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Africa: Shades of Green, 1
AfricaFocus Bulletin
Sep 24, 2012 (120924)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
"AGRA adopts a fairly good critique of prior approaches to
support for African agriculture, including systematic under-
investment, the historical focus on large-scale agriculture
and standardised technologies, and efforts to transfer
technologies developed elsewhere which were inappropriate to
the context (both seed and manufactured fertilisers). ...
[but there is a hidden agenda of privatization] behind the
humanitarian façade." - African Centre for Biodiversity
This AfricaFocus Bulletin, one of a series of three released
today, and available on the web at http://www.africafocus.org/docs12/ag1209a.php, contains
a clear description of the main features of the Alliance for
a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), excerpts from a new
report from the African Centre for Biodiversity.
Another Bulletin, sent out by e-mail as well as available on
the web at
http://www.africafocus.org/docs12/ag1209b.php, contains
excerpts from the same report focusing on critical
alternative approaches to the AGRA commercialization model
of agricultural development.
And a third related Bulletin, available on the web at
http://www.africafocus.org/docs12/ag1209c.php, focuses
on the key issue of "gene grabbing," the privatization of
intellectual p;operty in African seeds drawn from the common
store of resources developed by African farmers of
centuries. Included in this Bulletin are excerpts from a new
overview article by Andrew Mushita and Carol Thompson and
from a 2010 study from the African Centre for Biodiversity
on "The Sorghum Gene Grab."
The official web site for AGRA is http://www.agra-alliance.org/
For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on food and agriculture
issues, visit http://www.africafocus.org/agexp.php
++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++
Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA): Laying
the Groundwork for the Commercialisation of African
Agriculture
African Centre for Biosafety
September 15 2012
http://www.acbio.org.za/
The African Centre for Biosafety (ACB) is a non-profi
organisation, based in Johannesburg, South Africa. ... The
ACB has a respected record of evidence based work and can
play a vital role in the agro-ecological movement by
striving towards seed sovereignty, built upon the values of
equal access to and use of resources.
About this paper and why the focus on AGRA
This paper examines the Alliance for a Green Revolution in
Africa (AGRA) with a focus on its work around seeds. AGRA's
intervention in African agriculture ties together a number
of otherwise disparate initiatives by public sector
institutions, national and multinational government
structures and private companies and investors. AGRA thus
provides an organisational and technical nucleus for the
expansion of profit-making ventures in African agriculture.
It focuses on interventions in seed as one of the central
technologies for the commercialisation of agriculture, and
as a profit centre.
Appraisals of AGRA from sovereignty movements so far have
tended to focus on generic critiques of Green Revolution
approaches to agriculture, and on the links between the Bill
& Melinda Gates Foundation (Gates Foundation) and
multinational biotechnology and seed companies, in
particular Monsanto. Most existing critiques emerged soon
after AGRA's launch in 2006 before much had happened, based
on the historical experience of the Green Revolution and the
role of the Rockefeller and USAID programmes amongst others,
based on the historical experience of the Green Revolution
and the role of the Rockefeller and USAID programmes amongst
others.
Enough time has passed now since AGRA's launch to begin
interrogating the initiative on the basis of its practical
experiences. What we have tried to do in this paper is to
dig a bit deeper into AGRA's philosophy and practice to
understand in more detail what they are proposing and
interrogate this. ...
...
4. The Green Revolution in Africa and new frontiers of
accumulation
In the second decade of the new century, a growing consensus
has emerged that we have entered a period of structurally
higher food prices (Timmer, 2008:32). These rising prices
are driven inter alia, by limited arable land and rising
urban populations and the expansion of biofuel production
using maize, especially in the US (the historical generator
of maize surpluses for food aid to Africa). The United
Nations (UN) predicts that food prices as a whole will rise
at least 40% in the next decade (Vidal, 2011). The United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development/Food and Agriculture
Organisation (OECD-FAO) predict that global wheat and grain
prices will be 30-60% higher in the coming decade than they
were during the period 2002-2007 (Headey, et al., 2009:17).
There is also an expectation of growing volatility because
demand for cereals is highly inelastic (there are no
alternatives).
As a result, land and agricultural production have become
more important as well as a site for potential profitable
investment. Africa is seen as the 'new frontier' of
accumulation (Goldman Sachs, 2012). Following decades of
neglect, the past few years have thus witnessed growing
external investment in African agriculture, including in
Africa's seed systems. The possibilities for profitable
investment are situated in the context of foreign direct
investment (FDI) as the perceived answer to Africa's
problems, both from within and outside Africa. The New
Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and its related
agricultural programme, the Comprehensive Africa
Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP), are explicit in
their support of a strategy that attracts FDI on the basis
of investor friendly policies and systems. The limits to
Africa's development are identified essentially as lack of
capital and expertise.
There are two sides to this new wave of investment: on the
one hand is the production and export of raw or semi-
processed materials for consumption outside Africa in a
continuation of Africa's colonial role as an exporter of raw
materials. On the other hand is an emphasis on building
local and regional markets in Africa. That is, Africa is an
emerging zone of consumption for the realisation of surplus
value in its own right. Much of the consumption based on
Western diets currently means imports from other countries,
e.g. wheat from the US, and soya from Argentina and Brazil.
However soya and other crops are targeted for development in
Africa. The first side provides inputs into production and
consumption elsewhere; the second side is the expansion of
markets. Biofuels, maize, rice and cassava are key focus
areas from an agricultural point of view.
The key challenge facing investors in African agriculture is
how to increase productivity so that sustainable profits can
be made. It is logical that they will turn to the
experiences of the Green Revolution in Asia and Latin
America in the 1960s and 1970s to see what lessons can be
learned for application in Africa. Green Revolution seed
work was spearheaded by the Consultative Group on
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), with its roots
in research institutes that pioneered technological
innovations in plant breeding and seed systems since the
1940s. The first such institute, the International Maize and
Wheat Improvement Centre (CIMMYT) was sponsored by the
Rockefeller Foundation, which continued its funding as the
group of institutes expanded over the decades. Although the
Green Revolution did lead to rapid and sustained increases
in yields, this came at immense social and ecological cost
(Box 1). These costs must be considered an integral part of
the Green Revolution package.
Social and ecological costs of the Asian Green Revolution
- Replacement of locally-used crops with cash crops for
export, and associated replacement of polycultures (mixed
farming) with monocultures;
- Land degradation
and soil nutrient depletion through overuse of synthetic
fertilisers and pesticides, led to destruction of soil
life;
- Negative health impacts for rural
communities as a result of pesticide poisonings;
- Water pollution and waste;
- A focus on a few
high-yielding varieties resulted in a narrowing of
agricultural and wild biodiversity;
- Sharp rises
in input costs, resulting in greater indebtedness of
small-scale farmers and consequent loss of farmland;
- Concentration of land holdings, and rising social
inequality.
In comparison with Asia and Latin America where the Green
Revolution took hold, Africa has low grain yields, with
stagnating per capita grain production (Minot et al.,
2007:1). The dominant story until recently was that Africa's
low agricultural productivity was caused by the failure of
the first Green Revolution to take root. Initially lack of
African capacity to adopt new technologies and lack of
government will or support was blamed for this failure. More
recently, however, the arguments have become more
sophisticated, and there is greater recognition that the
simple transfer of technology model that allowed for the
rapid uptake of new technologies in Asia in particular is
not appropriate for Africa's more diverse ecological and
social context. The World Bank argues that the wide
diversity of agroecological zones in Africa require
adaptations in technology and "the 'technological distance'
between growing conditions prevailing in Africa and those
prevailing in developed countries is unusually large, so
technologies travel even less well to Africa than they do to
other developing regions" (World Bank, 2009:61). According
to this argument, there was not enough emphasis on local
adaptation in the first Green Revolution. Numerous other
factors played a role in the inability of Green Revolution
technologies to gain traction in Africa. For example, Minot
et al. (2007:152) add that the higher costs of fertiliser,
unreliable rainfall, lack of irrigation and low population
density "which makes yield-increasing technology less
appealing" were also contributing factors.
It is in this context that AGRA, an initiative of the Gates
and Rockefeller Foundations, was formed in 2006 as a private
sector initiative with links to government institutions
globally and in Africa. AGRA is registered as a non-profit
institution in the US, but operates out of Nairobi in Kenya
where it is registered as a branch of a foreign corporate
entity. The Gates Foundation has made large investments in
agriculture globally since 2003, to the value of US$2bn up
to 2011. Recipients include CGIAR institutes, universities,
public sector institutions and non-government organisations
(NGOs), and AGRA offers a wide range of support from
research into genetic modification (GM) to organic farming
support. Up to 2011, AGRA was the recipient of 16% of global
agriculture grants from the Foundation.
Funding for AGRA is primarily from the Gates and Rockefeller
Foundations and the UK Department for Foreign International
Development (DFID) ...
AGRA is only one programme the foundations are involved with
in Africa. Others include the African Enterprise Challenge
Fund (AECF) and the Coalition for African Rice Development
(CARD)5. The AECF is a US$150m "private sector fund"
sponsored by the governments of Sweden, Denmark,Netherlands,
Australia and the UK, and the International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD) and hosted by AGRA. The
focus is on building markets to enable the expansion of
agribusiness and, where it is potentially profitable, the
commercialisation and incorporation of smallholder farmers
into these formal markets. It is currently operating in 16
countries with regional hubs in South Africa, Ghana and
Kenya.
CARD is an initiative between AGRA and the Japanese
government to increase rice production in Africa using green
revolution technologies based on hybrid rice. It builds on
existing programmes such as the Africa Rice Centre
(AfricaRice) and the African Union's (AU's) CAADP. Partners
include the World Bank, African Development Bank (AfDB), the
FAO and a number of CGIAR institutes. It currently operates
in 23 countries.
...
5. AGRA's philosophy and structure
AGRA considers the fundamental problem in African
agriculture to be low productivity. It identifies a few key
areas that contribute to this problem: i) lack of scientific
knowledge and capacity, caused by ii) lack of investment in
African agriculture, iii) poor soils, iv) limited seed
systems that inhibit the introduction of new varieties, and
v) weak governance and regulatory systems.
Two key themes can be extracted from the body of work
surrounding AGRA: first, local adaptation is critical to
improvements in agricultural productivity in Africa; and
second, technologies should be blended with one another
without ideological hang-ups, so that techniques ranging
from organic methods through to biotechnology are
incorporated where appropriate.
AGRA adopts a fairly good critique of prior approaches to
support for African agriculture, including systematic under-
investment, the historical focus on large-scale agriculture
and standardised technologies, and efforts to transfer
technologies developed elsewhere which were inappropriate to
the context (both seed and manufactured fertilisers).
The following discussion draws heavily from an influential
book written in 2001 by Joe DeVries and Gary Toenniessen
called Securing the Harvest. DeVries is the current director
of AGRA's Programme for Africa's Seed Systems (PASS), which
is at the core of AGRA's seed work. He has worked on
agriculture in Africa since the 1980s, and was a director in
World Vision International and the Rockefeller Foundation
where his work on genetic improvement of African crops laid
the foundations for AGRA. Toenniessen has worked with the
Rockefeller Foundation since 1971, where he is now Managing
Director, leading the Foundation's strategic direction on
agricultural development. DeVries and Toenniessen were
instrumental in AGRA's formation.
DeVries & Toennissen argue that the wholesale adoption
of what they call the Asian Green Revolution cannot work in
Africa (2001:7). In particular, in Asia it was possible to
immediately target a layer of existing better-off farmers
who were able to adopt the technological package and make it
work in their interests. In contrast, in Africa rain-fed
marginal farming conditions are the norm, not a secondary
focus to be targeted once the more favourable areas have
been tapped. This means the emphasis at the outset must be
on resource-poor small-scale farmers in the context of the
actual constraints they face.
AGRA draws from different sources of knowledge in its
responses to the core problem of low agricultural
productivity. These range from locally-sensitive
agroecological practices through to biotechnology, with the
idea that there is a right time and place for different
types of technology. In the current context, AGRA argues,
biotechnology is not appropriate in most places in
Africa,although it explicitly views biotechnology (including
GM) as part of the longer-term solution. Ittherefore
suggests that conventional Green Revolution technologies can
only be introduced over time as systems are put in place and
the various components become readily available to farmers.
AGRA says that without effective distribution systems,
improved seed varieties will just sit on the shelf without
being used. Another example it offers is that the
effectiveness of fertilisers is reduced bythe absence of
irrigation. In this regard, it argues that GM crops cannot
be introduced without a proper institutional base and
regulatory framework that ensure they can be properly
developed and controlled in the field. Therefore, according
to AGRA, certain key building blocks must be put in place
first, before moving forward with these technologies.
AGRA's focus is on seed improvements and soil fertility. A
background report written for AGRA(Minot, et al., 2007) in
preparation for the launch of its seed work recognises some
value in informal or farmer-owned seed systems. These
systems produce inexpensive seed, farmers are familiar with
the performance of the seed, the varietal heterogeneity that
comes from these systems may reduce the risk of severe crop
losses, and selection is for a range of criteria (Minot, et
al., 2007:157). However,AGRA considers these systems to be
insufficient by themselves to increase productivity in a
sustained way. According to AGRA, there are limits to the
local sharing of seed. Over time the quality degenerates
because the genetic pool is not wide enough,and in
particular that local sharing systems are weak at
introducing new and 'improved' varieties. A related argument
is advanced by AGRA that formal seed systems in most parts
of Africa generally lack capacity and therefore little if
any work is being done in developing new varieties based on
locally-adapted germplasm. As a result, AGRA focuses its
efforts on building formal seed systems.
AGRA identifies a number of areas where interventions are
required to facilitate the expansion of formal seed systems.
First, modern scientific methods must be introduced, built
up and supported where they already exist, to enable African
institutions to develop higher yielding varieties of crops.S
econd, systems must be developed to multiply and distribute
improved seed. In this context,there is very limited
production of foundation seed as this is seen as a primary
bottleneck in the expansion of new varieties (DeVries &
Toenniessen, 2001:xiv). Local specificity is key to AGRA's
approach, and DeVries and Toenniessen argue for country-
level programmes where practitioners can operate in close
proximity to the various agroecologies where they can
develop "localised 'agro-ecology-based' breeding programmes"
(2001:xiii). In their broad philosophy, AGRA's designers
strongly promote farmer participation in agricultural
research. On the face of it, it seems as if they recognise
that farmers best understand the conditions they work in,
and breeding programmes will be most effective if they
operate in close proximity to farmers and involve farmers
especially in variety selection (DeVries & Toenniessen,
2001:xv). Whether these ideas match the way the seed
programmes actually materialise in practice is an important
issue for further investigation.
Although systems are not currently in place for the
effective use of biotechnology, this according to AGRA, can
change. Part of AGRA's mission is to induce such change
through 'modernisation' of seed systems and the associated
R&D. The approach is to support biotechnology capacity
where it exists (DeVries & Toennissen, 2001:xiv),
starting with tissue culture of clonally propagated crops
and marker assisted selection for traits. Once effective
biosafety systems and regulations are in place, it will be
possible to advance to GM, using the genetic base of already
well-adapted varieties (DeVries & Toennissen, 2001:xiv).
Soil fertility is the second strand of AGRA's strategy.
According to DeVries and Toenniessen (2001:xv),"in spite of
its potential, genetic improvement of crops will always face
limitations with regard to what it can offer to farmers in
regards to their levels of productivity. No matter what
efficiencies genetic enhancement is able to build into crop
plants, they will always draw their nutrition from external
sources, and this places enormous importance on the
investments that can be made in the soils of Africa". The
basic argument is that there is need to increase the organic
content in soil, and AGRA will support work in this
direction. But, as with existing farmer-based seed systems,
AGRAargues that in and of itself this is not enough.
According to AGRA, there is also need for the judicioususe
of manufactured fertilisers, e.g. rock phosphate is
necessary for plant growth, and this can be manufactured
into a form that is easily taken up by plants. Like seed,
AGRA says that fertilisers need to be adapted to local
conditions. A one-size-fits-all, standardised technology
will not work in Africa's diverse agroecological conditions.
Again, the notion of blending different technological
approaches, at least in the conceptual framework, can be
seen here.
AGRA places a focus on small-scale farmers as the main
producers of food in Africa, stating that upwards of 70% of
the African population is involved in agriculture, but
because of past policies these farmers are caught in a
poverty trap. New technologies mean this is no longer
necessary, but changes need to be made, in particular in the
governance and funding environments. It is thus the view of
AGRA that the focus should be on "the very poor, rural
people who have been left behind by globalisation and the
interests of the private sector" (DeVries & Toenniessen,
2001:xv). That is, AGRA's initial emphasis is on building
new markets rather than on supplying export markets. To
realise this goal AGRA promotes farmer organisation, noting
the importance of organisation in facilitating communication
and to provide a market for seed (Minot et al., 2007:158).
In 2010 AGRA established the Farmer Organisation Support
Centre in Africa (FOSCA), which identifies networks of
organisations in AGRA's target countries, and links them to
service providers to realise AGRA's goals(AGRA, 2010:13).
There is some acknowledgment of the limits of a profit-
driven private sector in building African agriculture." In
Africa, multinational seed companies may be motivated to
popularise one or even several high-yielding maize varieties
among better-off farmers in favourable areas, but it is less
likely that they will find it profitable to devote
significant resources to developing varieties with the very
specific adaptation advantages required by small-scale, low
input farmers" (DeVries & Toenniessen,2001:22). However,
despite this recognition, there is an acceptance of the
dominance of the private sector and thus the emphasis is
placed on private investment of all kinds in the seed sector
(DeVries & Toenniessen, 2001:xv). ...
AGRA also recognises the role of the state/public sector. It
explicitly recognises that government interventions can
legitimately be based on efficiency (market failure) or
equity (redistributive) grounds. As a result, AGRA has
public-private partnerships (PPPs) at the core of much of
its work. This starts with the international agricultural
research centres (IARCs) under the CGIAR umbrella, but also
seeks to integrate national institutions wherever possible.
Part of the reason for this is access to a large pool of
free locally-adapted germplasm, infrastructure and
expertise,which amounts to subsidisation of the private
sector. The state is also necessary to create the 'enabling
environment' for effective private sector functioning and to
build markets. ...
AGRA is embedded in the G8's New Alliance for Food Security
and Nutrition initiative,announced in 2012. This is a
partnership between G8 countries, the AU and multinational
agri-food and input companies,including Monsanto, Syngenta,
Du Pont,Cargill, Unilever, Yara International, United
Phosphorous, Vodafone, SABMiller and others. ...
Many have been taken by what on the face of it, seems to be
a good idea: combining resources and focusing them on a
clearly defined set of technological challenges. However,
some critics, with good reason, perceive a hidden agenda
behind the humanitarian fa?ade. According to
Thompson(2012:345-6) the core goal of AGRA is not included
in its promotional materials: access to African genetic
wealth without benefit sharing, based on free access to
genetic materials, with the offspring privatised for
corporate profit. The result is free inputs but outputs sold
at monopoly prices via patenting, producing soaring
corporate profits. Thompson defines this theft not as the
sharing of the genetic base through free circulation of
these resources, but rather the privatisation of new
varieties without sharing with farmers who played a major
part in developing the genetic base.
There is good reason for suspicion. Although AGRA's public
face is linked to 'neutral' UN and government missions, it
has less visible links to multinational biotech and seed
corporations. For example, AGRA retains two main
consultants, David Westphal and Aline Funk. Westphal
hasworked his 41 year long career for Cargill and Monsanto,8
including as Monsanto's Area Co-Director for Sub-Saharan
Africa, Vice Chairman of Sensako Seeds, and Managing
Director of Carnia Seeds.9 Westphal works on start-up seed
businesses with AGRA. Aline Funk was the CEO of Channel Bio
Corp. registered in the US in Kentland, Indiana. The company
is now named Channel Seed, owned by American Seeds Inc, a
Monsanto holding company. It trades in corn, soybean,
alfalfa and sorghum - 'row crops' amenable to
industrialisation, and also has a focus on GM crops. Funk
stepped down as CEO to take up work with AGRA. She has a
background in financial markets11 and risk analysis.Between
them the consultants have been paid US$584,000 in three AGRA
grants until early 2012.The Gates Foundation has US$23m in
stock in Monsanto (Haeder, 2012), thus giving it a material
interest in boosting the company's value. Many of the
organisations funded by AGRA also receive separate funds
from Monsanto (English, 2010).
5.1 What does AGRA do?
AGRA consists of four focal areas: seed, soil health, market
access, and policy and partnership programmes, with a cross-
cutting theme on "innovative financing".
The first focal area is the breeding, production and
distribution of improved seeds through PASS,which has
offices in Accra and Nairobi, and was allotted US$100m in
AGRA funding from 2006-2011.This programme is the focus of
this paper and more detail is provided below.
The second focal area is the extension of locally
appropriate soil nutrients, and integrated soil and water
management through the SHP, which was allocated US$164.6m in
funding from 2007-2013.There is more detail on this
programme below. More recently AGRA is considering ways to
integrate livestock into their work (AGRA, 2010), which is
related to soil fertility.
The third area is improved market access through trade and
value chain development. This area has received US$43m for
the period 2008-2014. The basic argument is that in some
areas surpluses are produced but access to markets is non-
existent, leading to local gluts and collapse in local
prices in season, which acts against farmers adopting yield-
improving technologies (AGRA, 2010:20). The aim is to expand
market access for surpluses, built around a commercial
orientation of smallholder farmers, farm storage
technologies and intermediate processing technologies. One
strategyis to adopt and expand warehouse receipt systems
(WRS) to enable farmers to store products until the end of
the peak harvest season, and borrow against the stored
harvest if they require (AGRA, 2010:21). This will operate
privately and be at a cost to the farmer of storage and
collateral management fees.
AGRA's approach to wholesaling and processing technologies
is based on building greater coordination and predictability
in government actions in favour of the private sector, and
greater investm ent in 'public goods' (production and
marketing infrastructure, including transportnetworks). An
important part of this, which connects closely to the
broader agenda of building commodity markets in Africa, is
opening regional trade networks through lower barriers
(Minot etal., 2007:160). A regional initiative is co-
ordinated by the Alliance for Commodity Trade in Eastern and
Southern Africa (ACTESA), which was launched in 2008 by the
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).
ACTESA acts as an agency to integrate smallholder farmers in
local, regional and international markets. The alliance is
funded by the US, UK, EU and Australian governments together
with AGRA.
AGRA's fourth focus is financing for agriculture. It states
that only 2-3% of commercial bank loans and investments in
Africa go to agriculture, even though agriculture's
contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is much higher
than this almost everywhere in Africa. This indicates under-
investment in African agriculture. Banks see agriculture as
a risky investment, especially smallholder farmers. AGRA's
Innovative Finance Program aims to provide loans for
smallholder farmers and agribusinesses, using loan guarantee
funds to leverage larger loans from commercial banks
(10times the guarantee amount) (PWC, 2010:9-11). The banks'
risks are lowered through a syndicated risk-sharing pooled
facility (PWC, 2010:14) where risks are shared by a number
of participants. The guarantees allow the banks to reduce
requirements for their own funds. A core objective of the
scheme is financial returns for investors, i.e. profit-
bearing loans (PWC, 2010:22).
Stanbic (Standard Bank) is leading a consortium of banks and
funds, including African-owned banks and funds in
Mozambique, Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda to implement AGRA's
financial support strategy. Equity Bank in Kenya and
Microfinance Bank in Tanzania are participating in micro-
financing at reduced interest rates (AGRA, 2010:23). AGRA's
loan guarantee facility allows the banks to leverage
additional funding.
AGRA has identified a number of geographical focus areas for
its work, and has developed an approach based on
agricultural corridors with 'bankable projects'. Its core
'breadbasket strategy' focuses on regions with good soil,
adequate rainfall, basic infrastructure and large numbers of
smallholder farmers (Figure 1). These areas are considered
ripe for rapid improvements in agricultural production. Such
breadbasket areas have been identified in Mozambique,
Tanzania,Ghana and Mali, and AGRA is also working in other
countries to "prepare the ground" for expansion:Nigeria,
Burkina Faso and Niger in West Africa; Ethiopia, Uganda,
Kenya and Rwanda in East Africa;and Zambia and South Africa
in southern Africa (AGRA, 2010:11&14).
6. AGRA's Programme for Africa's Seed Systems (PASS)
7. Seed policy interventions
8. Soil Health Progamme (SHP)
[more detailed description in these three sections -
available in full-text online]
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