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USA/Africa: Wikileaks Highlights, 1
AfricaFocus Bulletin
Dec 14, 2010 (101214)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
For Africa, as for elsewhere in the world, the cables released by
Wikileaks - so far less than 1% of the full set - provide valuable
nuance, some embarrassment, and confirmation of many suspicions by
exposing a wide variety of reports by diplomats. The attempt to
silence Wikileaks should be rejected. It is all the more
important, however, that the cables should be used with the same
caution that competent journalists or historians should apply to
any other source.
Those interested in particular topics should take the time to read
the cables themselves, since they are available, rather than simply
relying on the proliferation of paraphrased accounts. These are
currently available at the main Wikileaks site at
http://213.251.145.96/cablegate.html
The site can be browsed through links on the left, by date or the origin of the
cable.
If this site should be blocked, it should be possible to find
alternate sources among the almost 2,000 Wikileaks mirror sites,
through a Google search.
AfricaFocus will be taking a year-end break after this issue. Publication
will resume in the second week of January. Best wishes for the holidays
and the New Year to AfricaFocus readers.
This AfricaFocus Bulletin, and another released today and available
on the web (at http://www.africafocus.org/docs10/wl1012b.php) but
not sent out by e-mail, contain four sample cables. This Bulletin
contains a cable citing comments on Nigeria by Ann Pickard of
Shell, and an account of a U.S. diplomat's interview with
Ethiopia's intelligence chief Getachew Assefa. The other Bulletin
contains cables relating to the shipment of tanks through Kenya to
Southern Sudan, and comments by the South African Foreign Minister
on Zimbabwe and other topics.
One glaring example of the misuse of Wikileaks cables,
unfortunately propagated by sites including some normally reliable
sources such as Sudan Tribune and Foreign Policy in Focus, began
with an article in Wired magazine by David Axe on December 2,
headlined "WikiLeaked Cable Confirms U.S.' Secret Somalia Op." (see
http://www.wired.com / direct URL: http://tinyurl.com/23ltwl7).
Although this cable (see http://213.251.145.96//cable/2007/01/07ABUDHABI145.html) simply
cited a United Arab Emirates Crown Prince, telling U.S. General
John Abizaid "The Somalia job was fantastic," this was quickly and
widely cited as confirming U.S. direction of Ethiopia's disastrous
invasion of Somalia the month before.
But while few observers would doubt U.S. complicity in
Ethiopia's actions (see, for example, http://www.africafocus.org/docs07/som0701a.php), this cable could
hardly be considered as significant additional evidence.
Nevertheless, it resulted in misleading headlines such as
"WikiLeaks Reveals U.S. Twisted Ethiopia's Arm to Invade Somalia."
While we may hope that future cables do reveal more details of the
U.S.-Ethiopian collaboration, stretching the evidence does no
service to Wikileaks nor to the critique of U.S. policy.
++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note++++++++++++++++++++
Frequently Asked Questions: Secret US Embassy Cables
http://213.251.145.96/static/html/faq.html
What are the US embassy cables?
Wikileaks is releasing classified United States diplomatic cables
sent to and from US embassies in countries throughout the world.
These cables include orders sent out from the Department of State,
embassy reporting about the local governments and details of US
government activities in each country.
How many are there and what period do they cover?
Wikileaks will publish 251,287 cables, originating from 274
embassies and dating from 28th December 1966 to 28th February 2010.
Of this total, 15, 652 of the cables are marked Secret, 101,748
Confidential and 133,887 Unclassified, although even the
'unclassified' documents contain sensitive information.
...
US authorities have said the release may put people at risk. Is
this true?
Wikileaks has a four-year publishing history. During that time we
have released documents pertaining to over 100 countries. There is
no report, including from the US Government, of any of our releases
ever having caused harm to any individual. For this release we are
releasing the documents in a gradual manner, reviewing them with
the assistance of our media partners.
...
Nigeria - Shell
http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA259.html
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000259
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE PASS USTR FOR AGAMA
USDOE FOR GEORGE PERSON AND CHAYLOCK
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2028
TAGS: EPET ENRG ELAB PINR ECON SENV PGOV NI
SUBJECT: (C) NIGERIA: SHELL BRIEFS AMBASSADOR ON OIL GAS ISSUES,
COMMENTS ON PRESIDENT'S HEALTH AND HIGH-LEVEL CORRUPTION
REF: ABUJA 203
Classified By: Ambassador Robin R. Sanders for reasons 1.4. (b
& d).
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Shell's regional executive vice president for
Africa Ann Pickard and government relations representative Peter
Francis met with the Ambassador on January 27 in Abuja and provided
an update on problems in the oil and gas sector. Pickard said that
things were going from bad to worse, especially the security
situation. She said that Nigeria now had one of the highest
negative ratings for maritime operations, creating problems for
Shell in hiring oil tankers to load, as tanker operators will work
only under highly selective conditions. Last year there were about
80 piracy attacks on land and water combined. This year already 15
have been tallied, which includes 3 for Shell and 3 for Exxon. On
corruption, Pickard said that Nigerian entities control the lifting
of many oil cargoes and there are some "very interesting" people
lifting oil. Oil buyers would pay NNPC GMD Yar'Adua, Chief Economic
Advisor Yakubu and the First Lady Turai Yar'Adua large bribes to
lift oil. Pickard also reported an instance of the Attorney General
Aondoakaa allegedly soliciting a $20 million bribe to sign a
document. The International Oil Companies (IOC) are quite concerned
about the "very flawed" new petroleum sector energy bill. The IOCs
will be asking U.S., Dutch, and U.K. COMs to convey points on the
bill to GON policymakers. Pickard agreed that the President's
health is a guessing game. She said that in her recent meetings
with Yar'Auda he seems alert, though very drawn in the face, thin,
and frail. Her information is that the President was not in danger
of dying soon, but also was unlikely to ever fully recover from his
ailments. (Note: see septel on oil/energy sector issues for the
Ambassador's meeting with the new Minister of Petroleum Resources.
End Note). END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) Shell's regional executive vice president for Africa Ann
Pickard and government relations representative Peter Francis met
with the Ambassador on January 27, 2009 in Abuja and provided an
update on problems in the oil and gas sector. Pickard reported that
Shell's meeting with Minister of Petroleum Resources Dr. Rilwanu
Lukman scheduled for earlier that day had been cancelled; the third
week in a row where key appointments had fallen through, with the
excuse of being summoned to the Presidential Villa. (Note: Emboffs
have observed that meetings with ministers and senior staff are
indeed often cancelled with the explanation that they have been
summoned to the Presidential Villa, even when the President is out
of town. End note). Econ Counselor and Econoff (notetaker) also
attended the discussion.
FROM BAD TO WORSE
¶3. (C) The Ambassador took the opportunity to share with Pickard
that the Mission was in the midst of completing its Strategic Plan
and asked Pickard where she thought Nigeria was headed. Pickard
said that things were going from bad to worse, especially in terms
of security. She said that Nigeria now had the highest negative
rating for maritime security, creating problems for Shell in hiring
oil tankers to load; tankers will work only under highly selective
conditions. She also noted that late on the evening of Saturday
January 17, Nigerian militants attacked and boarded two vessels at
a Shell crude oil loading platform in Bonny and took eight crew
members hostage. Standard procedure on the tanker was followed: the
ship went into immediate lock down; there were no injuries or
fatalities from the boarding. The eight Nigerian crew members who
were taken hostage were later released. The pirates who went
through the sections of the boat to which they were able to gain
access, smashing and stealing computers, electronics, and personal
items of the crew members. The second vessel was a tug boat towing
a supply vessel from Bonny to Calabar. Last year there were about
80 incidents of piracy; this year already 15 had been tallied,
which includes 3 for Shell and 3 for Exxon. GON officials have told
Shell to "hire more security." The price of doing business in the
oil and gas sector in Nigeria continues to climb she concluded.
[Note: The International Maritime Bureau (IMB), a division of the
International Chamber of Commerce - www icc-ccs org - reports that
the waters off the Gulf of Guinea (Nigeria) remain the second
worst, with 40 incidents in 2008 to the Horn of Africa (Somalia)
with 42 recorded incidents. The IMB notes that in 2009 the Horn of
Africa will be more intense as Spring comes due to the large number
of foreign warships in the region on active patrol to ensure the
safety and security of vessels. The same increased security is not
expected for Nigeria in 2009. End Note]
SHELL BELIEVES COUP UNLIKELY; CORRUPTION WORSENING
ABUJA 00000259 002 OF 003
¶4. (S/NF) The Ambassador asked what Shell's thoughts were on any
potential for a coup. Pickard answered that there is little
intellectual capital to plan and execute a coup and Shell sees
little potential for one. Pickard then went on to say that
corruption in the oil sector was worsening by the day. The
Ambassador asked for a few examples. Pickard said that Nigerian
entities control the lifting of many oil cargoes and there are some
"very interesting" people lifting oil (People, she said that were
not even in the industry). As an example she said that oil buyers
would pay Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) General
Managing Director Yar'Adua, (Note: not related to President
Yar'Adua. End Note) Chief Economic Advisor Yakubu, and the First
Lady Turai Yar'Adua large bribes, millions of dollars per tanker,
to lift oil. The IOCs control the liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)
cargos, so GON actors do not have the same opportunity for illicit
gain. Pickard also said a former associate of hers (protect) had
told her he had been present when Attorney General Aondoakaa had
told a visitor that he would sign a document only if the visitor
paid $2 million immediately and another $18 million the next day.
VERY BAD BILL
¶5. (C) Pickard reported that Shell, Exxon-Mobil and Chevron all
have big license review disputes with the GON. Shell has taken its
dispute to court and the court is supporting Shell's position.
According to her, Shell is stepping back for the moment, however,
to see how the other two majors negotiation fair, but is not taking
its case out of court yet. The IOCs are quite concerned about the
"very flawed" new petroleum sector energy bill. The bill is silent
on what fiscal regimes would be applied. Shell says that the bill
could reduce the corporation's overall value in Nigeria. GON
discussions around the bill have mentioned the possibility of
moving to five-year licenses and prohibiting exploring both oil and
gas from the same source, which would contradict how oil and gas
extraction works in practice. The bill is silent on joint ventures;
it just states that NNPC will be incorporated. Pickard said the
bill was "likely to sail through." The IOCs will be asking U.S.,
Dutch and U.K. COMs to convey points on the bill to GON
policymakers. (Note: Pickard mentioned that the IOCs will not share
company information directly; they will hire consultants, like
McKinsey, to produce common themes so the messages from the IOCs to
be shared with the relevant Ambassadors are clear and consistent.
End note). Pickard lamented that the expected cycle of petroleum is
at least five years for the first oil to flow, another 10 years of
production to begin to break even. These numbers change when oil is
$40 per barrel instead of $100 per barrel. Hence, a five year
license would not be an incentive for investment and development.
GAS ISSUES
¶6. (C) The Ambassador said that the Mission was looking at
performance measures for the economy, i.e. the linkage between the
country's electricity output and gross domestic product (GDP). The
Ambassador shared that the Mission feels strongly that gas for
feedstock is the key to Nigeria's power production, which is only
about 2,800 average megawatts for a country of 140 million people.
Pickard agreed and added that the U.S. got it wrong on its domestic
natural gas policies, which it took over 20 years to sort out. So
it is not surprising that Nigeria has it wrong at this point. She
said there is not adequate infrastructure for gas. Gathering plants
and pipelines to carry the product to the power plants still have
to be financed and built. The Nigeria Independent Power Projects
(NIPP) were located where there is no gas and no infrastructure. In
addition, the international oil companies were coerced into
building a power plant each, something they have no expertise in,
and they are scrambling to deliver gas to these plants.
YAR'AUDA VACATION IS PERHAPS SOMETHING ELSE
¶7. (S/NF) Pickard agreed that the President's health is a guessing
game. She said that in her recent meetings with Yar'Auda he seems
alert but drawn in the face and frail. She reported that a Julius
Berger (protect) contact says that the President was not in danger
of dying soon but has serious ailments from which he will never
fully recover. Pickard shared that Berger provides transportation
including planes for the President and has reportedly flown in
doctors and technicians to attend the President (reftel). She said,
for instance, that her Berger contact confided that they flew the
President from Germany to Saudi in September 2008. Additionally,
the Berger contact thought the President would not return to the
Villa
ABUJA 00000259 003 OF 003
offices, as they were moving the President's personal things out
of the Villa. (Note: What we think this means is that Yar'Adua is
spending most of his time in the presidential residence and not in
the Villa offices. End Note).
HOPES THAT OIL NATIONALISM CAN BE TEMPERED
¶8. (C) The Ambassador asked how comfortable Shell was with the new
appointment of Dr. Rilwanu Lukman as Minister of Petroleum
Resources, and the appointment of Mohammad Sanusi Barkindo as the
new NNPC GMD. Pickard sees the nationalism card cooling with the
removal of former NNPC GMD Yar'Adua, given that new Minister of
Petroleum Lukman is more "pragmatic" and will hold sway over deputy
Minister Ajumogobia. (Note: Ajumogobia's technical assistant told
EconOff in a meeting on January 14, 2009 that the State Minister
was focusing on Gas, since before the mass cabinet change he was
State Minster of Petroleum, with a separate State Minster for Gas.)
End Note. She said she was also okay with NNPC chief Barkindo. She
has worked with Barkindo several times over the past few decades,
especially when they were both working climate change. She said
Barkindo led Nigeria's technical delegation to climate change
negotiations that produced the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC)and the Kyoto protocol to UNFCCC during
while he served on its Bureau at various times. She indicated that
although his undergraduate studies were in political science, he
obtained his MBA from Southeastern University in Washington DC and
did postgraduate work in petroleum economics and management at
Oxford University. Although she also said terms like nationalistic
and Chavez she however said that she thought he could be steered in
the right direction on the petroleum sector.
COMMENT
¶9. (C) Although Pickard clearly seems frustrated with the way
things are going in the maritime security, oil sector legislation,
and corruption which affects Shell's bottom line, it was useful to
hear that she has hopes for the new Petroleum Minister and NNPC
chief. Septel on the Ambassador's meeting with new Petroleum
Minister Lukman will address many of these same issues.
¶10. (U) This cable was coordinated with Consulate Lagos.
SANDERS
Ethiopia - Hardliner Views
http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/06/09ADDISABABA1318.html
Monday, 08 June 2009, 12:33
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 001318
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 06/07/2019
TAGS PGOV, PINR, PREL, KPAO, ET
SUBJECT: UNDERSTANDING THE ETHIOPIAN HARDLINERS
Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (B) and
(D).
SUMMARY
¶1. (S) In a rare meeting with the elusive head of the Ethiopian
National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) and main
hardliner within the powerful executive committee of the ruling
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) party,
Ambassador and NISS chief Getachew Assefa discussed a wide range of
regional and bilateral issues. Getachew made clear during the four
hour private meeting that Ethiopia sought greater understanding
from the U.S. on national security issues vital to Ethiopia,
especially Ethiopia's concerns over domestic insurgent groups like
the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogaden National Liberation
Front (ONLF). He spoke at length about former Addis Ababa
Mayor-elect Berhanu Nega XXXXXXXXXXXX; VOA's biased reporting; the
dangers of former defense minister Seeye Abraha's growing authority
within the opposition; Ethiopia's views on democracy and human
rights; Eritrea's role as a rogue state in the region; and regional
issues including the importance of supporting the Transitional
Federal Government and a rapprochement with Alhu Sunna Wal Jama'a
(ASWJ) as the only option for Somalia's survival; and the need for
U.S. reconciliation with Sudan. End Summary.
TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING
¶2. (S) Through the arrangements of former U.S. Ambassador to
Ethiopia, Irv Hicks, Ambassador met with Ethiopia's national
intelligence chief, Getachew Assefa, for a four hour private
meeting on June 4. Getachew, noted for his eccentric behavior and
elusiveness, explained to the Ambassador that he welcomes greater
dialogue with the U.S. Embassy, but underscored the importance of
deeper U.S. understanding of Ethiopia's security concerns.
Characterizing the U.S. relationship as sound and expressing
appreciation for the cooperation with the U.S. on special projects
on counterterrorism, Getachew emphasized that Ethiopia shares U.S.
views on high value targets (HVT) like Robow and al-Turki as
threats to regional stability. But domestic insurgent groups, like
the OLF and ONLF, should also be treated as terrorists because they
have safe haven camps in extremist-held areas in Somalia and
receive support and assistance from the very same HVTs that the
U.S. and Ethiopia are trying to neutralize. Such support makes the
ONLF and OLF accomplices with international terrorist groups,
Getachew argued. Just as Ethiopia would not meet with domestic U.S.
insurgent groups, referring to individuals and groups who would
conduct bombings of U.S. government offices, abortion clinics and
advocates of racial and gender hate, Ethiopia would not want U.S.
officials to meet with Ethiopia's domestic insurgents who bomb and
kill Ethiopian officials and citizens.
¶3. (S) Getachew added that the GOE does conduct talks with the
ONLF and OLF and there are groups, like the Ethiopian elders, who
reach out to the membership in an effort to end the violence.
Getachew stressed that this is an Ethiopian process by Ethiopians
and should remain an Ethiopian-led, Ethiopian-directed and
Ethiopian-coordinated process. Ambassador made clear that the U.S.
Administration does not meet with the ONLF and that the U.S. is in
close consultations with Ethiopian authorities on their views on
the ONLF and OLF, and that the U.S. supports the work of the
Ethiopian Elders to end the violence. Getachew noted the visit to
European Capitals and Washington of ONLF senior leaders and said
they met with staffers in the U.S. Vice President's office. The
Ambassador said that we had no evidence that a meeting took place
with the Vice President's staff and stressed that the State
Department did not meet with the ONLF group. Further, the U.S.
military no longer meets with alleged ONLF supporters in the
volatile Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia because of security
concerns. The Ambassador stressed that such meetings in the past
was for force protection of U.S. military civil affairs team
working in the dangerous Ogaden region near Somalia, but in the
last few years there has been no contact. The Ambassador added that
there should be closer discussion between he U.S. and Ethiopia on
this issue.
U.S. GIVES EXTREMISTS A VOICE AND LEGITIMACY
ADDIS ABAB 00001318 002 OF 004
¶4. (S) Getachew complained pointedly that Voice of America (VOA)
is biased and gives a platform for extremist elements. XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶5. (S) Getachew also discussed the VOA reports covering former
State Department official Greg Stanton of Genocide Watch, who
charged Prime Minister Meles of crimes against humanity as a result
of Ethiopia's incursion into Somalia in 2006. Getachew complained
that VOA Amharic reporting was biased and not even handed. He did
note that VOA English was fine. VOA Amharic service does not
interview Ethiopian officials who can refute "false assertions"
espoused in the VOA interviews. Getachew praised Germany's Deutsche
Wella service for its balanced and yet hard hitting reporting.
Getachew underscored that if the GOE is doing something wrong or
does not have the support of the people, news services have an
obligation to highlight such problems. Getachew said VOA, however,
seeks to report only what is anti-government or lend support for
the opposition. Getachew concluded that the U.S.G., because of VOA
Amharic service is an official arm of the U.S.G., lacks neutrality
in its support for the opposition and this undercuts relations
between the two countries. The Ambassador replied that VOA is a
very independent media and the U.S.G. does not have oversight and
control over the content of the reporting.
¶6. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX
THE OPPOSITION
¶7. (S) Getachew commented on Ethiopia's opposition leadership
underscoring that he wishes to see a vibrant opposition movement,
but currently, the NGO community and foreign missions support the
opposition blindly without critical analysis. XXXXXXXXXXXX
ADDIS ABAB 00001318 003 OF 004
¶8. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX
DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
¶9. (S) Getachew echoed common themes advocated by the ruling EPRDF
party stalwarts from the Prime Minister to the party faithful. He
stressed that the EPRDF supports democracy and that it is the goal
for the ruling party to eventually give way to other parties of
common vision in fighting poverty and a commitment to support the
process of democratization. Getachew said he would support
opposition parties if they have a better message to help Ethiopia
overcome poverty, improve health care and education, and raise the
standard of living of the Ethiopian people. He added that the U.S.
and others should look at Ethiopia's democracy efforts and human
rights record as a work in progress. It will take time but Ethiopia
is moving in the right direction that will make Ethiopia a
democratic state.
FOREIGN POLICY: ERITREA, SOMALIA, AND SUDAN
¶10. (S) Getachew described Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki as
"no martyr," who sought to survive and establish himself as the
predominate leader in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia stands in the
way of Isaias' grand design and it is his goal to divide Ethiopia
and weaken it through terrorism. Getachew remarked that one of
Isaias' bodyguards was in Dubai and then defected to Ethiopia. The
bodyguard remarked that Isaias was a recluse who spent his days
painting and tinkering with gadgets and carpentry work. Isaias
appeared to make decisions in isolation with no discussion with his
advisors. It was difficult to tell how Isaias would react each day
and his moods changed constantly. Getachew added that Eritrea
trains over 30 rebel groups at Camp Sawa near the Sudan border and
graduates are infiltrated into Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia to
enhance instability and target Ethiopian interests. Getachew
expressed dismay with Kenya in allowing Eritrean intel officers and
military trainers who support al-Shabaab in Somalia, to bribe their
way out of Kenya and return to Eritrea. He explained the activities
of Abraha Kassa, Eritrea's elusive intel chief who directs
Eritrea's Somalia operations.
¶11. (S) On Somalia, Getachew said the only way to support
stability was through support for the ASWJ which attracts a wide
range of support from all the clans, especially those groups in
conflict with each other. The ASWJ has been effective in countering
al-Shabaab and is ideologically committed to Sufism and the defense
of Islam against the extremist salafists which form al-Shabaab.
Getachew said the U.S. can best help by supporting the ASWJ and TFG
to cooperate, to pay salaries of TFG troops and support the IGAD
and African Union which are seeking to sanction Eritrea, implement
a no fly zone, and close ports used by extremist elements.
¶12. (S) On Sudan, Getachew urged the U.S. to engage Bashir and the
Sudanese leadership. Sudan, more than Somalia, poses the greatest
threat to regional security and stability, Getachew argued. The
prospects for a civil war which destabilizes the region would be
devastating. The only country that would benefit would be Eritrea.
COMMENT
¶13. (S) It is interesting that Getachew's description of President
Isaias mirrors Getachew's own character, as well.
ADDIS ABAB 00001318 004 OF 004
Getachew avoids speaking with foreigners and few foreigners really
know him. He is not well liked within his own agency for decisions
he makes in isolation which, at times, make little sense and are
not discussed in consensus with his staff. His apparent hot temper
and reclusive habits have made it difficult for his staff to gauge
his moods and understand his thought process. The Prime Minister
himself and other EPRDF leaders have remarked to the Ambassador
that it is difficult to talk with Getachew and to meet with him,
but that his loyalty to the EPRDF is never in question. Despite his
poor reputation, Getachew is regarded as a strong EPRDF hardliner
and commands considerable authority and influence within the
powerful EPRDF executive committee which lays down the policy for
the ruling party and the government. While relations with NISS
officials below Getachew's rank are extremely cordial and,
depending on the unit, very close, the Ambassador has met with
Getachew only twice in the past three years, and other Embassy
staff have also met with little success in engaging him. Even
visiting senior U.S. intel officers have not been successful in
meeting Getachew. Ambassador will pursue future meetings with
Getachew but he will never be a close contact.
End Comment. YAMAMOTO
AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with
a particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
Bulletin is edited by William Minter.
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