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USA/Africa: Wikileaks Highlights, 2
AfricaFocus Bulletin
Dec 14, 2010 (101214)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
It should be no surprise to anyone that South African diplomats
been been frustrated both with Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe
and with Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai, or that Kenya and the
United States have enjoyed close military to military ties despite
vocal U.S. criticism of the Kenyan government. Wikileaks cables
released to date, such as the ones included in this AfricaFocus
Bulletin, provide some nuances and may be embarrassing, but provide
no "smoking guns" or startling revelations.
This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains the text of two cables from late
2009, one reporting on conversations between Kenyan and U.S.
officials on disagreements about shipment of tanks to Southern
Sudan, and the other a conversation between the U.S. Ambassador to
South Africa and the South African Foreign Minister, including
remarks about the sitution in Zimbabwe.
Another AfricaFocus Bulletin sent out today (and available at
http://www.africafocus.org/docs10/wl1012a.php) contains the texts
of two cables, concerning Nigeria and Ethiopia, respectively, as
well as direct links to the Wikileaks pages organized by origin of
the cables, and a brief comment from AfricaFocus on misuse of these
primary sources.
For access to the cables released by Wikileaks to date, visit
http://213.251.145.96/cablegate.html If this site is unavailable,
use a Google search to locate Wikileaks mirror sites.
++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note++++++++++++++++++++
Kenya responds to Sudan tank demarche
http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09NAIROBI2497.html
S e c r e t section 01 of 02 nairobi 002497
Noforn
sipdis
E.o. 12958: decl: 2019/12/16
Tags: marr, mcap, mops, mass, parm, pinr, pter, prel, ke, ug, up,
su
SUBJECT: Kenya responds to Sudan tank demarche
Ref: 09 state 122115; 09 nairobi 2487
CLASSIFIED BY: Rachel Meyers, Deputy Political Counselor, State,
POL;>
reason: 1.4(a), (b), (d)
¶1. On December 15, Ambassador Ranneberger discussed the tank
transfer issue with Prime Minister Odinga, who said that the GOK
was committed to assisting the GOSS and that there was "intense
pressure" from the GOSS to deliver the tanks. He hinted that the
GOK might instead transfer the tanks to Uganda (and, he implied,
from there to South Sudan). On December 16, following AF guidance,
Ambassador Ranneberger reiterated to the PM that any further
transfer of the tanks, via Uganda or otherwise, would violate U.S.
law and could trigger sweeping sanctions against Kenya. He also
noted that the likelihood of receiving a waiver for past transfers
of LME to the SPLA since 2007 would be remote if the GOK proceeded
with moving the tanks to Sudan. Ambassador Ranneberger also briefed
Minister of Finance Uhuru Kenyatta on the issue on December 16, and
Kenyatta responded that he understood the U.S. position.
¶2. xxxxxxxxxxxx, COL McNevin and DAO notetaker met with
xxxxxxxxxxxx. xxxxxxxxxxxx also attended. McNevin reiterated
the points made by Ambassador Ranneberger to the PM (see para 2)
and noted that we are open to discussing possible future options
for disposition of the tanks so that the GOK is not stuck with
assets it does not need. Before the meeting, xxxxxxxxxxxx mentioned
that in the GOK's view, the tanks belong to the GOSS and that his
government is receiving "increasing pressure" to deliver them. He
added that President Kibaki was personally very angry about this
issue. During the meeting, xxxxxxxxxxxx commented that the GOK was
"very confused" by our position and did not understand why they
needed a waiver, since the past transfers had been undertaken in
consultation with the United States and they thought we were in
agreement on the way forward towards implementation of the CPA. He
added that this was causing a "major problem" between the GOK and
the GOSS. xxxxxxxxxxxx asked about the significance of what
appeared to him to be a major policy reversal, and questioned whether the
United States is rethinking the CPA, increasingly shifting its
support to Khartoum, and/or now seeking a unitary state in Sudan.
xxxxxxxxxxxx asked that the United States explain directly to the
GOSS/SPLA why we are blocking the tank transfer. Following that
discussion, xxxxxxxxxxxx indicated the GOK would like to
participate in a high-level trilateral meeting (GOK, GOSS, and USG)
to reach a collective understanding of U.S. and regional partner
countries' objectives with respect to implementation of the CPA.
¶3. As McNevin was departing the meeting, xxxxxxxxxxxx called
him back and asked, on xxxxxxxxxxxx behalf, for a list of all DOD
programs and funding for Kenya, due to xxxxxxxxxxxx later today
(December 16) in preparation for an upcoming Defense Council
meeting scheduled for December 21. The Defense Council is chaired
by President Kibaki, and it appears likely that xxxxxxxxxxxx will
use the list to underscore the importance of the U.S.-Kenya mil-mil
relationship and to convince Kibaki not to transfer the tanks. In
addition to Kibaki and xxxxxxxxxxxxx other Defense Council members
are NSIS Director Gichangi, Minister for Defense Haji, Minister for
Internal Security Saitoti, Commandant of the Administration Police Mbugua, and Police
Commissioner Iteere. (Note: The Defense Council is composed
entirely of advisors who are close to the President and come from
his Kikuyu ethnic group or closely related groups. End note.)
¶4. As directed in ref A, the demarche regarding transfer of
Ukrainian-origin LME by the Government of Kenya (GOK) to the Sudan
People's Liberation Army (SPLA) was originally delivered by Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Defense Vicki Huddleston and Kenya-US
Liaison Office Chief COL McNevin to Kenya Assistant Minister for
Defense David Musila and xxxxxxxxxxxx. COL McNevin also discussed
the issue further with the xxxxxxxxxxxx. In addition, the Political
RA Chief met with Director of National Security and Intelligence
Service (NSIS) General Gichangi on the issue on December 16.The GOK
representatives assured DASD Huddleston and COL McNevin that no
tanks would be delivered to the SPLA for the foreseeable future.
(Note: There are 32 T-72 tanks remaining in Kenya from the shipment
that arrived in Mombasa aboard the M/V Faina. End note.)
Nairobi 00002497 002 of 002
¶5. xxxxxxxxxxxx also noted that all other transfers
have been done with full disclosure to the United States, and the
GOK has shared all information regarding these transfers without
hesitation. He further noted that stopping this shipment will incur
"big costs" and that "Salva Kir will not be happy." He went on to
state that the GOK may seek waiver support from the Government of
Southern Sudan (GOSS) and that the basis for the waiver would be
the implementing instructions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA), which allow other nations to support the modernization and
conversion of the SPLA from a guerilla force to a small
conventional civilian military that would be capable of future
integration with the Sudanese national military. As noted in ref A
talking points, McNevin and xxxxxxxxxxxx also briefly discussed
that U.S. legislation does contain a waiver provision. xxxxxxxxxxxx
McNevin held a subsequent meeting with xxxxxxxxxxxx at the
Ambassasdor's request and noted that the likelihood of a waiver
being granted by the United States would be remote if the GOK went
ahead with the tank transfer.
¶6. Comment: As of 16 December, the 32 T-72 tanks remain on
flatcars at Kahawa Army Barracks in Nairobi. If indeed the tanks
are not going to be transported in the "foreseeable future," we
would expect to see them off-loaded soon and the flatcars returned
to Rift Valley Railroad service. The GOK is understandably
confused, as transfer of these tanks, in their view, dove-tailed
with the goals of the United States to implement the CPA by
converting the SPLA from a guerrilla force to a small conventional
force capable of defending Juba (but not take Khartoum), able to
integrate with a national force, and able to counterbalance the
significant military capacity of Khartoum. Despite the GOK
assurances, there are a number of factors that may lead to the
eventual transfer of the tanks, including: the need to maintain
good relations with South Sudan and keep a friendly ally on Kenya's
unstable northwestern border; the substantial financial losses
Kenya will incur if it does not complete the transfer; the fact
that Kenya has no need to add additional tank assets to its
military; and Kenya's financial and, to a lesser extent,
cultural/ideological links with South Sudan.
¶7. Over the past two years, KMOD officials have shared full
details of their engagement with the SPLA as we have shared details
of our training program for the SPLA, including combat arms soldier
training, under a May 2007 Presidential Directive. The GOK views
this as a reversal of U.S. policy that has significant
security,financial, and political implications for them. It is
difficult to persuade the Kenyans that transferring this equipment
to the SPLA violates the terms of the CPA and therefore will merit
sanctions if completed when they are well aware that the United
States is continuing military to military security sector reform
assistance to the SPLA.
¶8. We have been pushing the GOK very hard on the civilian
side to bring about reform and good governance, and have sparked
mounting resistance as a result. Despite that pressure and tension,
our military to military relations have been excellent and our
unimpeded access has been of significant benefit to the USG in
terms of counterterrorism and anti-piracy. Given the competing
policy issues on the table, we welcome ideas to defuse this
situation, discuss options for alternative dispositions of the
tanks, and to harmonize the "apparent disconnect" between the CPA
and U.S. legislation mentioned in ref A. We urge Washington to
consider the GOK's request to convene a high-level dialogue with
the GOK, GOSS, and other relevant stakeholders as soon as possible
to foster a clear understanding of U.S. policy and develop a way
forward towards CPA implementation.
Ranneberger
Ambassador's Courtesy Call on Foreign Minister Mashabane
http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/11/09PRETORIA2245.html
Tuesday, 03 November 2009, 15:52
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRETORIA 002245
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/01/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PHUM, ECON, ASEC, KHIV, SF, ZI
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S COURTESY CALL ON FOREIGN MINISTER
MASHABANE
REF: PRETORIA 2167
Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD GIPS FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador's first official call with
Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Maite
Nkoana-Mashabane was warm and frank. Mashabane thanked the USG for
its partnership and support through PEPFAR and acknowledged past
mistakes in HIV/AIDS policies. The Ambassador thanked the SAG for
support on security and the Minister promised to continue the
current support. They agreed to work together on establishing a
bilateral mechanism and cooperating on augmenting food security and
combating violence against women. Mashabane made strong statements
on distancing the SAG from Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe and
supporting Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai. Although Mashabane was
very positive about our bilateral agenda, the SAG's capacity to
execute remains a question. End Summary.
Positive Bilateral Agenda
¶2. (C) Minister of International Relations and Cooperation
Maite Nkoana-Mashabane was warm and receptive in the Ambassador's
first official meeting with the South African Government on
November 2. She said her government was excited about working with
the Obama Administration, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and
the Ambassador, expecting that bilateral relations would continue
to improve. Mashabane expressed the hope that we could develop a
bilateral mechanism early in 2010, building on her meeting with the
Secretary in Pretoria in August. The Ambassador said we looked
forward to hearing the SAG's ideas for the bilateral mechanism and
setting a date for the Annual Bilateral Forum early in 2010.
Mashabane hoped that President Obama could make a state visit to
South Africa linked to attending the FIFA World Cup in June-July
2010. She envisioned President Zuma reciprocating with a state
visit to the U.S. early in 2011. Mashabane also noted the positive
role of the U.S. in the G-8 and the G-20, emphasizing that
developing countries were excited about President Obama's
leadership.
¶3. (C) Mashabane noted that the Ambassador's confirmation
speech showed that he and the USG shared South Africa's five key
priorities set forth at the ANC Conference at Polokwane in December
2007: employment, education, health, fighting crime, and rural development. She and the
Ambassador agreed that there was a long agenda of shared objectives
and that they should identify clear and achievable goals. The
Ambassador said the U.S. would like to do more to support
education, and observed that USAID had important initiatives in
this area. He also said he would like the U.S. and South Africa to
partner for various trilateral programs in Africa. She supported
this approach, noting South Africa's interest in "prospering" its
neighbors. Mashabane highlighted AGOA as a positive force for
stability in Africa. The Ambassador noted that US UN Ambassador
Susan Rice would like to host the Minister for an event when she
next visits New York. He thanked the SAG for its recent Human
Rights Council vote in favor of the U.S.-Egypt-sponsored Freedom of
Expression Resolution.
¶4. (C) Mashabane said she was passionate about integration
and de-racialization as tools to eradicate the legacies of
apartheid in both rural and urban townships. She said Qapartheid in
both rural and urban townships. She said advancing rural
development was complicated by an excessive number of
municipalities at 284. Mashabane encouraged the Ambassador to make
contact with the Premier of Gauteng Province, Nomvula Mokonyane, a
close childhood friend, now known as "Mama Action". She said that
her staff would share a new proposal for the South Africa
Development Agency, newly brought under her Department of
International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). The Minister joked
that she needed to be nice to Minister of Finance Gordhan and
Minister of National Planning Manuel, suggesting that they
controlled the economic and finance levers in the new government.
The Ambassador emphasized that the USG wants to support and
contribute in all the priority areas, like education, rural
development, and health. He noted his comment in his Senate
confirmation statement that our job is to help South Africa
succeed, observing our shared diversity and the special challenge
of overcoming the legacy of apartheid. Mashabane said it was a
propitious moment with a new President (Zuma)
PRETORIA 00002245 002 OF 003
who listens to and supports South Africans.
Health and HIV/AIDS - Extolling Cooperation, Noting Past Mistakes
¶5. (C) The Minister thanked the USG for its sustained support
as a key partner in fighting HIV/AIDS under the PEPFAR program in
South Africa, hoping for continued support. She admitted that
there had been mistakes in past policy, but the SAG was now
committed to catching up. Mashabane stated that President Zuma
would make a strong statement on World AIDS Day on December 1,
emphasizing that South Africa would now lead from the front, not
from behind. The Ambassador noted that the USG had agreed to make
a one-time contribution of $120 million over two years to help with
the ARV stock-out gap, subject to some key conditions. Mashabane
encouraged the Ambassador to communicate with Minister of Health
Motsaeledi and Minister of Finance Gordhan on these issues. The
Ambassador noted the need to make plans for the next five years,
also encouraging South Africa to share its experience and skills
with the rest of Africa. Mashabane said the SAG would like to be
able to make greater use of generic ARVs and other drugs to save
costs.
Food Security and Agriculture - Women's Issues
¶6. (C) Mashabane identified food security and agriculture as
key areas for cooperation. She said we would shortly receive a
written response on our food security initiative. The Minister
spoke highly of the work and vision of the passionate and dynamic
Agriculture Minister, Tina Joemat-Petterson. She encouraged the
Ambassador to visit one of the Minister's rural pilot projects.
¶7. (C) The Ambassador raised our desire to cooperate on
women's issues and to target specifically violence against women,
noting its linkages to HIV/AIDS. The Minister agreed with the
importance of this issue. She said South Africa has good laws and
regulations, but many women - particularly in rural areas - still
live in the past in terms of their culture and communities.
Mashabane cited the Progressive Women's Movement of South Africa as
an effective organization, chaired by Baleka Mbete, who is also the
National Chair of the ANC. She cited the value of workshops aimed
at preventing violence before incidents. The Ambassador mentioned
visiting a U.S.-funded Tutuzela Care Center that supports rape
counseling and law enforcement. Mashabane said such centers had
achieved a significant increase in conviction rates from 20 to 80
percent. She said that she was the outgoing Chair of the
Progressive Women's Movement of SA in Limpopo and cited a recent
workshop in that Province. The Ambassador said that the USG would
like to follow up on participating in such workshops.
Security
¶8. (C) The Ambassador thanked the Minister for the SAG's
security support to the U.S. Mission since the mid-September threat
and asked that it remain in place (also requested by separate
diplomatic note.) She said she supported this request. Mashabane
said South Africa would win its battle against crime, asserting
that it would never have problems as great as Brazil's. The
Ambassador offered technical support and training for law
enforcement agencies.
Zimbabwe
¶9. (C) The Minister expressed great frustration with
President Mugabe, saying that "we cannot do quiet diplomacy
forever" and calling him "the crazy old man". She said we must all
support Prime Minister Tsvangirai, but she expressed disappointment
that he withdrew from the government without consulting South
Africa and other international partners. She said there were rumors
that he was instructed to do this by a senior USG official. The
Ambassador said that to his knowledge this was not the case, noting
that Tsvangirai "walked" without any consultation and seemingly
without a
PRETORIA 00002245 003 OF 003
plan. Mashabane said the current SADC Chair President Joseph Kabila
was left cooling his heels in South Africa over the weekend when
Mugabe at first refused to receive him until late Sunday. (She
noted that she was stuck in Pretoria waiting to fulfill her
protocol role of seeing him off at the airport, so was not able to
take her children home to Limpopo Province over the weekend.)
Mashabane said the SAG view was that Mugabe is getting desperate
and is trying to push the country into elections. On the other
hand, she said Tsvangirai wasn't realistic in calling for removal
of all the security chiefs. She advocated seeking to change the
electoral law to facilitate proper counting, while pragmatically
leaving the security chiefs in place. Mashabane broached
consideration for amnesty scenarios for the security chiefs that
might induce them not to block a political transition.
¶10. (C) Mashabane promised to follow-up with the Ambassador
on next steps following discussions she would have very soon with
President Zuma and the Foreign Minister of Mozambique. She
advocated helping Tsvangirai prepare for elections if they happen
and exposing the dirty actions of the security chiefs. The Minister
pointed out the danger to her northern province of Limpopo and the
rest of South Africa with potential for more cholera outbreaks and
significant refugees if the situation lingers or worsens.
¶11. (C) Mashabane raised concerns about Palestine, Israel,
and the Goldstone Report. The Ambassador said the U.S. was
committed to a two-state solution. He said President Obama was
frustrated with Israel and noted that private messages are much
stronger than the public ones. The Ambassador said Secretary
Clinton would be aggressive in calling for greater dialogue and
results. Mashabane recommended that the Ambassador meet with South
African Jewish Deputies to hear their perspectives. The Ambassador
welcomed the suggestion and said he was also interested in outreach
to the Muslim community in South Africa.
¶12. (C) COMMENT: The Ambassador's first official meeting with
the South African Foreign Minister was particularly friendly and
open, emblematic of the positive trend in our bilateral
relationship. The Foreign Minister indicated a desire to set up a
dinner to welcome the Ambassador, as long as we did not tell the
other Ambassadors. The Ambassador met her last August (prior to
presenting his credentials) while accompanying Secretary Clinton on
her visit to South Africa, when the two Ministers established a
warm rapport. There is clearly enthusiasm within the SAG for
developing a bilateral mechanism. We should bear in mind, however
that the South African Government faces shortfalls in capacity
which limit its ability to staff cooperative mechanisms and to
implement programs, so we will have to carefully choose our
initiatives. The Foreign Minister made strong statements on
Zimbabwe and Robert Mugabe, but our sense is that her department
does not have the lead within the SAG on the Zimbabwe agenda. GIPS
AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with
a particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
Bulletin is edited by William Minter.
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