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Congo (Kinshasa): Call for Real Security Reform
AfricaFocus Bulletin
Apr 25, 2012 (120425)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
An impressive array of Congolese and international civil
society organizations have issued a new call for real
security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, to be impelled by more coordinated pressures from
African and other international partners as well as
Congolese civil society.
Many will be skeptical of the prospects, given past failures
and the recent fraudulent election. But this report argues
that simply accepting the status quo, in which the
population is threatened by the security forces themselves
as well as by multiple other armed groups, is worse than
trying to get government action on this central issue. They
note that there have been limited successes in promoting
greater accountability, although primarily with police
rather than military forces, and that the international
community has substantial leverage given that external
funding makes up nearly half the government budget.
They propose specific measures for greater collaboration among
international actors, including not only traditional
multilateral and bilateral donors, but also South Africa,
Angola, the African Union, and the Southern African
Development Community (SADC), as well as with Congolese
civil society.
This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains the executive summary of
the report, recommendations, and a few additional excerpts
from the report.
The full report, with a data annex and endnotes, is
available at: http://media.soros.org/files/drc-ssr-report-20120416.pdf
The French-language version of the report is available at:
http://reliefweb.int/node/490142
For additional comments by one of the authors of the report,
and replies by Congolese generals, see the Reuters news
story "Donors, government failing to reform Congo army -
report," Apr 17, 2012 http://tinyurl.com/775u27x
See also the April 19 testimony by Mvemba Dizolele to the UN
Security Council, at
http://dizolele.com/?p=941
For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, see http://www.africafocus.org/country/congokin.php
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The Democratic Republic of Congo: Taking a Stand on Security
Sector Reform
This report is produced by the following organizations:
International Organizations: Eastern Congo Initiative (ECI),
The Enough Project, Eurac: European Network for Central
Africa(Consisting of 48 European NGOs working for peace and
development in Central Africa), International Federation for
Human Rights (FIDH, OENZ: Ecumenical Network for Central
Africa, Open Society Initiative for Southern African
(OSISA), Refugees International, UK All-Party Parliamentary Group on
the Great Lakes Region of Africa (APPG)
Congolese Organizations: African Association of Human Rights
(Association Africaine des Droits de l'Homme (ASADHO)),
Congolese Network for Security Sector Reform and Justice
(Consisting of 289 Congolese NGOs and set up to monitor
progress of security sector reform), Groupe Lotus, League of
Voters (Ligue des Electeurs), Pole Institute - Intercultural
Institute for Peace in the Great Lakes Region
Executive Summary
- The 2006 elections were a moment of great hope for the
DRC, as the country and its people moved out of the shadow
of one of the most destructive conflicts the world has
known. The international community has invested heavily in
the years since. Official development assistance since the
end of the post-war transition totals more than $14 billion.
External funding makes up nearly half of the DRC's annual
budget
- The UN peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO, costs more than $1
billion a year. The international financial institutions
have buttressed the DRC's economy, most importantly through
writing off $12.3 billion debt and granting access to IMF
loans. Trade deals, notably the one struck with China, push
the aggregate figure up still further. Taking stock of
progress as the DRC moves through its second post-war
electoral cycle is sobering. Investment has not resulted in
meaningful change in the lives of ordinary Congolese. The
country is now in last place in the annual UNDP development
rankings, 187th out of 187 countries. Despite slight
improvements, life expectancy and child mortality are below
average for the region. National income per capita is less
than 50 cents a day. The DRC will miss all of its Millennium
Development Goals. 1.7 million Congolese are displaced, a
further 500,000 refugees outside the country. There are
worrying signs of renewed conflict in the East. The
investment of billions of dollars has had little impact on
the average Congolese citizen.
- The central cause of this suffering is continued
insecurity. The Congolese government's inability to protect
its people or control its territory undermines progress on
everything else. An effective security sector - organized,
resourced, trained and vetted - is essential to solving
problems from displacement, recruitment of child soldiers
and gender-based violence, to economic growth or the trade
in conflict minerals. This is not a new finding. The
imperative of developing effective military, police and
judicial structures has been repeatedly emphasized. Yet, far
from showing sustained improvement, Congolese security
forces continue posing a considerable threat to the civilian
population rather than protecting them. The recent
allegations of an army Colonel leading his troops to engage
in widespread rape and looting of villages near Fizi in 2011
underscores the fact that failed military reform can lead to
human rights violations. The military - the Forces Armées de
la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) -has been
accused of widespread involvement in the most serious human
rights violations. Police corruption is endemic, and almost
any form of judicial protection out of reach for the vast
majority.
- The root of the failure to implement security sector
reform (SSR) is a lack of political will at the highest
levels of the Congolese Government. Rather than articulating
a vision for Congolese security and marshaling assistance to
achieve it, the Government has instead encouraged divisions
among the international community and allowed corrupt
networks within the security services to flourish, stealing
the resources intended to pay basic salaries or profiting
from exploitation of natural resources. Unless this is
changed, sustainable reform will be impossible. The
investment made by Congo's partners could be wasted, and
Congo's people will continue to suffer.
- The international community also bears significant
responsibility. The DRC's international partners have been
politically incoherent and poorly coordinated. Little has
been spent on security sector reform, despite its paramount
strategic importance -official development aid disbursed for
conflict, peace and security totaled just $530 million
between 2006 and 2010, roughly 6% of total aid excluding
debt relief. Spending directly on security system management
and reform is even lower, $84.79 million over the same
period, just over 1%. A lack of political cohesion after
2006 undermined effective joint pressure on the Congolese
government. Poor coordination resulted in piecemeal
interventions driven by competing short-term imperatives.
The resulting failures have led many to give up on systemic
reform altogether.
- This is unsustainable and unacceptable. The DRC's
external partners, old and new, must take a stand on SSR. As
the dust settles after the 2011 presidential elections, many
of the DRC's partners are reassessing their programs. The
international community must take this opportunity to be
more forceful in pressing the DRC government to engage in
reform. If international donors acted in concert, and
effectively capitalized on their political and economic
investment in the DRC, they could positively influence DRC
government behavior. Their full weight needs to be brought
to bear.
- The international community therefore needs to create a
new pact with the Congolese government, one that puts in
place clear conditions and benchmarks for progress on
achieving army reform and minimizing harm to the population
in return for continued assistance and recognition. These
benchmarks must be based on positive efforts to achieve
change. A strategic plan for military reform must be
implemented, and a high-level body to coordinate on-going
programs set up. And steps must be taken to improve the
protection of Congolese civilians, through minimizing human
rights abuses carried out by the security forces, and
prosecutingthe worst offenders.
- This new pact must transcend traditional donors. China
will need peace in the DRC for future generations to reap
the rewards from its investment. South Africa also has huge
and growing economic interests in the DRC. Angola has
pressing issues of national security at stake. All need the
stability that can only come from effective SSR. The
international financial institutions (IFI) have rewarded the
stabilization of Congo's macro-economic situation with
significant support. They must recognize that continued
growth will be dependent on new investment, which in turn
demands security. Regional organizations, most importantly
the African Union (AU) and Southern African Development
Community (SADC), need to play an active role in marshaling
effective pressure, and providing a framework for
discussion. Critically, this pact must also include the
Congolese population. Congolese civil society must have a
key voice in defining a global vision for Congo's security,
and connecting high-level reform processes with those that
matter most, Congo's people.
- And the new pact must happen now. Flawed presidential
elections have been completed. The DRC's relations with its
neighbors have improved significantly in recent years.
Though securityin the DRC is precarious, and there are
worrying signs of a resurgence of violence in the East,
challenges to the Congolese government from non-state armed
actors have receded. In fact, the biggest threats perhaps
now come from within the army itself. The government needs
effective SSR, particularly of the military, to rebuild its
reputation at home and abroad, an imperative reflected by
President Kabila in his speech to the UN General Assembly in
November 2011. Since the elections there have been some
promising signs of greater receptivity on the part of the
Congolese government. The opportunity to engage in an honest
dialogue with the Government must not be missed.
- Though the picture painted above is bleak, it is
leavened with hope. There are signs that, with the right
will and appropriate support, change is possible. Increased
numbers of prosecutions for sexual violence (including of a
senior officer19) and the reintegration of child soldiers
show that justice can be done. FARDC formations trained by
the US, South Africa and Belgium have performed well in
intervening in delicate domestic environments. A census of
military personnel is nearly complete. If these glimmers of
hope are to be sustained and magnified, robust action is
necessary. With the right political will in Kinshasa,
endemic corruption can be tackled, salaries paid, and the
worst abusers removed. Once the right conditions are in
place, the long term and large scale work so clearly
necessary - reducing the size of both police and military
through retirement or new demobilization programs, vetting,
reinforcing capacity and increasing the combat effectiveness
of troops - can begin in earnest.
Recommendations
To the Congolese Government
Recognize the urgent need for serious reform to create an
effective, professional security sector, especially the
military. Overcome previous suspicions and engage positively
with the international community in building a new coalition
to assist with SSR efforts. Ensure that the voices of the
Congolese people are heard in elaborating a new vision for
security in the DRC.
1. Renew political commitment to security sector reform at
the highest levels. Make military reform a top political
priority of the new government. Remove from office those
individuals that are obstructing SSR and take all necessary
steps to achieve effective reform.
2. Urgently develop and implement a global vision for
security and defense in the DRC in collaboration with
Parliament and Congolese civil society, and implement a
strategic action plan for achieving the vision of the FARDC
set out in legislation. Request international expertise or
assistance as appropriate.
3. Positively engage with international partners, notably in
a high-level international forum on security sector reform,
including though allocating a senior co-Chair, and agree on
transparent, measurable benchmarks for progress.
4. Collaborate with international partners in re-launching a
working-level cooperation body for military reform, based in
Kinshasa, including through nominating a high-level coChair.
Agree on an international partner to provide
appropriate technical and administrative support.
5. Take urgent action to address the most pressing shortterm
requirements for amelioratingthe performance of the
security sector, notably the progressive demilitarization of
the East, effective action to end corruption in the security
services, and bringing the worst military human rights
abusers to justice, including through requesting appropriate
international support to meet short-term resource gaps.
To all DRC's international partners
Overcome the legacy of frustration and failure built up
since 2006, and use political space opening up in Kinshasa
and the new government's need for support to generate new
political will on security sector reform. Provide high-level
political commitment and coordination, including the
appointment of sufficiently senior officials to provide
momentum and leadership. Robust benchmarks and nuanced
conditionality will be essential. Assistance must be
sustained for the long term, and founded on a realistic
understanding of what is possible.
6. Re-energize efforts and cooperation on security sector
reform in the DRC through concerted pressure at the highest
level for Congolese Government commitment to effective
security sector reform.
7. Collaborate in a broad-based coalition of international
and regional actors engaged in the DRC, notably through the
launch of a high-level forum on security sector reform in
the DRC.
8. Agree benchmarks for progress with the Congolese
government, to include; progress on the human rights record
of the security services, development of a global vision for
security and a strategic reform plan for the military; and
the establishment of an effective coordination body on
military reform. Put in place a binding series of conditions
for on-going political and programmatic support.
9. Ensure that the imperative of effective SSR, and the
benchmarks and conditions agreed at the high-level forum,
are reflected in any new programming decisions or bilateral
agreements.
10.Assist with short-term quick-win projects to raise
confidence and open space for broader reform, notably
progressive demilitarization of conflict-affected areas,
anti-corruption activities and effective judicial action
against human rights abuses committed by the security
forces, as requested by the Congolese Government, and urge
for long-term, sustained reform efforts.
To the Great Lakes Contact Group (US, UK, EU, UN, France,
Belgium and the Netherlands)
11. Catalyze diplomatic efforts to build a new coalition on
SSR, though pro-active high level diplomatic contacts with
key partners, notably Angola, South Africa, China, the AU
and SADC, and their inclusion in an expanded Great Lakes
Contact Group. To the UN Security Council and MONUSCO
12. Generate renewed engagement on security sector reform
through an urgent debate on the issue. Encourage, in
parallel with the AU, the organization of a high-level forum
on security sector reform in the DRC.
13. Amend the mandate of MONUSCO to include assisting the
DRC government on all aspects of SSR, including military
reform.
14. Increase the resources allocated to the MONUSCO SSR
unit, notably in fulfilling its mandated task of collating
information on existing and planned SSR programs. Remind all
member states of their responsibility to share information.
15. Extend the UN sanctions regime to include political and
military leaders impeding effective SSR and direct the group
of experts to provide information about the identity of
these individuals.
16. Ensure that the UN system has sufficient in-country
resources to make a comprehensive assessment of the human
rights performance of the Congolese security services.
To the EU
17. Renew the mandates of EUSEC and EUPOL, and reflect the
imperative for progress on SSR in the planned 2012 program
review. Stand ready to offer technical assistance to the DRC
in elaborating a strategic reform plan for the army.
18. Extend targeted sanctions to individuals hindering
effective SSR.
To the AU
19. Encourage, in parallel with the UN, the organization of
a high-level forum on security sector reform in the DRC
20. Participate actively in the high-level forum and
technical cooperation mechanism, including through agreement
of benchmarks and conditions.
To the World Bank and IMF
21. Expand the assessment criteria for on-going support to
the DRC, notably access to the IMF loans, to include
progress on security sector reform and budget allocations to
key priority areas, especially justice.
Insecurity: Congo's Achilles Heel
1. Taking stock of progress in the DRC since 2006 is
sobering. The war has been over for a decade. An elected
government has served a full term. Between 2006 and 2010,
the DRC received considerable external assistance, including
more than $14 billion in official development aid and a UN
mission costing more than $1 billion a year. Yet this
investment has yielded little result. Life expectancy and
child mortality remain far below the Central Africa average.
National income per capita is less than 50 cents a day. In
fact, the DRC has slipped to last place in UN development
rankings, 187th out of 187 countries. Public discontentment
is rife, and there are concerning signs of renewed violence
in the East. A decade on from the end of a devastating war,
and all that has been invested in the DRC risks going to
waste. The Congolese people deserve better.
2. The proximate cause of this failure is simple. Congo's
population continues to suffer, directly and indirectly, at
the hands of men with guns. There are an estimated 1.7
million internally displaced people in the DRC, most in the
conflict- affected Eastern provinces, driven from their
homes by fear of a variety of armed groups - from the Lord's
Resistance Army (LRA) in the North East, to Mai Mai groups,
bandits and Front Democratique pour la Liberation de Rwanda
(FDLR) rebels further South - and at the mercy of
malnutrition, ill-health and pervasive fear. Nearly half a
million are refugees outside the country. UNICEF estimates
that thousands of children are still being used in various
capacities by armed groups in DRC, including by the
Congolese Army.
3. This failure is not just indicative of the inability of
the Congolese security apparatus to defeat these groups. It
is also the result of abuses at the hands of the security
services themselves. A survey of more than 10,000 households
in North and South Kivu cited the FARDC as the second most
common source of insecurity, after banditry. In June and
July 2011, UN human rights monitors recorded more abuses at
the hands of the FARDC than armed groups. Congolese soldiers
are responsible for some of the rapes reported across
Eastern DRC. Members of the security services are also
responsible for pervasive low-level predation, including
involvement in illegal resource exploitation and theft. Many
abuses have been perpetrated by deserters from the military,
or by those reacting to abuses at the hands of the army.
4. Abuse by Congolese security forces extends beyond
immediately conflict-affected zones. The abuse has been most
visible in the brutal suppression of political protest or
internal unrest, notably in the suppression of the Bundu dia
kongo group, the crushing of MLC forces loyal to Jean-Pierre
Bemba in Kinshasa, and heavy-handed responses to political
protests around the 2011 elections. It has also been felt in
the arbitrary arrest or killing of regime opponents, human
rights activists and journalists, as well as day-to-day
predation and lack of access to even-handed justice.
5. This is not a new insight. The establishment of an
effective security sector is the fundamental step to meeting
all other objectives, from ending the humanitarian crisis,
preventing human rights abuses, encouraging investment and
growth, stopping the trade in conflict minerals and
preventing regional tensions from escalating. Adequate
security is widely acknowledged to be a development,
economic and geostrategic imperative. The Congolese
Government recognized its pivotal importance in the
'Governance Compact' it produced immediately after the 2006
elections, repeated again by President Kabila in his address
to the UN in November 2011. All major bilateral and
multilateral actors have engaged in a wide variety of
security sector reform programs, from capacity building in
the justice system, to rebuilding key infrastructure, or
training military and police. The UN considers SSR to be the
process of enhancing effective and accountable security in a
country and the transformation of "security institutions to
make them more professional and more accountable". Security
institutions can include the armed forces, police, judiciary
and others.
6. Yet despite this consensus, military reform efforts have
failed, both during the transition and afterwards. They have
failed for two primary reasons. The first is the lack of
political will on the part of the Congolese government; the
second inadequate and poorly coordinated assistance from the
donor community.
...
The Shared Imperative of SSR
20. In combination, these factors have resulted in the view
that the Congolese security sector, and particularly its
military, are simply too dysfunctional for reform to be
achieved. The result has been an increasing detachment on
SSR. Support for military reform is now frequently subsumed
under wider stabilization efforts, or framed as a response
to a specific threat, such as the US project to train units
to tackle the LRA. ...
21. This is compounded by the view that pushing the DRC
government to take serious action is too dangerous to
attempt - that effective sanctions would generate a
political backlash, disrupt bilateral relationships, and
risk defections, mutiny or insurrection. This is certainly
the case in relation to entrenched corrupt networks and the
impunity of the most infamous war criminals.
22. But this view must no longer be allowed to dominate. The
status quo, of failed reform and popular discontent,
presents far greater dangers. The most significant risk of
renewed conflict comes from within the Congolese security
services itself, particularly the FARDC, and from the
inability of the Congolese government to control its
territory or protect its people. Reform of the security
sector would no doubt bring short-term pain, but the longterm
risk of inaction is far greater. The human, political
and financial cost of the DRC again collapsing back into war
is difficult to fathom.
23. Yet these costs would be felt by all of the DRC's
external partners. China struck a landmark deal with the DRC
government in 2007, exchanging a $6 billion investment in
infrastructure - building roads, hospitals and universities
- in return for long-term access to Congolese mineral
resources, extending decades. Internal and regional
stability will be vital for this deal to come to fruition,
demanding an effective security sector. South African
companies have invested heavily in the DRC, and peace in the
DRC and across Central Africa will be vital for its long
term prosperity. And Angola, the DRC's key regional security
partner, considers chaos across the border to be a core
threat to its national security. It too needs an effective
Congolese state. All three states have already engaged in
bilateral reform and retraining.
24. Regional organizations, most importantly the African
Union (AU) and the Southern Africa Development Committee
(SADC) have a pressing and legitimate interest in regional
prosperity and stability. And the international financial
institutions - frequently cited as the actors with the most
significant leverage and access in Kinshasa - are committed
to helping the DRC achieve sustained economic growth. The
IMF is the only actor currently providing direct budget
support to the DRC government.
25. Reform is not only vitally necessary, it is possible.
Compared to 2003 or 2006, political and military conditions
in the DRC are now such that renewed, joint efforts on SSR
could yield real and lasting results. ...
26. These constraints are now less acute. Congolese nonstate
armed groups may be reduced in number and scope.
Foreign armed groups are significantly less powerful than in
the past. Though both remain a considerable threat to
civilians, neither presents the same challenge they once did
to regional peace and security, or to the Kinshasa
government. The political context has also changed.
President Kabila and his government are facing a crisis of
legitimacy. The 2011 elections were roundly criticized by
international and Congolese election monitors, and have
little popular credibility. The single most telling step
that the government could take to rebuild its reputation at
home and abroad, and to improve the lot of the population,
would be to undertake meaningful reform of the security
apparatus. ...
27. The overriding need for meaningful SSR cannot be
questioned. There is a broad synergy of interests across the
international community and the DRC's neighbors, economic
partners and population. The timing is right. It will be a
long and difficult road, but the first step to unlocking a
more hopeful future for the population is simple. The
Congolese government must take responsibility for serious,
sustained and strategic reform, particularly of the
military, backed by political commitment at the very highest
levels.
28. The international community must recognize this
imperative. It must act on it. All other objectives -
humanitarian, developmental, economic or security-related -
will be difficult or impossible to achieve without concerted
SSR. The DRC's external partners must make a collective
stand on serious security sector reform, both to engender
political will and to support resulting Congolese reform
processes. The Congolese government has received significant
financial and diplomatic support since the end of the war.
The weight of these commitments must be brought to bear.
A New Deal on SSR
29. It is a new political commitment that is urgently needed
above all, on both sides. The international community should
seek to strike a new collective pact with the Congolese
Government on SSR. This need not involve the immediate
allocation of significant new resources. In the absence of
political will and the establishment of oversight
structures, significant new programs could be counterproductive,
replacing functions that need to be carried out
by government. Though investment will certainly be
necessary, a new push on SSR need not be expensive in the
short-term.
30. Such a pact would see political backing and coordinated,
targeted programmatic support exchanged for Congolese
leadership and robust benchmarks on progress towards
mutually agreed goals. It would need to involve all
international actors engaged in the DRC, including the
traditional donor community, newer international actors
including China and South Africa, the DRC's neighbors either
bilaterally or through regional organizations (AU and SADC),
and the international financial institutions. It would
demand renewed commitment, coordination and communication,
robust benchmarks, and quick-win confidence raising
projects.
31. It should be launched in a spirit of transparency and
collaboration, recognizing that a new effort on SSR is a
need shared by the Congolese government, its people, and all
of its economic, diplomatic and development partners. An
overly confrontational attitude on the part of the
international community could cause an unhelpful political
backlash - managing tensions will require astute and fleetfooted
diplomacy, and a leading role to be played by African
actors. But equally, no one should be under any illusion as
to difficulties that will need to be faced - there is no
magic bullet to security sector reform in the DRC. It needs
sustained political commitment above all. There will be
disagreements, with Congolese Government, and between
elements of the international community. Such a push will
need sustained, high-level political commitment, and must be
backed by real conditions.
...
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