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Liberia: Elections Necessary, Not Enough
AfricaFocus Bulletin
Oct 10, 2005 (051010)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
With frontrunners including soccer star George Weah and experienced
international official and banker Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Liberians
are set to choose among 22 candidates for president as well as new
legislators. "This country has to finish with war," a shopkeeper in
Monrovia told a New York Times reporter as the election approached.
Despite hopes for a new start, however, both Liberians and
international observers are well aware that much more is needed
beyond elections.
A report released by the International Crisis Group in September
spells out the background and some of the steps needed to ensure
stability and recovery, including continued international support,
civil society involvement in fighting corruption, and dealing with
the issue of exiled warlord Charles Taylor and other factors which
could lead to renewed war.
This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains the press release, the executive
summary, and excerpts from the full report "Liberia's Elections:
Necessary but Not Sufficient" from the International Crisis Group
(ICG). For the full ICG report visit http://www.crisisgroup.org.
For earlier AfricaFocus Bulletins on Liberia and additional links
for background and news, see
http://www.africafocus.org/country/liberia.php.
A recent analysis by Reed Kramer of allAfrica.com, focusing on the
candidates and on opinions from Washington policymakers, is
available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200510050120.html.
The website of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) is
http://www.unmil.org.
++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++++++++
Liberia's Elections: Necessary but Not Sufficient
International Crisis Group
http://www.crisisgroup.org
Contacts: Andrew Stroehlein (Brussels) +32 (0) 2 541 1635
Kimberly Abbott (Washington) +1 202 785 1601
Dakar/Brussels, 7 September 2005: Liberia's approaching elections
represent welcome progress, but it would court disaster to consider
them the end of the country's transformation.
Liberia's Elections: Necessary but Not Sufficient, the latest
report from the International Crisis Group, examines the key
elements of the country's reconstruction and argues legitimate
presidential and legislative elections in October are just one
small step on a long road to recovery. The process can still easily
fail if Liberians refuse to implement an intrusive economic
governance mechanism or if international partners pull out early.
"If the international community tries to make an exit strategy out
of the Liberian elections, it would almost certainly have to return
to end another bloody war there within a year or two", says Mike
McGovern, Crisis Group's West Africa Project Director. "And any
such return would cost far more than just staying put in the first
place".
Liberia has been crumbling for at least 25 years, but there is some
room for optimism as elections approach. Economic governance and
rooting out high level corruption are the subject of active public
debate. The intrusive Governance and Economic Management Assistance
Program (GEMAP) that donors and diplomats have proposed is in the
final stages of negotiations with the transitional government.
The UN, the U.S., the EU and the World Bank need to stay the
course. Working in conjunction with the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union, they must rebuild
the country's shattered institutions and infrastructure and ensure
Liberia's security through maintenance of the UN peacekeeping
mission and the gradual training of new Liberian security forces.
Beyond the short- to medium-term goals of clean elections,
international involvement in economic governance, and security,
several important long-term issues will need to be addressed. They
include citizenship, reintegration of ex-combatants,
decentralisation of government, transitional justice, judicial
reform and possibly constitutional reform aimed at lessening
executive power.
"In the fast approaching second stage of Liberia's recovery,
addressing all these areas in a comprehensive way will be crucial",
says Suliman Baldo, Crisis Group's Africa Program Director. "The
international community must remain engaged throughout the long
process to ensure that Liberia does not descend again into violence
and pillage that engulfs the region".
Liberia's Elections: Necessary but Not Sufficient
7 September 2005
Executive Summary
Everything indicates that Liberia's October 2005 presidential and
legislative elections are likely to be transparent and fair. Many
hope this will permit an exit strategy to be implemented that could
see international actors leaving the country as soon as the end of
2006. The probable result of such a scenario would be that, in the
words of one ex-combatant, "the UN will be coming back in 2007 or
2008". Liberia has been crumbling for at least 25 years. Elections
are but a small, early step in a lengthy reconstruction process
that will be sabotaged if Liberian elites refuse some form of
intrusive economic governance mechanism, or if international
partners pull out before a sustainable security environment is
achieved. If the international community does have to return in
several years, it will be to mop up yet another war that will cost
far more than remaining seriously engaged over the next decade or
more.
The UN, the U.S., the European Commission and the World Bank must
stay the course, working in conjunction with the Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) to
rebuild Liberia's shattered institutions and infrastructure, and
assuring Liberia's security first through maintenance of the UNMIL
peacekeeping presence and eventually through the training and
mentoring of new Liberian security forces. In a regional context in
which UN peacekeeping forces are drawing down to zero in Sierra
Leone, Guinea remains volatile, and violence in C“te d'Ivoire
simmers just beneath the surface, anything less than full
commitment to reintegration and reconstruction in Liberia will most
likely contribute to a new, wider conflict.
Despite the fragility of the situation, there is much room for
optimism in Liberia today. Preparations for elections are on track,
though such areas as campaign finance will require continued and
serious attention. Refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)
are returning home, even if not under ideal circumstances. Life in
both Monrovia and distant counties is taking on the rhythms, sounds
and appearance of normality. Most importantly, issues of economic
governance and high level corruption have become a central
preoccupation of almost everyone in the country as a result of
investigations conducted by ECOWAS and the European Commission. The
intrusive Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program
(GEMAP) that donors and diplomats have proposed is in the final
stages of negotiation with the transitional government.
The discussions that have emerged out of this proposal are
heartening. Liberians in Monrovia, the hinterland, and the diaspora
are arguing its merits and demerits. Some are motivated by pure
self-interest, but many are not. The liveliness of the debate, like
the thoughtful planning going into the elections, augurs well for
the future, provided the plan is not gutted on the disingenuous
grounds of national sovereignty.
Beyond the three key elements necessary to move Liberia forward in
the short to medium term -- clean elections, international
involvement in revenue collection and economic governance
generally, and the maintenance of security -- there are several
important longer-term issues which will need to be addressed. They
include citizenship (increasingly problematic across West Africa),
reintegration of ex-combatants, decentralisation of government,
transitional justice, judicial reform, and possibly also
constitutional reform aimed at lessening executive power.
These issues should all be addressed as soon as possible after the
elected government is inaugurated. An inclusive national conference
might be a helpful way of determining the priorities among these
and other issues and building public support for further change.
The international presence, having assured credible elections and
continuing to assure security and that monies due to the government
arrive, will give space to the government to take on these other
daunting tasks. The candidates for elected office, the Liberian
people, and international partners should all begin to raise their
sights toward these more ambitious goals at the same time that they
continue to ensure the success of the three foundational elements
of elections, economic governance and security. Liberia is quickly
approaching the second stage of its recovery: a smooth,
well-planned transition will be as important as the individual
policies.
Liberia could surpass Sierra Leone in all major indicators within
three to five years and within ten years stand (once again) solidly
ahead of other countries in the region such as Guinea, Guinea
Bissau, Mali, and Niger. The country is rich, its population is
small, and Liberians overseas send large remittances home. If these
elements are multiplied by donor assistance and good management of
resources, Liberia should make quick progress. However, another,
gloomier scenario is also possible, even with the basic security
provided by UN peacekeepers and a good election. If the theft and
impunity that have characterised the transitional government are
not corrected, Liberia will likely follow in Sierra Leone's
footsteps, languishing at the bottom of the Human Development
Index, failing to create jobs for young men, and probably sliding
back into war by the end of the decade.
Excerpts from full report
I. Introduction
In August 2003, the series of battles for Monrovia that Liberians
called World Wars I, II, and III had just ended, and a deal
brokered by the U.S., the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) and Nigeria sent a sanctimonious and unrepentant Charles
Taylor off to Nigeria. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) then
hammered out in Accra created a transitional government with
businessman Gyude Bryant at its head and a two-year mandate.
Simultaneously, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was
setting up its operation with a mandate to restore security, assist
the transitional government, and prepare for elections in October
2005.
On the surface, there have been several setbacks, most notably a
premature start to the disarmament process that allowed spoilers to
capitalise on UNMIL's lack of preparation and launch an uprising
that led to nine deaths, as well as another explosion of violence
in October-November 2004, also exacerbated by spoilers, that led to
sixteen deaths and significant destruction of property. Overall,
the progression from radical insecurity to reasonably good security
for most people most of the time has been consistent and
encouraging. ...
Few Liberians had any illusions about the transitional government
assembled in Accra. It was the product of an arrangement that was
99 per cent realpolitik and 1 per cent principle. The three warring
factions got to carve up the national cake, each taking its piece
in the form of ministerial positions and legislative seats -- in
short, two more years of looting rights. This was a continuation of
the predatory logic that had decimated the country, and it was
difficult to see how it would reorganise itself according to a new
set of rules. The erstwhile warlords and their proxies in the
national transitional government (NTGL) could not be counted on to
do it, and UNMIL insisted that its mandate was not sufficiently
strong. Somewhere along the way, the dynamic shifted, largely
thanks to an active civil society, including a press that has
proliferated and begun to professionalise; human rights, women's
rights and environmental activists who came up for air after six
years of Taylor repression; and others working with the UN and
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). These actors were provoked
into action by members of the transitional government who showed
themselves to be monumentally corrupt, rapacious, and unconcerned
by the plight of ordinary Liberians. By February 2005, the press
and civil society organisations began to level accusations of
financial malfeasance at individuals within the NTGL for granting
contracts negotiated in secret and being unable to account for
government funds. Speaker George Dweh and Deputy Speaker Eddington
Varmah were suspended indefinitely on 14 March for alleged
misappropriation of some $90,0004 in allowances. ,,,
By mid-year, an anti-corruption sweep unleashed by civil society,
ECOWAS and the European Commission (EC) was closing in on an
increasing number of officials, ,,,The donor and diplomatic
communities decided they had had enough and proposed the intrusive
measures now known as the Liberian Governance and Economic
Management Assistance Plan (GEMAP). Those measures, described in
Section III below, have raised the possibility that an end to
impunity and new accountability to the electorate may be introduced
into the Liberian political equation.
Liberia has a newly-appointed Special Representative of the UN
Secretary-General (SRSG) and a new U.S. ambassador. In several
months it will have a new elected president and legislature. The
two-year interim since Charles Taylor's forced departure has seen
success in three vital areas: improved security; the setting of
conditions for legitimate elections; and the raising of key issues
of governance and impunity that were root causes of the disaster
that was Liberia for two decades.
With this solid base and a fresh roster of key actors, Liberia is
poised to begin tackling its enduring, structural problems. It must
be emphasised that *Liberia* is poised, and *Liberia* must tackle
them. International partnership might do one of four things in the
country. First, it could help restore a fragile peace, begin to
raise core problems, and then walk away, risking a new collapse.
This is what happened in 1997, and the result was a quick
resumption of the war. Secondly, it could pour in enough money to
alleviate some of the immediate symptoms of the root problems that
caused the wars but do little to address the problems themselves.
This is the route donors have taken in Sierra Leone, and in the
long term it is certainly a very debilitating approach. A third
approach would involve a high level of intrusiveness, specifically
intended not to repeat some of the mistakes of Sierra Leone;
international partners would manage most of Liberia's finances and
other affairs, but eventually disengage. This would risk creating
little more than a hiatus between two periods of bad governance,
exactly as the first scenario risks inserting a hiatus between two
chapters of war.
The final and only desirable option would be for intrusive economic
governance measures to be accompanied by the good faith
participation of the newly-elected government, with civil society,
a political opposition and the press all playing vital watchdog
functions with respect to the activities not only of the elected
officials, but also of the international actors in-country to help.
Liberians will successfully take over the functions that
non-Liberians temporarily fill only if their critical institutions
blossom, which requires a good deal of serious exercise during the
"capacity building" phase. ...
D. The Taylor Factor
One of the names that came up several times in interviews with
Liberian politicians, members of civil society, and diplomats as
allegedly participating in attempts to influence the elections
financially was former President Charles Taylor's.32 The role, if
any, that he is playing continues to be a matter of speculation but
several of those claiming he has tried to influence the elections
come from within his own party. During its May convention, NPP
insiders contend, Taylor made frequent phone calls from Nigeria
insisting that his former minister, Dr Roland Massaquoi, be
nominated for president rather than Francis Galawolo, the other
main contender.33 This came on the heels of claims that Taylor was
involved in a 19 January 2005 armed attack against President
Lansana Cont‚ of Guinea, a television interview he gave that led
the Nigerian authorities to rebuke him for having broken the terms
of his stay, and visits by former associates like David Kortie, who
publicly stated that he had met with Taylor in Calabar and alleged
having received $10,000 and a cell phone from him.34 Diplomatic
sources have said that Taylor was continuing to make phone calls to
the highest levels of the NTGL as recently as July 2005.
The calls for Taylor's extradition to Freetown to be tried for war
crimes and crimes against humanity that began with the UN Special
Court for Sierra Leone have been echoed by the European Parliament,
the U.S. Congress, and many human rights organisations in Africa
and elsewhere. More importantly, in a joint communiqu‚ published 28
July 2005, Chairman Gyude Bryant of Liberia, President Kabbah of
Sierra Leone, and Prime Minister Diallo of Guinea, speaking for the
Mano River Union, noted that:
While the Heads of State appreciate the decision of ECOWAS and the
gesture of His Excellency President Obasanjo and other Heads of
State in the African Union to grant temporary stay to Charles
Taylor in Nigeria, they believe that some of his alleged activities
may be in breach of his terms of stay in Nigeria .In light of the
views exchanged, the Summit agreed to suggest to the Government of
the Federal Republic of Nigeria that there may now be need for a
review of the terms of the temporary stay granted to Charles Taylor
or a referral by the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
of the matter to ECOWAS Heads of State for further consideration.
The three leaders asked Nigeria either to turn Taylor over for
trial or tighten its controls over his activities. Their use of the
terminology "temporary stay" rather than "asylum" and the
suggestion that the matter be brought before ECOWAS suggested
increased pressure on Nigeria. Because the initial safe haven offer
was made to save many lives, and negotiators in West Africa or
elsewhere may need to make similar good faith and credible offers
in the future, if Taylor is to be turned over to a court it is
vitally important to demonstrate that he has broken the terms of
his agreement, which focus on his noninterference in Liberian and
regional politics.36 Such evidence as there is suggests that he has
done so, but probably not at a really significant level. His NPP
party increasingly appears impoverished and relatively weak. That
said, Taylor himself appears committed to exercising as much
influence as he can, and there is little reason to imagine that he
will desist.
It is difficult to confirm accusations of Taylor's continued
involvement in wider West African politics. The preponderance of
the evidence suggests that such infractions have occurred but again
are most likely of modest significance. Crisis Group's view is that
shortly after inauguration, the new Liberian president should call
for a meeting of ECOWAS heads of state to take a collective
decision as to whether Taylor has breached the terms of his stay in
Nigeria sufficiently significantly to justify terminating his
asylum. The question at hand should then be Taylor's extradition to
Sierra Leone, where he has been charged, and not to Liberia.
AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with
a particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
Bulletin is edited by William Minter.
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