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Congo (Kinshasa): War in the East, 1
AfricaFocus Bulletin
Nov 28, 2012 (121128)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
In a statement issued earlier this week, a coalition of
Congolese organizations has called for sanctions against
Rwanda, Uganda, and any other individuals or entities that
threaten the territorial integrity of the DRC. They also
called on the UN to urgently appoint - in consultation
with the African Union - a special representative for the
Great Lakes.
The events in eastern Congo are rapidly changing but also
depressingly predictable and familiar. The M23 rebels are
giving "mixed signals" about withdrawing from recently
occupied Goma, as demanded by regional states
(http://tinyurl.com/bs6txb8). New negotiations are
expected. But the fundamental realities of insecurity in
the east, including support from Rwanda and Uganda to
rebels across the border, the lack of a legitimate
Congolese state with security forces that protect the
people, the weakness of international peace efforts, and
vulnerability of the civilian population to a changing
configuration of armed groups, continue the same.
Today's two AfricaFocus Bulletins contain a selection of
recent articles I have found useful in digging beyond the
day-to-day headlines.
This one, sent out by e-mail, contains reports by
statements by Congolese and international groups calling
for a new approach (also a pattern that has been repeated
again and again), two background articles from the blog
CongoSiasa (on the rebel group M23 and the role played by
Susan Rice in stalling pressure on Rwanda), and an
article from Southern Africa Resource Watch noting the
surprising absence of "conflict minerals" in the
background of the latest fighting.
The other AfricaFocus released today, not sent out by email
but available on the web at http://www.africafocus.org/docs12/ec1211b.php, contains
two longer analytical articles appearing recently on
http://www.africanarguments.org, with additional
background on the conflict.
Additional resources with calls for action and policy
proposals include:
TransAfrica Avaaz Petition to U.S. Ambassador to the UN
Susan Rice http://tinyurl.com/coaut3h
Friends of the Congo
http://www.friendsofthecongo.org/
"DR Congo's Goma: Avoiding a New Regional War"
International Crisis Group, 20 November 2012
http://tinyurl.com/bvp8hwh
For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on Congo (Kinshasa),
visit http://www.africafocus.org/country/congokin.php
++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++
Congo-Kinshasa: Governance Reforms Key to Lasting DRC
Peace
by Richard Lee, 27 November 2012
Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa
(Johannesburg)
http://allafrica.com/stories/201211270745.html
As usual, a 'peace plan' for the eastern Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) has been negotiated by regional
leaders behind closed doors - without any real input from
Congolese citizens or civil society. Realising that this
approach will not result in lasting peace and stability,
three major Congolese organisations have issued a joint
statement calling for specific actions to be taken by the
government, the M23 rebel movement and the United
Nations.
The National Network on Security Sector Reform and
Justice (RRSSJ), the League of Voters (LE) and the Centre
for Governance (CEGO) expressed their deep concern about
the situation in North Kivu province following the
capture of the town of Goma by M23 forces and by the
international community's insufficient response to the
latest conflict in eastern DRC.
The organisations are especially concerned about the
'lack of sanctions against the aggressor countries,
namely Rwanda and Uganda, whose support for the rebels
was clearly demonstrated by the report of the Expert
Group of the United Nations' - and are urging the UN to
impose sanctions on any individuals and entities that
threaten the territorial security of the DRC. They also
want donor nations to cut development aid to Rwanda.
The statement also calls on the UN to urgently appoint -
in consultation with the African Union - a special
representative for the Great Lakes. A similar call was
made last week by a coalition of international
organisations, including the Open Society Foundations and
the Eastern Congo Initiative.
However, the three organisations - two of which are
grantees of the Open Society Initiative for Southern
Africa (OSISA) - understand that the root cause of the
conflict in eastern DRC is the country's governance
crisis and that genuine peace depends on genuine reforms.
In particular, the groups call on the Congolese
government to immediately pursue - with the support of
the UN stabilisation force (MONUSCO) - clear, structured,
coordinated and deep reform of the security sector,
including the army, police and intelligence services. But
this importance of this call has only been underlined by
the fall of Goma, not sparked by it. All three
organisations had been calling for serious reform well
before the sudden advance of the M23.
But Congo also needs to get its democratic house in order
and the groups called for the restructuring of the
Independent National Electoral Commission and the
establishment of a National Commission on Human Rights to
protect human rights and boost citizen's confidence.
Critically, the statement urged the government to ensure
that the negotiating process involved non-combatants to
give it more chance of success - rather than just the
Congolese authorities, neighbouring countries and the
M23.
And speaking of the rebels, the organisations made it
clear that M23 must end its armed struggle, must 'respect
human rights and international humanitarian law in areas
currently under its control, including the prohibition of
the recruitment of children for military purposes', and
cease all attacks against civilians.
Given that the players in DRC's conflict seldom listen to
civil society, it is possible that this statement will
once again fall on deaf ears. But it shouldn't. There
will be no long-term peace in eastern Congo unless the
people and civil society organisations are involved. This
statement makes that very clear.
Addressing the Conflict in Eastern Congo: Urgent
appointment of a UN/AU Special Envoy
http://www.osisa.org/hrdb/drc/time-au-un-envoy-eastern-drc
November 22, 2012
The conflict in eastern Congo between the government of
Congo and the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group is crippling
the Great Lakes Region, and is now at a critical juncture
with M23's recent advance on the city of Goma in Congo's
North Kivu Province. Recent reports suggest that, despite
its continuing denials, Rwanda has continued to provide
military, logistical, and political support to M23,
emboldened by the failure of the international community
to hold it fully accountable for its aggression. The
government of Congo has continued to demonstrate an
inability to deal with the threat on its eastern borders,
as a consequence of its failure to initiate necessary
reforms of its weak and undisciplined army as well as
other critical institutions. Meanwhile, since the onset
of the M23 mutiny in April, 2012, more than 650,000
people have been displaced in eastern Congo due to the
ongoing conflict - and once again it is the civilian
populations of the region that continue to bear the brunt
of the violence and instability.
We believe that it is imperative to initiate a credible
internationally-facilitated political process that is
focused in a first phase on an immediate cessation of
hostilities, but in the longer-term also on addressing
the systematic drivers of conflict in the region. The aim
of such a process must be a departure from the cycle of
violence and regional interference that has defined the
conflict for much of the last decade.
Efforts to achieve a durable peace in the region must be
led, not by those that continue to perpetuate the
conflict, but rather by a credible facilitation process
with the commensurate experience and stature to elevate
the process above the regional mistrust that is the
hallmark of local processes, and bring the necessary
parties into a constructive dialogue. This should be done
under the joint auspices of the United Nations and the
African Union, as recommended at the recent high-level
meeting on the DRC held at the United Nations on
September 27, 2012. We call on the Security Council to
request the Secretary-General to reach out immediately to
the African Union with a view to appointing an Envoy or
Panel in a matter of days.
We also call on the Security Council and the African
Union to condemn in unequivocal terms Rwanda and the M23
for their actions and to immediately apply sanctions
against all the individuals identified in the most recent
Group of Experts report as having violated the U.N. arms
embargo on Congo, including the Rwandan military and
political officers who have been supporting and directing
the M23. We also call on bilateral donors to Rwanda to
continue and expand the suspension of all aid programs
that are not explicitly directed to the humanitarian
needs of the Rwandan civilian population.
We the undersigned groups strongly reiterate the attached
brief and recommendations, which we widely distributed
among senior policy-makers in governments and
international institutions in October 2012. We believe
now as we believed then that military solutions alone
will not resolve this crisis and that a new political
process is needed to prevent further violence in the
region.
Signed
Eastern Congo Initiative
Enough
EurAc
Humanity United
Open Society Foundations
From the CNDP to M23
Jason Stearns, November 12, 2012
http://congosiasa.blogspot.com
Last week, we published a report on M23, tracing its
roots back through the CNDP to deeper history. What is
the take home message from the report?
The CNDP (2004-2009) and the M23 (2012-) emerged out of
the failures of the Congolese peace process. The
negotiations that began in Lusaka in 1999 and culminated
in the Accord global et inclusif in 2002 succeeded in
unifying the country, but also disadvantaged one of the
strongest belligerents. The Rwandan-backed RCD went from
controlling a third of the country to 2-4 per cent
representation in national institutions. In response,
elites in Goma and Kigali created the CNDP, led by
Laurent Nkunda, to maintain leverage on Kinshasa and to
protect their interests in the East. These interests are
varied, and include economic investments, security fears,
and the general perception that North Kivu lies within
Rwanda's sphere of interest.
These movements draw on deep historical grievances, but
are propelled mainly by military and political elites.
The CNDP and M23 are led mostly by Congolese Tutsi and
have deep roots in this community. Especially during CNDP
times, there were mobilization cells across the region,
and even in the US and Europe, that gathered funds and
represented the movement. There is no doubt that many in
this community saw the CNDP as a vital protection against
an abusive and often xenophobic state. However, the main
instigators were Congolese Tutsi officers - people like
Nkunda, Bosco, and Makenga - and, in particular, the
government in Kigali. Interviews with dozens of ex-CNDP
officers show clearly that, while the CNDP maintained a
large degree of autonomy from its Rwandan allies, Kigali
was crucial in the creation of the group in 2004-2006 and
then in leading it to the gates of Goma in October 2008.
During the M23, this influence has become even more
decisive, as Kigali stepped in to prop up a foundering
mutiny in April 2012 and has been a key factor in all its
military offensives.
The CNDP and M23 are Tutsi-led movements; this does not
mean that community is united or a puppet of Rwanda. Many
Congolese lump all Tutsi together, from both sides of the
border. It is true that many Congolese Tutsi fought for
the RPF's in Rwanda's civil war (1990-1994), and have
featured prominently in all Rwandan-backed rebellions in
the Congo. But deep tensions have emerged between
Congolese Tutsi and the RPF. Many of the former have a
deep sense of belonging in the Congo, and feel that the
RPF has not looked after their interests. An example of
this was the Murekezi mutiny of 11 November 1997 (exactly
15 years ago), which pitted Congolese Tutsi against the
RPF, as well as similar mutinies in South Kivu. These
tensions have grown, and the M23 seems to be a turning
point in relations. A majority of Congolese Tutsi
officers have refused to join the mutiny, and have been
used by Kinshasa in the front line against the M23. Even
those who have joined the M23, such as Sultani Makenga
and even Bosco Ntaganda, often have difficult relations
with Kigali - the arrest of Nkunda by the RDF in 2009
created mistrust among top CNDP officers, especially the
Makenga wing.
The M23 has a much narrower social base than previous
movements. The cornerstone of Rwanda's strategy between
1998-2003 was to create a communal alliance between
Banyarwanda in the eastern Congo, if possible extending
it to other groups, as well. Thus, Congolese Hutu and
Banyamulenge (Tutsi from South Kivu) featured prominently
in the RCD. When the CNDP was created in 2004-2006,
Rwanda and Nkunda tried to revive this alliance. This
strategy, however, failed, with Hutu strongman Eugène
Serufuli leading the defection of several thousand Hutu
soldiers from the CNDP in 2005-6. The M23 has an even
narrower base - aside from a few officers, the military
leadership is almost entirely Tutsi, with very few Hutu
or Banyamulenge joining. (The group has a very multiethnic
political wing, but few of these leaders have much
legitimacy in their communities, with the somewhat
bizarre exception of the Nande).
The group's strategy relies more on creating instability
than on taking and controlling territory. Precisely
because the group has a narrow social base, it has been
hard pressed to take much territory. Besides the lack of
cross-ethnic alliances, the group had a manpower
problem - they started off with 300-700 men, and have
since grown to 1,500-2,500. Despite military backing from
Uganda and Rwanda (whose troops do not want to venture
too far from their borders), this makes conquering and
holding territory difficult. The group has therefore
relied on a web of alliances with other Congolese groups.
But, since their historical Hutu and Banyamulenge allies
have refused to go along, the M23 have sought out more
opportunistic alliances, often among communities that are
historically deeply anti-Rwandan. These alliances - the
Raia Mutomboki, Sheka's group, the FDC, Bede Rusagara,
Mbusa Nyamwisi - are volatile, as many of the groups have
no love lost for the M23 or Rwanda, but their interests
(fighting against Kinshasa) happen to converge for now.
The M23 will not be able to use these alliances to
conquer territory, but rather to highlight the derelict
nature of the Congolese state and the need for a change
of leadership in Kinshasa.
Absent a credible political process, there is likely to
be further escalation. The only political channel
currently open is through the ICGLR, chaired by Uganda,
and which is proposing the deployment of a neutral force
to 'eradicate' the M23 and FDLR. Since the Ugandan
government, however, has backed the M23, and few
countries seem willing to staff or fund the neutral
force, this initiative is unlikely to succeed. Kinshasa's
strategy, on the other hand, relies on donors putting
pressure on Rwanda and Uganda - but donors are reluctant
to do so without channeling their pressure into a larger
political process. Since the sticks available are
limited - the Congolese army is weak and donors are
unlikely to lead - the solution will have to pass, at
least in part, through negotiations.
A long-term solution will have to grapple with systemic
issues. In order for this kind of compromise to be
successful, and not to return us to a volatile 2009-style
agreement, systemic issues will have to be dealt with.
Kigali will have to accept a much-diminished ex-CNDP
force in the Kivus, while Kinshasa will have to
strengthen its institutions and reassure the Tutsi
community. Various policy options should be
considered - none of them easy or straightforward
- including decentralization, cross-border
economic projects, land reform, and the complete overhaul
of the stabilization program for the Kivus. Donors, on
their part, can no longer separate Rwanda's admirable
development successes from its interference in the Congo.
(I will be blogging more in detail on these policy
options).
Susan Rice and the M23 crisis
Jason Stearns, November 24, 2012
http://congosiasa.blogspot.com
[Editor's note: For another critique of Amb. Rice's stand
on authoritarian African leaders,
see http://tinyurl.com/c4jql83, with reference to Ethiopia.
It is ironic to many familiar with African issues that
Amb. Rice is being criticized publically for quite the
wrong reasons.]
As the M23 crisis has unfolded in the eastern Congo, the
US Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice has
emerged as a holdout within American foreign policy, a
sort of minority report to the prevailing criticism of
Rwanda and the M23.
The first indication of this emerged in June, when Rice
delayed the publication of UN Group of Experts' interim
report, insisting that Rwanda be given a chance to see
the report first and respond. While these UN
investigations are supposed to give the accused the
opportunity to respond and explain - the Group says it was
refused meetings by the Rwandan government, which Kigali
denies - they rarely allow them to see the entire report
before publication. In any case, the Group finally did
brief a Rwandan delegation in New York in June in New
York (unsurprisingly, the Rwandan rejected the report as
flawed) and the report was released.
Rice emerged as skeptic within a State Department that
had largely accepted Rwanda's role in backing the M23.
Both Assistant Secretary of State Johnnie Carson and
Special Envoy Barry Walkley have told Kigali explicitly
to stop supporting M23. According to sources within the
Obama administration, Rice has weighed in during these
conversations, even when they do not directly relate to
the United Nations.
According to an international NGO that follows Security
Council politics closely, "Rice isn't convinced that
support is ongoing - maybe [there was some] in the past,
but not now." Others point to her skepticism at the UN
Group of Experts reports and their methodology.
Her latest controversial step was to block the explicit
naming of Rwanda and Uganda in this week's UN Security
Council resolution, condemning the M23 occupation of
Goma. As in previous statements, the body demanded that
"any and all outside support to the M23 cease
immediately." Other Council members had wanted to name
Rwanda explicitly, but Rice demurred, arguing that this
would not be constructive in a process in which Rwanda
must be part of the solution. Rice's supporters say that
this was simply the official US position, and she was
following orders from Washington.
Rice's relationship with Rwanda goes back to the Clinton
administration, when she began her diplomatic career. She
worked on the National Security Council from 1993 to
1997, rising to become the Senior Director for African
Affairs. Infamously, she is quoted as having asked in a
cabinet meeting during the Rwandan genocide what its
impact would be on the mid-term congressional elections.
Guilt over her inaction during the genocide - when she was
still in a more junior position - and frustration with
first Mobutu and then Laurent Kabila fueled her sympathy
toward Rwanda. By 1997, Rice had been named Assistant
Secretary of State for Africa. When the Second Congo War
broke out in 1998, Rice was at the helm of a US policy
that, according to colleagues of her at the time, did not
denounce Rwandan abuses or involvement in the eastern
Congo during this period. As Howard Wolpe, the US Special
Envoy at the time, told me about Rwandan involvement in
this war: "We just didn't know what was going on, most of
the reports about abuses were coming from the Catholic
Church and we didn't know what to make of them." For
many, including Rice, the Congolese government was
corrupt and inept, Rwanda's was efficient and had good
security imperatives to justify their involvement in the
Congo. (An excellent, if controversial, account of this
era is a 2002 article by Peter Rosenblum in Current
History.)
Now, however, the predominant mood in the State
Department seems to have shifted to become more critical
of Rwandan interference in the Congo. Past wars have
brought suffering and few solutions, the FDLR threat,
while still present, is much diminished.
Rice is now favored by President Obama to become the next
Secretary of State, a choice that, according to a Rwandan
official, "would make many in Kigali happy. Rice
understands us."
Conflict minerals not fueling M23 rebellion
By Enrico Carisch and Dr Claude Kabemba, SARW Director
27 November 2012
http://www.gold.sarwatch.org/ | http://www.sarwatch.org/
The capture of Goma by M23 rebel forces is the latest
demonstration of the ineffectiveness of the government of
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and its army (the
FARDC). Whatever the political machinations behind the
military's most recent capitulation may be, the
overarching themes are the longstanding institutional and
governance weaknesses of Congo's central authorities -
weaknesses that the Southern Africa Resource Watch (SARW)
has highlighted multiple times in its reports and
analyses.
And yet almost nothing has been done to actively tackle
the real governance issues. In particular, the
international community and the government of President
Kabila have consistently neglected serious security
sector reform in eastern Congo, partly due to the
prevailing â€~conflict minerals' narrative. But the reality
on the ground could not be more different from the
concept that every conflict in eastern Congo is - at its
heart - a fight for control over the country's vast
natural resources. This certainly does not appear to be
the case with the current conflict.
Not only have UN reports pointed fingers squarely at
Rwanda and Uganda for providing support to the M23 but
the rebels have never gained a foothold in any areas
where formal or artisanal gold mining takes place or
where other major mineral extraction occurs.
Theoretically, by occupying the Bunagana border crossing,
the rebels seized control of the key point on the most
lucrative export route for Congo's cassiterite, coltan
and wolframite. In addition, occupying the Lueshe mine in
Rutshuru territory should have granted them access to its
strategically important Pyrochlor deposits.
However, since the M23 advanced into Rutshuru, mineral
exporters have chosen to avoid Bunagana and use
alternative routes to ship their valuable ore out of the
country, while the Lueshe mine has been inoperative for
more than a decade and provides no source of income for
the rebels.
And the vast majority of eastern Congo is not under the
control of the M23 - or indeed of other illegal armed
groups. In fact, a just-released research report from
SARW - Conflict Gold to Criminal Gold: The new face of
artisanal gold mining in Congo - provides compelling
evidence that the hundreds of thousands of artisanal gold
miners in four provinces (North Kivu, South Kivu,
Oriental and Maniema) are no longer afraid of warlords or
militias. Instead, they fear the hordes of corrupt civil
servants, bureaucrats and members of the government's
security forces, who are far more interested in
exploiting the miners rather than supporting and
protecting them.
Would FARDC soldiers have defended Rutshuru with greater
vigour if it were rich in gold? Wouldn't they have fought
harder to deny M23 control over Goma if it were an
important gold trading centre? The reality is that gold
is not responsible for the success of M23 - that
responsibility lies with Congo's leaders, who show no
interest in building effective institutions or following
democratic principles, and Congo's eastern neighbours.
Membership of regional and sub-regional organisations
comes with a duty to uphold regional peace and security.
The 11 members of the International Conference of the
Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) have stepped up to their
responsibility by condemning the M23 rebellion and by
compelling Rwanda's President Paul Kagame to publicly
support this position. But the ICGLR must go further. The
member states are obliged to assist each other and to
prevent non-state actors from instigating revolts -
obligations that include the careful screening of any
financial and mineral transactions that could support
illegal armed activities, and the prompt reporting to the
ICGLR Secretariat of any pertinent findings.
In addition, under the statues of the African Union,
sanctions must be imposed against any party that seeks to
overthrow the government of a member state through
unconstitutional means. AU sanctions must also be applied
to any state that supports such unconstitutional changes
of government.
While some countries are directly implicated in the M23
rebellion, nations that provide financial and military
support to these countries must accept responsibility for
indirectly supporting this latest attempt to overthrow
the DRC's government by unconstitutional means - and must
take action urgently.
It is true that Britain and America have withdrawn from
their support-Rwanda-at-all-costs position but this must
be more than just a rhetorical change - it must also lead
to a change of policy and practice. In particular, it is
time for them to impose sanctions on Congo's meddling
eastern neighbours and vigorously monitor those sanctions
to prevent them from further destabilising the DRC.
The current conflict is not about minerals. It is about
Congo's dreadful governance - and the bloody role of
neighbouring governments.
AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic
publication providing reposted commentary and analysis on
African issues, with a particular focus on U.S. and
international policies. AfricaFocus Bulletin is edited by
William Minter.
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