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Sudan: Abyei Aflame
AfricaFocus Bulletin
May 30, 2008 (080530)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
"The town of Abyei has ceased to exist. Brigade 31 of the Sudanese
Armed Forces, or SAF, has displaced the entire civilian population
and burned Abyei's market and housing to the ground. These events
were predicted, and absent effective word and action, they became
inevitable. [but] as this report goes to the press, the United
States has not even made a public statement regarding the violence
Khartoum instigated in Abyei." - Roger Winter
Roger Winter visited the oil-rich area Abyei, on the disputed
boundary between North and South Sudan, from May 16-17. This
AfricaFocus Bulletin contains his report issued today by the Enough
Project. Previous reports by Roger Winter on Abyei, and its
critical role in having the potential to ignite even greater
violence in Sudan, can be found at
http://www.enoughproject.org/reports/soundingalarmabyei (April
2008) and http://www.enoughproject.org/abyei (January, 2008).
Also included below is the joint statement by three U.S.
presidential candidates on Darfur.
Notable among the points stressed by Winter is that the Bush
administration, despite previous rhetoric for peace and in
opposition to violence in Sudan, continues to be engaged in a
process of "normalization" with the current Sudanese government, In
contrast to strong public statements about Darfur, U.S. policy
towards Sudan has also been driven by continued interest in
cooperation with Khartoum against "international terrorism." For
analysis of the background to this policy contradiction, see
"Sudan: Walking Loudly, Carrying a Toothpick"
(http://www.africafocus.org/docs07/sud0704b.php) and
"Sudan: Why Doesn't Bush Act on Darfur?"
(http://www.africafocus.org/docs06/sud0612b.php)
For earlier AfricaFocus Bulletins on Sudan and related links, see
http://www.africafocus.org/country/sudan.php
For recent news and commentary on Sudan, see, in particular,
http://www.sudantribune.com and http://allafrica.com/sudan
++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++++++++
Abyei Aflame: An Update From the Field
Roger Winter
Enough Project
http://www.enoughproject.org/reports/abyei_update_may08
05/30/2008
Five weeks after ENOUGH issued its report "Sounding the Alarm on
Abyei" the town of Abyei has ceased to exist. Brigade 31 of the
Sudanese Armed Forces, or SAF, has displaced the entire civilian
population and burned Abyei's market and housing to the ground.
These events were predicted, and absent effective word and action,
they became inevitable. Somehow, the government of the United
States of America missed all the signals - again. As this report
goes to the press, the United States has not even made a public
statement regarding the violence Khartoum instigated in Abyei, the
resulting humanitarian emergency, the damage done to the
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA, or
prospects for peace and democratic transformation in Sudan.
This paper is based on my travel to Abyei from May 16-17. For
background on Abyei, please see ENOUGH strategy papers "Abyei:
Sudan's Kashmir" and "Sounding the Alarm on Abyei".
Background
Comprehensive peace in Sudan hinges upon successful, peaceful
resolution of the issue of Abyei, the volatile and oil rich area
astride the boundary between North and South Sudan. Khartoum's
three-year failure to implement the CPA's Abyei Protocol has
resulted in skyrocketing political tensions, large-scale recent
killings, and a rapid military build-up by all sides that caused
experts to foresee the resumption of conflict in the region.
During my visits in February and March of 2008, I documented the
illegal presence of Sudanese Armed Forces in the Abyei area. During
this period, the Sudan Armed Forces's 31st Brigade used terror
tactics to systematically clear the population from the villages
outside of Abyei town. The village of Todaj, for example, was
rendered devoid of population due to nightly shooting by the
Brigade. A nearby International Organization for Migration
reception center, set up to assist returning people who had been
displaced by Khartoum-inspired violence years earlier, was shut
down.
The tension in the Abyei area was palpable. On May 13, an incident
between the Sudan People's Liberation Army, or SPLA[1], police and
SAF[2] occurred in Dokora village, about four miles north of Abyei.
Violence exploded, quickly spreading across the area. On the
afternoon of May 14, local officials reported heavy bombardment of
Abyei's civilian areas, as well as looting and burning of markets
and homes by SAF forces. This precipitated the mass flight of
thousands of civilians to safety in the South.
Abyei Emptied: May 16-17
Our first stop in Abyei town was to meet with U.N. civilian staff
and the military peacekeepers from the U.N. Mission in Sudan, or
UNMIS, mandated to monitor the situation on the ground. Despite
their armored personnel carriers, the UNMIS contingent from Zambia
was reluctant to move outside its headquarters and civilian U.N.
staff did not have the access around town to be in a position to
understand its condition. SAF's 31st Brigade was visibly present in
the town and remains so, as of the publication of this report. With
assistance from the Joint Integrated Unit,[3] or JIU, and an SPLA
detachment, we were able to access much of the town. It was empty.
You could look the full length of streets and see no one. I counted
only 10-12 civilians, several of whom appeared to be mentally
unstable. The others, sneaking back to where their homes once
stood, were evidently attempting to salvage any remaining blankets
or belongings. The market had been looted and burned to the ground.
Many structures were still smoldering. Block after block of
traditional homes were reduced to ashes. Approximately 25 percent
of the town's structures were totally destroyed. Shortly after our
visit, we received reliable reports that most of the rest was
aflame.
Abyei, as it had existed several days earlier, had ceased to exist.
Although there were a number of civilian casualties, most of the
people of the Abyei area were able to flee. Local SPLM officials
estimated 106,500 displaced people dispersed southward to nearly 20
sites, such as the town of Agok, a three day walk south of Abyei,
where we spent the night of May 16. The vast majority arrived
without belongings, and many families had been separated during
their flight. Women wailed for their lost children. Although
momentarily safe in GOSS-controlled areas, Khartoum's terror
tactics continued. The sound of overflights by the government's
notorious Antonov aircraft, a precursor to bombardment during the
decades of the North/South war, further terrorized the population
in the Abyei region.
The rainy season has begun in Abyei and surrounding areas, with
desperate consequences for the displaced. That night in Agok it
rained mercilessly and became quite cold. Without shelter, the
coughs of infants and old folk began. Our communication with
appropriate people in Khartoum, Juba, and Washington appeared to
help jump-start an international humanitarian response, already
begun by on-site local officials and NGOs such as Mercy Corps and
Catholic Relief Services. With international sources now estimating
90,000 people displaced from their homes for at least the second
time, Abyei's former residents will likely require substantial
assistance for the foreseeable future.
How Did We Get Here: A Policy Failure Foretold
Accounts following our visit detail extensive hostilities between
SAF and the SPLA during May, with reportedly substantial casualties
on both sides.[4] Although death is commonplace in Sudan,
fatalities due to direct fighting between SAF and the SPLA, the
military arms of the National Congress Party and the Sudan Peoples
Liberation Movement respectively, has been rare since these parties
signed the CPA in January 2005.
How could this have happened? Many complex factors boil down to two
interconnected issues:
- The ultimate cause of this most recent violence is the failure
of President Omar Bashir and the NCP to implement the Abyei
Protocol of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Bashir signed the
CPA, including the Abyei Protocol, more than three years ago, and
it is now clear that he will not implement it. An array of ghastly
consequences could follow from this decision, but the evidence
shows he and the NCP could care less. They will have their way.
Period.
- Why is Khartoum getting away with this strategy? The United
States has empowered Bashir to take his "devil may care" approach.
When it comes to Sudan, the United States is in meltdown mode and
Khartoum knows it. The very administration that energetically
created the environment that enabled the CPA turned impotent on
Darfur and now stands by watching the CPA stagger and twitch.
Although the United States literally wrote the Abyei Protocol, the
Bush administration has since shown little interest or
understanding of the issues, and has actively engaged in a policy
of appeasement.
Khartoum all the while has pursued a decidedly two-faced approach.
Only a couple of days before the Gotterdammerung began in Abyei,
the NCP asked that the SPLA be tasked with helping to defend
Khartoum from JEM, a Darfur rebel group that recently launched an
attack on a suburb city of the capital. The SPLM decided not to
fulfill the request, but Salva Kiir did rush to Khartoum while
Presidnt Bashir remained safe in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, while
Abyei was burning, Vice President Ali Osman Taha gave a speech at
the SPLM political convention, assuring the South Sudan officials
that the CPA would be fully implemented.
The "Normalization" Initiative: Appeasement in Action?
The U.S. government is currently engaged in a process that has
become known as "normalization" talks with Sudan, the first of
which were held in Rome in mid-April. Special Envoy Richard
Williamson heads the U.S. team. The Khartoum team is headed by
Presidential Assistant Nafie al Nafie, Sudan's former security
chief who decided to host Osama bin Laden during the mid-90s.
Although this process has occurred off-camera and outside the
limelight, documents associated with the normalization talks
surfaced in the New York Times on April 17.[5] The initial U.S.
document, supplied to me by the New York Times for my comments,
included a strong statement concerning Abyei: "This process of
improving the bilateral relationship will end if new violence is
initiated in or by Sudan. For example, the bilateral relationship
will not improve if violence escalates in Abyei or Chad." The
government of Sudan's response characterized the overall initial
U.S. statement as "disappointing" but expressed a wish to proceed
with the normalization talks because, it said, "The Special Envoy
characterized the [U.S.] proposals as a living document, and as
such we prefer to see how this document would look after our
response is incorporated in it."
On May 27, the day after the SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amum
asserted that because of the Abyei attack, the two parties were "on
the verge of civil war," the SPLM announced that it would not
participate in the normalization talks with the U.S. Special Envoy,
suggesting that the talks held so far may have emboldened Khartoum
to attack Abyei.
Normalization talks are scheduled to resume in Khartoum on May 30.
Given the absence of a public U.S. government response to the
violence and displacement in Abyei, the failure to make any effort
to prevent these events, and the clearly stated position that
violence in Abyei would bring an end "normalization" talks, the
meeting scheduled for the end of May to continue this discussion is
deeply worrisome. U.S. government failure to follow through on
Abyei has major implications for the prospects of CPA fulfillment
and a possible return to war.
What Next? Urgent Steps for the Short Run
The administration should:
Postpone any further "normalization" talks until Khartoum:
- Removes the 31st Brigade and any other illegal
Khartoum-affiliated military from the entire Abyei region. First
Vice President of Sudan and President of the Government of Southern
Sudan Salva Kiir Mayardiit spoke with President Bashir about
removal of the 31st Brigade from the Abyei area some weeks ago and
received a positive commitment, never fulfilled. Perhaps a joint
demand by the United States and its "troika" partners (the UK and
Norway), along with the First Vice President, will obtain a more
practical positive response.
- Accedes, at minimum, to interim boundaries and an interim
administration of the Abyei area in accordance with the Abyei
Protocol, without prejudice to a final settlement on these issues,
along with a disbursement of the oil revenues due to the Abyei
administration under the Protocol, in order to provide services to
the area.
- Agrees to fully fund the return of Abyei's displaced to their
now-destroyed homes, properties and businesses, with an appropriate
initial deposit to the Government of South Sudan or the United
Nations to show good faith within 30 days.
The U.S. Congress should:
Specifically increase its oversight of the executive branch's
actions with regard to Sudan in this period leading up to a
transition in administrations. Pursuit of constraining actions by
the Congress may be in order.
The U.N. Security Council should:
Ensure that the UNMIS presence in Abyei town is reinforced with a
permanent U.N. military and civilian presence to effectively
monitor the situation, accurately report conditions on the ground,
and promote local reconciliation.
Those that care about Sudan must be especially alert to the full
spectrum of U.S. government activities regarding the entire
country. We cannot be parochial. Abyei should matter to all who
care about peace and democratic transformation in Sudan. For there
to be a solution in Darfur, there must be full implementation of
the CPA. For the CPA to bring peace to Sudan, the crisis in Darfur
must be addressed.
What has just happened in Abyei may turn out to be Sudan's defining
moment. Abyei is recognized by most Sudan experts as a uniquely
important bellwether of war or peace between Khartoum and Sudan's
South. Combat directly between the NCP's military and that of the
SPLM has just occurred in this volatile area. Interested parties
should have done everything within their power to prevent this.
That did not happen. There is still time to prevent a return to
full-scale war throughout the entire country. The Bush
administration must step up and make sure the international
community is doing all it can to bring peace to all of Sudan.
Endnotes
[1] The Sudan People's Liberation Army and its political wing, the
Sudan People's Liberation Movement, fought against the Sudanese
government since 1983. A peace deal was signed in 2005. The SPLA is
the military arm of the SPLM.
[2] The Sudan Armed Forces is the national army of Sudan, but since
1989 it has effectively become the military arm of the ruling
National Congress Party in Khartoum.
[3] The Joint Integrated Units were stipulated in the 2005 peace
deal signed between the North and the South. These units consist of
equal numbers of SAF forces from the North and SPLA forces from the
South and are supposed to help stabilize and secure the country
until the 2011 referendum is held.
[4] "New Civil War Feared in Sudan As Town Empties," Washington
Post, May 26, 2008.
[5] "Incentive in Sudan Talks: Normalized Ties with U.S.," New York
Times, April 17, 2008.
Clinton, Mccain, Obama Joint Statement: 'We Stand United On Sudan'
Source: http://www.savedarfur.org
As we campaign for President of the United States over the next
several months, we expect there to be significant focus on the many
differences between us. After all, elections are about choices in
a free society. We have had a spirited contest so far and fully
expect a robust debate about issues foreign and domestic right up
to Election Day.
As we engage in this process, we are fully aware that friend and
foe around the globe are watching and sometimes reacting based on
their own analysis of the latest developments in the campaign.
It is with this awareness that we are taking the uncommon step of
issuing a joint statement about an issue.
After more than five years of genocide, the Sudanese government and
its proxies continue to commit atrocities against civilians in
Darfur. This is unacceptable to the American people and to the
world community.
We deplore all violence against the people of Darfur. There can be
no doubt that the Sudanese government is chiefly responsible for
the violence and is able to end it. We condemn the Sudanese
government's consistent efforts to undermine peace and security,
including its repeated attacks against its own people and the
multiple barriers it has put up to the swift and effective
deployment of the United Nations-African Union peacekeeping force.
We further condemn the Sudanese government's refusal to adhere to
the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the
conflict in southern Sudan.
Today, we wish to make clear to the Sudanese government that on
this moral issue of tremendous importance, there is no divide
between us. We stand united and demand that the genocide and
violence in Darfur be brought to an end and that the CPA be fully
implemented. Even as we campaign for the presidency, we will use
our standing as Senators to press for the steps needed to ensure
that the United States honors, in practice and in deed, its
commitment to the cause of peace and protection of Darfur's
innocent citizenry. We will continue to keep a close watch on
events in Sudan and speak out for its marginalized peoples. It
would be a huge mistake for the Khartoum regime to think that it
will benefit by running out the clock on the Bush Administration.
If peace and security for the people of Sudan are not in place when
one of us is inaugurated as President on January 20, 2009, we
pledge that the next Administration will pursue these goals with
unstinting resolve.
AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with
a particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
Bulletin is edited by William Minter.
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