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Congo (Kinshasa): Conflict Background Analyses
AfricaFocus Bulletin
Dec 13, 2007 (071213)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
"North Kivu has been the epicentre of Congo's violence since the
conflict began more than fifteen years ago. Now is the time to
address this major gap in the Congolese transition and end a crisis
which is producing immense suffering and continues to carry wider
risks for Congo and its neighbours." - International Crisis Group
This call from the International Crisis Group on October 31 was
accompanied by recommendations for "a comprehensive initiative [that]
needs to be launched urgently to de-escalate the crisis." Instead,
new military action by the Congolese government appears to be
escalating the crisis. An early November agreement between the
Congolese and Rwandan governments pledging cooperation against
groups in Kivu that have been continuing the conflict was welcomed,
but its implementation was soon in doubt.
This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains excerpts from several current
analyses of the current crisis, its roots, and prospects of
solution, from the International Crisis Group, African Rights, and
Refugees International. Another AfricaFocus Bulletin has several
reports on the most recent developments.
For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, and related links, visit
http://www.africafocus.org/country/congokin.php
++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++++++++
Congo: Bringing Peace to North Kivu
International Crisis Group
http://www.crisisgroup.org
Africa Report N 133
31 October 2007
Executive Summary
[For recommendations and full report visit
http://www.crisisgroup.org]
North Kivu is again a crucible of conflict in Congo. Since fighting
resumed between the insurgents of Laurent Nkunda and the national
army in December 2006, over 370,000 civilians have been displaced
in the province. Due to the failure of the latest attempt to
integrate Nkunda's troops into the army, the crisis has become much
worse since May 2007. UN attempts to impose a ceasefire and appoint
a special envoy to mediate have failed. President Joseph Kabila's
15 October decision to suspend offensive operations and his
subsequent call on all Congolese armed groups in the region to
present themselves for disarmament or army integration is welcome
but fighting continues, and there is no real dialogue with Nkunda.
A comprehensive initiative needs to be launched urgently to
de-escalate the crisis and address the root causes of the conflict.
This new crisis results from failures of the Congo peace process on
army integration, economic governance and transitional justice.
During the second half of the political transition - which formally
ended with the election of President Kabila and a new legislature
in 2006 - a policy of containment, appeasement, and international
emphasis on the holding of elections cooled tensions but left their
causes unaffected. The province remained in effect split into two
pieces, with Masisi and Rutshuru territories caught in a cold war
between dissidents from the former Rwandan-backed rebel group, the
Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), and the national army (FARDC).
Little progress was made on disarmament and reintegration of Mai
Mai militias or repatriation of the Rwandan Hutu (FDLR) rebels. The
illegal exploitation of natural resources continued unabated as all
communities armed, animated by deep mutual resentments over land
security, mass human rights abuses during the war and control of
natural resources.
The 2006 national and provincial elections liquidated politically
the RCD. Strengthened by his election, Kabila held discreet talks
with Nkunda, facilitated by Rwanda, and concluded an agreement for
the progressive integration of Nkunda's troops into the regular
armed forces, a process locally known as mixage, with the
understanding that they would not have to leave the province until
the general security situation improved significantly. But neither
Nkunda nor Kabila was able to contain their hardliners opposed to
the settlement.
Afraid to become the victims of revenge killings and lose
everything they had illegally acquired during the war, Goma-based
Tutsi leaders accused Nkunda of betrayal and threatened to stop
supporting him. Kabila's hardliners attacked him over the perceived
preferential treatment given to the Tutsi in the army integration
process and used the public outcry over the massive human rights
violations and displacement of civilians caused by the operations
against the FDLR to undermine the agreement's legitimacy. Mixage
collapsed in May 2007, leading to new escalation.
So far, the crisis has not jumped the border to draw in Rwanda.
Both Kinshasa and Kigali have shown restraint and chosen to
continue with regular consultations. However, on the ground, there
is combat; the humanitarian situation is appalling; neither side
has a good prospect of military success; and escalation continues
to carry the risk of destabilisation of the wider region.
To compensate for the national army's weakness, Kabila has been
trying to co-opt the UN mission (MONUC) into his operations, a move
the UN should continue to resist lest it be caught in the crossfire
between Nkunda and the FDLR. The international community should
encourage Kabila to suspend his military offensive and launch a
comprehensive peace initiative for North Kivu, aimed first at
de-escalating the conflict and improving the general security
environment in the province, then addressing the core issues
related to restoration of state authority such as regulation of the
exploitation of natural resources, return of refugees and a
transitional justice process facilitating community reconciliation.
A prolonged deadlock would inevitably result in further
displacement of civilians and increased risk of ethnic cleansing
and revenge killing on both sides.
Over the past three years, ending the North Kivu conflict has been
repeatedly postponed in favour of efforts to consolidate the
transition and secure Kabila's election. But North Kivu has been
the epicentre of Congo's violence since the conflict began more
than fifteen years ago. Now is the time to address this major gap
in the Congolese transition and end a crisis which is producing
immense suffering and continues to carry wider risks for Congo and
its neighbours.
A Welcome Expression of Intent - The Nairobi Communique and the
Ex-FAR/Interahamwe
African Rights
Press Release
11 December 2007
[Excerpts. For the full press release see
http://allafrica.com/stories/200712110920.html
The full report is available as a PDF download at
http://allafrica.com/peaceafrica/resources/00011449.html
For more information contact African Rights at rights@rwanda1.com, or by phone Rakiya Omaar or Theodore
Nyiliknwaya at (+250) 503679.]
On 9 November 2007, representatives of the Governments of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda met in Nairobi,
Kenya, and signed a communique pledging "a common approach to
address the threat posed to our common security and stability by
the ex-FAR/Interahamwe." The agreement was facilitated by the
United Nations and witnessed by the United States and the
European Union. This new accord represents a comprehensive and
constructive point of departure that could pave the way for an
end to the armed presence of the ex-FAR and interahamwe in
eastern DRC, and to the needless suffering of those living in
North and South Kivu provinces, who have been the most directly
and seriously damaged by the recent violence in the region. A
Welcome Expression of Intent reveals details of the organization
and functioning of the ex-FAR and interahamwe both within eastern
DRC and internationally. In publishing this report, African
Rights hopes to support and encourage the crucial process of
dismantling these forces.
The protracted lack of co-operation in finding lasting solutions
to long-standing problems in eastern DRC, in which the two
governments and the peoples of both countries have an enormous
stake, has profoundly hurt the entire Great Lakes region in terms
of human security, political stability and economic development.
The neighbouring states of Burundi and Uganda have also been
affected by the troubles in this shared border region. Yet, as
the signatories themselves point out, there has been no shortage
of agreements - bilateral, sub-regional and regional - to promote
co-operation between the DRC and Rwanda. It is therefore easy,
and tempting, to write off this late st initiative as just
another document. Indeed, it may turn out to have little real
impact, or far less than the civilians whose lives have been
devastated need and deserve. It is for their collective benefit
that every effort must be made to translate the promise of
Nairobi into reality.
... The clashes have been particularly intense in North Kivu.
Here, soldiers loyal to the National Congress for the Defence of
the People (CNDP), set up by a Tutsi general, Laurent Nkunda, are
at war with the armed forces of the DRC. The communique draws
special attention to the need to reign in Nkunda's CNDP, whose
military campaigns have been a major contributing factor in the
humanitarian disaster. Also ranged against the CNDP are the Mayi
Mayi militia, and the Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Fighters,
(PARECO), a militia force essentially made up of Congolese Hutus,
both working in close collaboration with the Democratic Forces
for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a Rwandese militia directed
by former officers deeply implicated in the 1994 genocide, and
which counts many genocide suspects among its combatants and
civilian cadres. ... These multiple conflicts reinforce each
other, providing new opportunities and justifications for the
endless cycle of conflict.
Whatever the political, ethnic and social tensions that
characterize the history of eastern Congo, there is little doubt
that the seemingly permanent crisis in the Kivus dates from the
arrival of more than two million Rwandese refugees in July 1994,
incl ding soldiers of the Rwandese Armed Forces, known as the
ex-FAR, and their allies, the interahamwe militia. Their
activities, and those of the groups which express their political
interests and aspirations, and which fight on their behalf, for
example the Republican Rally for Democracy (RDR), the FDLR and
the Rally for Unity and Democracy (RUD/URUNANA), are at the
source of the violence, mistrust and sense of hopelessness which
feed on each other in the Kivus. ...
Although the most recent fighting and atrocities in the Kivus
were sparked by the rebellion of Laurent Nkunda, there is little
prospect of stemming the violence, of restraining the armed
groups or of facilitating the voluntary return of Rwandese
refugees without first neutralizing the ex-FAR and interahamwe.
... Even if Nkunda is brought under control, so long as the ex-FAR
and interahamwe hold sway, as they do, in large parts of the Kivus,
there will be neither peace nor security for the Congolese people
or Rwandese refugees, and the Great Lakes region will continue to
be unstable and fraught with tension.
In addressing the complex configurations of warfare, the Nairobi
communique rightly acknowledges that all foreign as well as
national armed groups in the Kivus are part of the problem and
must be tackled in a serious, urgent, concerted and collaborative
manner, and places particular emphasis on the hazards inflicted
by the ex-FAR and interahamwe. It calls for military action to
dismantle illegal armed groups, as well as political programmes
to enable fighters to lay down their arms, move away from the
border areas and, for the Rwandese, to exercise the right to
choose between voluntary repatriation to Rwanda or peaceful
integration in the DRC. Rwanda and the DRC have committed
themselves to impose strict controls to prevent cross-border
movements of fighters, weapons and the provision of food and
medical supplies to all groups; to refrain from giving human,
material or political support, directly or indirectly to the
armed groups; to desist from engaging in destructive propaganda
against each other, to encourage and enable refugees to return
home; to share information and to use existing mechanisms to deal
with issues of common concern. It urges the DRC to "arrest and
hand over to the ICTR [International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda] and Rwanda those indicted for crimes of genocide, crimes
against humanity or war crimes."
Calling the ex-FAR/interahamwe a "genocidal military
organization", the communique also calls on the Security Council
to impose sanctions against them, and appeals to all member tates
of the UN to "prev all fund-raising, mobilization or propaganda
activities of the ex-FAR and interahamwe." International concern
about the serious crimes the ex-FAR and the interahamwe
combatants have inflicted on communities in eastern DRC is
crucial to achieving progress in the region, but African Rights
believes that attention must simultaneously be focused on the
activities and presence of their members abroad. Little
consideration, if any, has been given to their representatives
and spokespeople in Africa, Europe and North America, who raise
funds; lobby governments, Churches and NGOs for political and
other support; recruit within the large Rwandese diaspora
communities; facilitate travel and travel documents for their
leaders and their families; act as conduits through which
relatives send money to the fighters; win over public opinion,
especially through contacts with the media, and spread the
propaganda of their groups to mislead the world. ...
The presidents of the FDLR and RUD, Ignace Murwanashyaka and Jean
Marie-Vianney Higiro, are based in Germany and the US
respectively, along with other senior officials, an advantage
that gives their organizations considerable exposure and
opportunities internationally. FDLR cells or satellites exist in
Zambia, Congo-Brazzaville, Tanzania, Cameroon, Zimbabwe,
Mozambique, Malawi, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, and also in
Norway, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, Denmark, Canada, Belgium,
France and the US. A Welcome Expression of Intent provides
extensive information about the identities and backgrounds of the
men and women who act and speak in the name of the ex-FAR and
interahamwe in the DRC and on the world stage. Many of their
names are on the wanted lists of Interpol, the US Rewards for
Justice Programme and the ICTR.
...
Contrary to the arguments that there are only a small number of
genocide suspects among the FDLR in the Congo, there are
hundreds. And there are dozens more genocide suspects, living in
comfort in Africa, Europe and North America, among their
representatives. ... African Rights' report discusses the
allegations against dozens of people, both military and
civilians, who are in the DRC, in Africa and in Europe. The
report also refutes the argument that the military commanders
implicated in the genocide are now too old to be among the
commanders of the FDLR. A substantial number of officers in
senior positions are in their late thirties, and for the most
part in their forties and early fifties. ...
DR Congo: Civilian Protection Must Remain MONUC Priority
December 6, 2007
Refugees International
Peacebuilding Program Officer Mark Malan and Peacebuilding
Associate Erin Weir just returned from a three-week assessment of
the security and protection situation in eastern Congo.
[Excerpts: for full report visit
http://www.refugeesinternational.org]
After a successful democratic election in 2006 violence has
re-erupted in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) and security conditions continue to deteriorate,
particularly in the volatile province of North Kivu. Violent
confrontations between the Congolese military - the FARDC - and
the armed group lead by dissident General Laurent Nkunda,
claiming to fight on behalf of the Tutsi minority in the east,
have precipitated new waves of internal displacement and have
caused a sharpening of ethnic tensions throughout the region.
Meanwhile, the security vacuum and persistent lack of a
functioning justice sector has meant that rape, looting, and
violence against civilians continue to go unpunished.
Civilians at Risk
Displacement in North Kivu alone has risen to nearly 400,000
people in 2007, with over 190,000 fleeing their homes in just the
last four months and even greater displacement expected. The
internally displaced are increasingly dividing themselves along
ethnic lines, with non-Tutsis fleeing into areas controlled by
the FARDC and Tutsis moving primarily into Nkunda-controlled
areas, raising concerns about the potential for ethnically
targeted massacres. These people have been traumatized by ongoing
violence, and frequently arrive at IDP sites with almost nothing,
having been 'taxed' and looted along the way. ...
Due to lack of proper pay, housing, and family support, as well
as a general sense of impunity enjoyed within the ranks of the
military, the FARDC continues to be among the major perpetrators
of violent crime, rape, and theft. The troops loot civilians
through the exaction of 'taxes' and use forced labor to move
military equipment and supplies to the front lines. Foreign and
internal armed groups perpetrating violent crimes and
intimidating civilians throughout North and South Kivu include:
the forces of Laurent Nkunda, the FDLR (forces led by the
remnants of the Rwandan genocidaires who fled to DRC - then Zaire
- in 1994), and the Mayi Mayi militias (an ethnically based armed
group operating throughout North and South Kivu).
The Security Situation
General Nkunda is the major source of instability in North Kivu.
Despite ultimatums, the buildup of FARDC troops in North Kivu,
and President Joseph Kabila's very public intention to seek a
military solution to the 'Nkunda problem,' Nkunda and his
estimated 5,000 fighters continue to refuse to reintegrate back
into the Congolese national army.
In South Kivu the situation is tense, but calm. The FDLR are
currently concentrated in the Nindja Forest, Bunyakiri, and Fizi
areas of South Kivu. The FDLR and their associated armed groups
continue to pose a threat to civilians throughout North and South
Kivu, and represent a major thorn in the side of the Government
of Rwanda, which wants to see the former genocidaires brought to
justice. Under increasing international pressure to resolve this
issue, the Congolese Government recently endorsed the 'Nairobi
Communiqu‚,' outlining their intention to take military action
against the FDLR. Staff of humanitarian agencies fear that any
military action against the FDLR will result in reprisal killings
against civilians, a tactic that it historically favors.
MONUC and Protecting Civilians
In this difficult context MONUC, the UN peacekeeping mission in
DRC, has a mandate to protect civilians under threat of violence,
and - somewhat paradoxically - to provide combat support to the
undisciplined and under-resourced FARDC. In accordance with the
responsibilities laid out in Security Council resolution 1756,
MONUC forces continue to bolster FARDC capacity by providing
logistical and material support, low-level capacity building, and
- where necessary - taking strong intervening action in defense
of strategic locations.
In spite of the heavy support burden shouldered by MONUC, the
mission's primary responsibility continues to be the protection
of civilians, a task not easily accomplished in the vast, hilly,
densely forested eastern region, with just one MONUC soldier for
every 123 square kilometers. In order to maximize limited
resources the Protection Cluster, composed of the Office of the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNICEF, the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, MONUC Civil Affairs and
Civil-Military Affairs officers, and a number of
protection-focused NGOs, is working collaboratively to identify
protection priority areas, and has shown great creativity and
flexibility in meeting the current and projected civilian
protection needs. ...
While MONUC can never guarantee complete physical protection, there
is no doubt that this "thin blue line" has contributed
substantially to the containment of military violence, the
prevention of massacres, and the safe delivery of humanitarian
assistance in a complex and often chaotic environment. ...
Policy Recommendations
- The UN Security Council should ensure that civilian protection
remains the first priority of MONUC, and that force levels remain
at present authorized strength, at a minimum. Any additions to
the current responsibilities of MONUC must come with sufficient
human and material resources to ensure that civilian protection
priorities do not suffer.
- MONUC and humanitarian agencies in eastern DRC should increase
the number of high-level political and civilian representatives,
including representatives from the Protection Cluster, in Goma
and field locations in the east to give MONUC a civilian face,
enhance analysis that can contribute to contingency planning and
durable political solutions, and relieve some of the pressure on
MONUC military forces.
- The Congolese government should take steps to publicly
denounce the anti-Tutsi rhetoric and fear mongering that is
ongoing in the east, and take action to demonstrate a real
commitment to the protection of ethnic minorities, while at the
same time sustaining and redoubling efforts to find political
solutions to continued insecurity, impunity, and human suffering
in the region.
Additional Background Reports
On Human Rights: Human Rights Watch
Renewed Crisis in North Kivu (October 2007) and other reports
http://www.africafocus.org/country/congokin_hrw.php
Role of Mining Companies
Global Witness
http://www.globalwitness.org
For reports and press releases on the Democratic Republic of the
Congo: http://tinyurl.com/2u6ek5
Rights & Accountability in Development
http://www.raid-uk.org/news.htm
On UN Peacekeeping
The United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (MONUC): Lesson and Experience by Ambassador William Lacy
Swing, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. ISS Situation Report November
23, 2007
Institute for Security Studies
http://www.iss.co.za
For links to situation reports: http://tinyurl.com/yt89yt
AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues,
with a particular focus on U.S. and international policies.
AfricaFocus Bulletin is edited by William Minter.
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