."
In addition to over 16,000 UN peacekeepers in the country, and a
newly functioning military commission bringing together Congo,
Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, the African Union is considering
deploying as many as 7,000 additional troops to the country in
2006. But the UN Security Council has rejected the SecretaryGeneral's
recommendation for an additional brigade to provide
security in the province of Katanga, and there are still as many as
15,000 foreign combatants in eastern Congo. The UN General Assembly
has proposed a budget of $1.13 billion for the UN mission over the
year ending in June 2006.But the International Crisis Group report
says the mission needs not only funds but also to act more
forcefully to protect civilians and overcome the obstacles to
peace.
This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains a press release and overview
from an October report by the International Crisis Group, stressing
the steps necessary to "save the peace process and produce a
successful transition to elected government." It also contains an
excerpt from the latest report by the United Nations SecretaryGeneral
on peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo.
The most extensive source of background and current news on the
peace process, in both English and French, is the MONUC website
(http://www.monuc.org).
++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++++++++
The Democratic Republic of the Congo will likely relapse into mass
violence unless the Congolese parties and the international
community take urgent measures.
International Crisis Group
http://www.crisisgroup.org
Nairobi/Brussels, 19 October 2005:
A Congo Action Plan, the latest policy briefing from the
International Crisis Group, lays out a comprehensive and urgent set
of actions to save the peace process and produce a successful
transition to elected government by June 2006. Reunification has
been plagued by government corruption and mismanagement, failure to
reform the security sector, the ongoing threat of the Rwandan Hutu
insurgency FDLR based in the eastern Congo, and a weak UN
peacekeeping mission (MONUC) that is not adequately protecting
civilians.
"With elections already postponed for a year, security sector
reform, good governance and justice cannot await a new government",
says Suliman Baldo, Crisis Group's Africa Program Director. "They
must be prerequisites for elections or the transition process will
continue to crumble, and the country will descend into renewed
ethnic violence".
Up to 1,000 people are still dying every day from war-related
causes in Congo. While the transitional government has made some
progress, the reluctance of the main parties to relinquish power
has stalled the process. Crisis Group's Congo Action Plan lays out
specific steps for the transitional government and major donors,
such as the U.S., the UN and the European Union to take, including
to:
- prepare for and carry out free and fair elections by passing key
electoral laws and setting up a robust monitoring system;
- curb state corruption by tying foreign assistance to good
governance, strengthening Congolese institutions, creating a human
rights chamber in the court system and enacting targeted sanctions;
- create an integrated national army and police force to establish
security; and
- resolve the FDLR problem by returning the rebels to Rwanda,
peacefully and voluntarily by incentives if possible, or by
forcible disarmament if necessary, led by a more assertive MONUC,
which must fulfil its mandate to protect civilians.
"This is a watershed year", says Jason Stearns, Crisis Group's
Senior Analyst for the Congo. "Thousands of civilians are still at
risk, and this is their country's last best chance at a real
transition to peace".
Contacts: Andrew Stroehlein (Brussels) +32 (0) 2 541 1635 Kimberly
Abbott (Washington) +1 202 785 1601
A Congo Action Plan
Africa Briefing N 34
19 October 2005
Overview
More than two years into the transition in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, the peace process remains at risk. As many as 1,000
people a day still die from war-related causes -- mainly disease
and malnutrition, but also continuing violence. While the main
belligerent leaders are all in the transitional government, their
corruption and mismanagement threaten stability during and after
the forthcoming national elections, now postponed from June 2005 to
March 2006. The international community needs to maintain pressure
on a wide front, making specific security sector reform,
transitional justice and good governance measures prerequisites for
the elections, not allowing them to be postponed until there is a
new government.
The 2002 Global and All-Inclusive Agreement created the present
transitional government out of the main domestic warring parties
and committed it to a plan for reunification of the country,
disarmament and integration of armed groups, and elections. Some
progress has been made. The parliament has passed a draft
constitution (though it faces an uncertain referendum in November)
and laws on citizenship, the national army and political parties.
The former belligerents have begun to merge their separate
administrative structures and armed groups. But the process with
respect to reform of the security sector, as well as the judiciary
and local administration, is far from complete.
The main reason for the impasse, including postponement of
elections, has been the reluctance of the former belligerents to
give up power and assets for the national good. All have maintained
parallel command structures in the army, the local administration
and the intelligence services. Extensive embezzlement has resulted
in inadequate and irregular payment of civil servants and soldiers,
making the state itself perhaps the largest security threat to the
Congolese people.
State weakness also allows armed groups in the east to continue to
abuse civilians. The Rwandan Hutu insurgent group, the Democratic
Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), has refused to honour
its March 2005 pledge to return home peacefully and has committed
several massacres. In northern Katanga, Mai-Mai groups have fought
each other and the Congolese army, displacing over 280,000 people
in the province. And in Ituri, despite some robust actions by the
UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), 4,000
to 5,000 combatants still regularly attack the local population,
international troops and humanitarian officials.
The coming year will be decisive for the Congo, one of Africa's
largest and potentially richest countries. A successful transition
is by no means guaranteed. Unfortunately it is quite possible that
political leaders will continue to block critical transitional
reforms and try to skew the elections in their favour. There are
reasonable grounds for fearing electoral manipulation and even a
relapse into mass violence that would put at severe risk both the
unity of the Congo and the stability of much of the continent.
If these dangers are to be avoided, the UN Security Council and
other key members of the international community must press the
transitional government to take comprehensive action to stop the
suffering of the Congolese people, and ensure the success of the
transition by June 2006. This briefing spells out a comprehensive
action plan, built around five critical objectives, with the
following major elements:
- One: free and fair elections. The parliament must pass key
electoral laws; President Kabila must keep his commitment to
appoint new local administrations that fairly reflect the
power-sharing agreement signed in Pretoria in 2002; and the
international community must set up an effective system for
monitoring the elections anticipated in March 2006.
- Two: good governance and justice. A joint donors/ Congolese
mechanism should be implemented to curb state corruption; donor aid
should be tied to specific progress on good governance and
strengthening Congolese institutions, in particular the judiciary
and parliamentary commissions; a specialised human rights chamber
should be established within the court system to supplement the
work of the International Criminal Court (ICC); and the Security
Council should enact targeted sanctions against the violators of
the arms embargo.
- Three: an integrated national army and police force to establish
security. Donors should create an International Military Assistance
and Training Team (IMATT) to integrate all aid and training for the
new security forces; assistance for security sector reform should
be increased and a working group established to coordinate support
for police development.
- Four: disarmament, demobilisation and repatriation of the FDLR.
Peaceful efforts to entice the FDLR home must be exhausted, with
Rwanda clarifying which officers it intends to prosecute for
genocide and offering more generous incentives for others to
return; there should be international monitoring of the return
process and targeted Security Council sanctions against hard-line
leaders, especially those in Europe. In parallel, there should be
preparation for, and commencement of, military pressure on the
FDLR, with MONUC taking the initial lead.
- Five: fulfilment of MONUC's mandate to protect civilians. The UN
Security Council needs to authorise more troops for MONUC; the EU
and other donors should give it greater access to intelligence
assets; and either MONUC's mandate should be formally strengthened
or its concept of operations should be clarified to ensure that it
acts more robustly and proactively against the FDLR and other armed
groups.
Nineteenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Security Council Distr.: General 26 September 2005
United Nations S/2005/603
[Full report available on http://www.monuc.org and
http://www.un.org]
VII. Observations and recommendations
71. Despite delays, largely caused by logistical problems,
encouraging progress has been made so far in the voter registration
process, which is an important step towards the holding of
democratic elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is
vital that the necessary legislation, including the electoral law,
be adopted by the Transitional Government and Parliament with a
minimum of delay so that the elections can be organized no later
than June 2006. In this connection, the commendable support
provided by the international partners to the electoral process
needs to be sustained. I urge donors to accelerate the disbursement
of their generous pledges for financing the organization of the
elections. Meanwhile, MONUC is expanding its extensive role
nationwide in providing logistical and other support to the
Independent Electoral Commission, which will be crucial for the
successful holding of the polls.
72. In the meantime, considerable progress has been made in
training of the Congolese National police who will provide security
for the elections. Furthermore, I am grateful to the Security
Council for the authorization for additional formed police units,
which will be deployed in the coming weeks and will increase the
Mission's capacity to assist in providing security during the
electoral period. However, as also indicated in my previous report
on MONUC (S/2005/506), an enhancement of the Mission's military
capacity will be required to address the threats posed by armed
groups in Katanga and contribute to establishing the necessary
security conditions for elections in that volatile province. In
this regard, I hope that the Council will give due consideration to
my recommendation for an increase of 2,580 in the force strength of
MONUC, to carry out the tasks outlined in paragraphs 27 to 29
above.
73. Good governance, including, in particular, the proper
management of natural resources and State funds, including those
provided for the elections, and ensuring the regular payment of
salaries to military personnel, police and civil servants, is vital
to ensure that the transitional process is credible and enjoys
widespread public support. In this connection, the Transitional
Government needs to demonstrate a commitment to working closely
with its international partners to establish a mechanism to ensure
the sound, transparent and accountable management of public
finances and to effectively address corruption.
74. While well-trained and equipped police and military presences
are vital to achieving security, law and order cannot be achieved
without effective judicial and corrections institutions to underpin
law enforcement activity. In many areas of the country, however,
there is neither detention capacity nor any functioning courts,
obliging law enforcement authorities to release allegedly dangerous
perpetrators or request that MONUC contingents confine suspects for
reasons of security and protection of civilians. The Transitional
Government needs to take urgent action to increase judicial
capacity and to ensure humane conditions of detention. In this
regard, I call upon the Congolese authorities to allocate adequate
financial resources for strengthening the justice sector in the
2006 State budget and I appeal to donors to increase their support
to this vital area.
75. In the remaining months of the transition, the extension of
State administration throughout the country and the improved
delivery of basic services to the population should be accorded
priority by the Transitional Government. In this connection, the
Government and its international partners should focus on
developing and implementing a plan to integrate Ituri more fully
into the rest of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly
with regard to financial, administrative and security aspects. The
transitional authorities should also take the necessary measures to
establish control over the exploitation of Ituri's natural
resources, to promote reconstruction and development and to provide
a tangible peace dividend for the people. In this regard, the
development of security mechanisms to protect civilians and to
facilitate the monitoring of cross-border movements of combatants
in the east of the country and violations of the arms embargo
should be priority tasks.
76. Despite the immense suffering of the people of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, too little attention has been paid by the
international community to the continuing humanitarian catastrophe
in the country. The work being undertaken to launch a 2006
humanitarian action plan seeking to address basic needs of the
Congolese people is highly commendable, and I would urge donors to
support this important, comprehensive initiative, as well as to
provide additional resources in response to the 2005 Consolidated
Appeal.
77. During the past three years, MONUC has sought to disarm and
demobilize foreign armed groups on the territory of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and to facilitate their voluntary return to
their countries of origin. Almost 12,000 combatants and their
dependants have been repatriated. During that period, MONUC and the
International Committee for Support to the Transition have urged
the Transitional Government to take measures to forcibly disarm the
remaining foreign armed groups and facilitate their repatriation.
The general consensus within the Transitional Government on
carrying out a process of forcible disarmament is encouraging.
However, FARDC still needs to build sufficient capacity to take
effective action against FDLR and additional international
financial and logistical support will be crucial in achieving this.
Meanwhile, clear public commitments from the Governments of Rwanda
and Uganda on security guarantees and incentives for returnees who
have not been responsible for gross human rights violations will be
vital in encouraging progress in the disarmament and repatriation
process.
78. Some progress has been made in the reform of the armed forces
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including the integration
and deployment of five brigades, and it is vital that the
Transitional Government assume full responsibility in this
important area. In this regard, I would call for increased support
by international partners for the security sector reform, including
through addressing the main requirements for supporting and
sustaining the FARDC brigades, as outlined in paragraphs 36 and 37
above.
79. Further concerted efforts need to be made to stop the continued
gross human rights violations by armed groups and FARDC against
civilians in Ituri, the Kivus, and central and northern Katanga,
which are seriously undermining efforts to stabilize these areas
and affecting the organization of elections. Under the Mission's
mandate for the protection of civilians, MONUC, as well as United
Nations humanitarian and human rights personnel, intend to carry
out protection activities, particularly where State institutions
are insufficient. I therefore commend the ongoing efforts to bring
all components of the Mission, together with other partners, under
a common framework for the protection of the civilian population.
In this regard, deterrent operations by the MONUC military
component will complement the monitoring, advocacy, assistance and
support activities performed by humanitarian and human rights
actors, and close coordination is essential in optimizing joint
efforts.
80. The constitutional referendum is scheduled to be held before
the expiration of the first extension of the transition on 31
December. Parliament is likely to have voted, by that time, for the
second and final six-month extension of the transition, to allow
the Independent Electoral Commission to organize the elections. In
this context, I would recommend that the mandate of MONUC be
extended for one year, until 1 October 2006, which would include
the period up until the elections and the immediate
post-transitional period following the installation of the new
Government.
81. In conclusion, I would like to thank my Special Representative,
William Lacy Swing, and the men and women of MONUC, the United
Nations system and international partners for their untiring
efforts, often under conditions of personal risk, to bring peace to
the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with
a particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
Bulletin is edited by William Minter.
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