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Sudan: Civil War in the North?
AfricaFocus Bulletin
Oct 7, 2011 (111007)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
"New thinking is required to take into account a Khartoum
regime now in the hands of Sudan Armed Forces generals, a
unifying opposition that seeks regime change, and an
international community that seems to be losing the ability
to engage coherently on Sudan's problems. Continuing with
the current ad hoc approach to negotiations and short-term
arrangements to manage crises will not address the
underlying causes of conflict." - International Crisis
Group
In its useful summary of the current escalating crisis in
Sudan, the International Crisis Group (ICG) notes the
incomplete implementation of the agreement leading to the
independence of South Sudan, the dominance of military
hard-liners in Khartoum, and the convergence of different
opposition forces within the boundaries of the territory
now still ruled by the Khartoum regime. As previous
commentators on the long-standing Sudan crisis have noted,
the issues were never simply North-South, but were rooted
in the absence of democracy in the country and the
dominance of a small elite at the center over the entrie
country, with peripheral regions particularly marginalized.
Also notable in the ICG commentary is the observation that
some international actors which played a leading role in
the earlier peace agreement, such as the United States,
United Kingdom, Norway, the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD), and the European Union, now have much
less influence. If there is to be effective international
involvement, consequently, leadership must fall primarily
to other parties, including the African Union, the United
Nations, and China.
This AfricaFocus Bulletin includes the full text of the ICG
"Crisis Risk Alert," published on September 26.
For a wide variety of current news and commentary on Sudan
and South Sudan, see http://allafrica.com/sudan,
http://www.sudantribune.com, and
http://africanarguments.org/category/making-sense-of-sudan/
Of particular interest in recent articles on Sudan Tribune:
"Despite conflict over pipeline fees and speculation about
alternative routes, South Sudan has exported 22 million
barrels of oil via North Sudan since independence last
July."
http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-exports-over-20,40352
"President of the Republic of South Sudan Salva Kiir will
be in Khartoum on Saturday for talks on the post
independence arrangements but he will also seek to contain
growing tensions with the northern neighbor."
http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-s-president-visits,40353
For previous issues of AfricaFocus Bulletin on Sudan and
South Sudan, see
http://www.africafocus.org/country/sudan.php
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Reminder: Given its frequency and selectivity, AfricaFocus
Bulletin does not provide continuous coverage of any
particular issue or country. Whenever possible, as above,
each Bulletin supplies links which interested readers can
follow for additional background and up-to-date coverage.
In addition, readers can also find more frequent links to a
variety of topics on the AfricaFocus Facebook page at
http://www.facebook.com/pages/AfricaFocus/101867576407
++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++
Stopping the Spread of Sudan's New Civil War
26 September 2011
International Crisis Group (Brussels)
Civil war is spreading in Sudan, and concerted
international action is needed to stem the violence and
prevent it from engulfing the entire country and the wider
region.
Khartoum's most recent military offensive -- this time in
Blue Nile state -- adds to fresh fighting between
government and opposition forces in Southern Kordofan and
recent hostilities in Abyei. With hundreds of thousands of
people displaced, at least 20,000 of whom have fled into
Ethiopia from Blue Nile in recent days, the growing war on
multiple fronts poses serious dangers for the country, for
its future relationship with the Republic of South Sudan
and for the stability of the region as a whole.
The recently renewed conflict in these three areas is
rooted in unimplemented provisions of the 2005
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between Khartoum's
ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's
Liberation Movement (SPLM), which ended a two-decade-long
north-south civil war in Sudan that cost millions of lives.
Those lagging issues include the failed democratic
transformation of Sudan, stymied popular consultations, and
the unresolved status of the Sudan People's Liberation Army
(SPLA) forces indigenous to the North.
After the end of the CPA, rather than negotiate with
Sudanese opposition forces, NCP hardliners have opted for a
military solution -- not an unusual policy response for the
regime when confronted with opposition. This, however, is
pushing Sudan's disparate rebel movements and opposition
forces together and could trigger a wider civil war for
control of the country.
The CPA
The CPA was intended to lay the foundation for a new
reality in Sudan, end chronic conflict and make continued
unity attractive. It was premised on three major
principles: fairer distribution of power and wealth between
the centre and the peripheries, democratic transformation
and the right of southern Sudanese to determine their own
future. The CPA also granted the people of the states of
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile to conduct popular
consultations to rectify the document's shortcomings on
their areas and to redefine their relationship with
Khartoum.
General elections were scheduled half way through the sixyear
interim period (ie, by 2008), so as to widen
participation in governance. In the period after the
elections, the new representative government was to build
on those foundations in order to consolidate
reconciliation, start the popular consultations, continue
review of constitutional arrangements and establish
conditions that would affirm the rights of all the people
of Sudan and encourage Southerners to choose continued
unity of their own free will.
This never happened. The NCP and SPLM failed to hold
elections as scheduled and manipulated them when they were
eventually conducted, two years late in April 2010, so as
to ensure majorities in their regions. Consequently, they
wasted the period that had been intended to consolidate
peace and unity, and the democratic transformation agenda
was dropped.
The situation became volatile in Southern Kordofan and Blue
Nile, where many sided with the South during the civil war,
but which remained in the North after Southern secession.
The promised popular consultations were repeatedly delayed,
and even when they started in Blue Nile state on September
2010, SPLM supporters and leadership lost confidence that
their demand, namely the right to self-rule, would be met
by Khartoum. The situation deteriorated further when Ahmed
Haroun, a man indicted by the International Criminal Court
(ICC) for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur,
was re-elected governor of Southern Kordofan in July 2011,
in elections the SPLM-North candidate, Abdel Azzizal-Hilu
(also Deputy Chair of the SPLM-N and former Deputy-Governor
of Southern Kordofan), claims were manipulated.
Lacking real political power, the leaders of the SPLM-North
were reluctant to relinquish their military forces, the
former 9th and 10th SPLA divisions composed of troops from
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, despite the CPA
requirement that these units be demobilised or redeployed
to south of the 1956 North-South border. With the CPA
coming to conclusion after the South seceded, and failing
popular consultations, they asked instead that a new
security arrangement be negotiated that would allow for a
more gradual integration of their forces into the Sudan
Armed Forces (SAF).
The NCP, weakened by the impending separation of the South,
refused any further political accommodation, and Khartoum
opted to remove its opponents militarily. This began with
the SAF invasion of Abyei in May 2011, followed quickly by
the attempt to take control of Southern Kordofan in June,
and now Blue Nile state.
Internal Sudanese Dynamics
The loss of South Sudan has had a profound effect on the
NCP, and senior generals led a soft-coup within the party.
They have outflanked more pragmatic elements in the NCP who
seek a negotiated strategy. Encouraging progress in the
post-separation arrangements between North and South was
blocked. More importantly, hardliners in Khartoum -including
SAF generals -- immediately rejected a 28 June
framework agreement, which includes a political and a
security agreement for Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile,
facilitated by former South African President Thabo Mbeki
and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, and signed by
Dr. Nafie Ali Nafie, Co-deputy NCP chairman and a
presidential adviser. A few days later, President Omar alBashir
publicly disavowed the agreement.
After conflict broke out in the Blue Nile on 1 September,
Khartoum formally banned the SPLM-N, arrested a number of
prominent opposition leaders and declared a state of
emergency in Blue Nile state and replaced its governor,
Malik Agar.
Now, the rebel forces are openly attempting to unify and
pursue a policy of regime change. On 8 August 2011, Abdel
Azziz al-Hilu met with the leaders of the Darfur rebel
movements who rejected the Doha peace process in Kouda (an
SPLM-N controlled area in Southern Kordofan), and
afterwards, they announced a new alliance with a common
objective: to change the regime in Khartoum by the use of
force and popular uprising. Two thousand armed men linked
to the Democratic Unionist Party and led by Al-Tom Hago
joined this alliance. The Beja Congress of East Sudan
likewise issued a statement vowing to rejoin the military
opposition.
In an effort to defuse the situation, Ethiopian Prime
Minister Zenawi met with Malik Agar and Al-Hilu in Addis
Ababa on 21 August, and on the same day, he took Malik to
Khartoum to negotiate a way out of the danger. However,
President Bashir responded by saying his government was
unwilling to engage in further external negotiations and
would not commit to the rejected framework. The door for
direct SPLM-NCP talks was closed.
On 8 September, the SPLM-N officially split from the SPLM,
formed a new leadership structure under Agar and vowed to
continue war against Khartoum. On 16 September, the SPLM-N
submitted a "road map for political transformation" to
Zenawi to discuss with Bashir. It lists six conditions to
be met by the government before the SPLM-N would accept a
cessation of hostilities, including reinstituting Governor
Malik Agar, allowing humanitarian access to affected people
and agreeing to international investigations into crimes
committed in both Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. If
Khartoum agrees to its proposals, the SPLM-N would want a
mediator to negotiate the road map. Since Zenawi's 17
September trip to Khartoum, there has been no reaction from
the NCP. Hundreds of thousands are now displaced, fighting
has intensified in both states, and the rainy season ends
in three weeks, foreshadowing increased conflict.
The Risk of Conflict Contagion
There is a real possibility of a new era of protracted
civil war in Sudan if key international actors are not able
to contain it. Fighting could quickly expand both within
Sudan and spill over into South Sudan. To the resurgence of
war in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile will likely be added
an escalation in Darfur, especially now that the leader of
the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) has returned from
Libya and rejoined forces in Darfur.
In addition, both Sudan and South Sudan have intensified
rhetoric that each country is supporting its rival's
insurgents. The government of Sudan claims that the
military action by the SPLM-N is a grand plan to topple the
regime in Khartoum, an agenda supported by external
elements including the government of South Sudan. Juba
claims the war is a northern affair and accuses Khartoum of
supporting South Sudan rebellions.
The situation will escalate if the international community
is delayed or disjointed in its response.
Unfortunately, the NCP no longer trusts the key
interlocutors who engaged previously, such as the United
States, United Kingdom, Norway, the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD), and the European Union.
Khartoum suspects them of indirectly encouraging regime
change, including by calling for additional investigations
into crimes committed in Southern Kordofan, complicating if
not derailing the Darfur Political Process (a key process
towards settlement of the Darfur problem after the Doha
agreement), and refusing to invoke Article 16 of the Rome
Statute for the deferral of the ICC cases against Bashir
and others. Khartoum is also sceptical of the U.S. offer to
normalise relations. After Southern secession these
perceptions have deepened.
It is becoming apparent that the only acceptable
interlocutors are the African Union High-Level
Implementation (AUHIP) team supported by the regional
actors and the United Nations envoy, Haile Menkerios, as
well as key partners such as China and other major
investors.
Two Sudans: The Need for a New Approach
The CPA period is over, and there is no coherent political
framework to deal with the many remaining challenges in
Sudan. Unfortunately, international attention focused on
safeguarding South Sudan's referendum and independence, and
largely underestimated the impact of secession on the
North.
New thinking is required to take into account a Khartoum
regime now in the hands of SAF generals, a unifying
opposition that seeks regime change, and an international
community that seems to be losing the ability to engage
coherently on Sudan's problems. Continuing with the current
ad hoc approach to negotiations and short-term arrangements
to manage crises will not address the underlying causes of
conflict. The various issues -- North-South negotiations,
Abyei, Darfur Peace Process, and Southern Kordofan and Blue
Nile -- are interrelated and efforts should be made to
ensure coherence in resolving them.
What is urgently needed is a new approach -- supported by
the key external actors, including friends of Khartoum --
to deal with the internal crisis in the North and the
conclusion of post-CPA agreements between the North and
South. The AU and UN should continue to support North-South
talks, and both parties should be brought back to focus on
the key agreements that must be reached, most immediate
being economic arrangements.
Meanwhile, the international community should unite behind
a single approach to begin addressing internal Sudan
crises. A sustainable solution to these must focus on a
cessation of hostilities and an inclusive national dialogue
consisting of renegotiating the relationship between the
centre and peripheries, and agreement on decentralisation
and a redistribution of power leading to a new
constitution, on the basis of which a referendum and new
elections should be held.
A negotiated settlement of disputes is in the interest of
all parties. Neither the SAF nor the SPLM-N can achieve an
outright military victory. Bashir and SAF generals must be
made to understand that the current military strategy of
using tribal militias, ethnic cleansing and allowing
insurgencies to fester, only increases the risk of
fragmentation and prolongs international interference.
Likewise, the newly aligned opposition will face similar
military challenges; the NCP regime is weakened but not
powerless, and an alliance of the disparate opposition
groups is unsustainable in the long-term. Widespread
instability in North Sudan would not only exact a great
toll on the Sudanese people but jeopardise the future of
South Sudan. The parties should be helped by their
international partners to recognise the imperative of a
non-military solution.
Immediate Steps
To begin implementing the approach outlined above,
mediation efforts must be streamlined, and key actors must
agree on a common international strategy on Sudan. The
AUHIP is facilitating the post-secession negotiations
between Sudan and South Sudan (with support from the UN and
US special envoys). These efforts should continue, but new
leadership and the involvement of friends of Sudan are
needed to convince the parties to step back from war and
engage in a genuine national dialogue and key reforms. The
AU, UN and Ethiopia can be helpful, but are unlikely to
deliver a comprehensive process without active engagement
by others, including efforts by some key actors to reengage
the regime in Khartoum. The following steps could
help build much needed consensus on the way forward:
- Define a new strategy: The AU, UN and Ethiopia should
develop a strategy in line with the new approach
articulated above: an immediate cessation of hostilities in
the three disputed areas, and commitment by the parties to
hold an inclusive national dialogue leading to
decentralisation, a new constitution and free and fair
elections. The AU, UN and Ethiopia should work to build
support amongst international partners and friends of Sudan
on the new way forward. This will require renewed
engagement from key actors.
- Streamline the mediation: The roles of the AUHIP, the UN
envoy and regional efforts under Prime Minister Zenawi
should be clearly defined and the processes streamlined.
The mediation efforts should have clear objectives and
define a set of benchmarks to underpin resolution of the
conflicts and a genuine transition to an inclusive
government.
- Achieve consensus: Convening of an international
conference under the auspices of the AU to build consensus
on a new international strategy for Sudan. The conference
should comprise a group of people representing all
different blocs with a stake in Sudan and should include
the AU, IGAD, Organisation of the Islamic Cooperation
(OIC), and the following countries: Egypt, Qatar, Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Turkey, China, India,
Malaysia, Brazil, South Africa, Ethiopia, as well as
the EU, UN and members of the troika (US, UK and Norway).
Now is the time for Sudan's key external actors to speak in
a single voice in support of a political strategy that
comprehensively deals with Sudan's spreading conflicts and
that is underpinned by a clear set of principles on genuine
political transformation rather than the current fire
fighting approach.
President Bashir will undoubtedly resist any further
external efforts to pursue a more peaceful outcome for
Sudan, but given the increasing fragility of the regime,
not least its growing economic weakness, he may be
persuaded to engage with a coordinated international
approach. International actors must come out with a strong
voice to support a national agenda for a transition to an
inclusive government. In the absence of a national
political framework, and without clear international
consensus to encourage and support a national peace
process, the conflict in Sudan may spiral out control and
engulf the region.
AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic
publication providing reposted commentary and analysis on
African issues, with a particular focus on U.S. and
international policies. AfricaFocus Bulletin is edited by
William Minter.
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