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Mali: Listening without Drones
AfricaFocus Bulletin
Mar 26, 2013 (130326)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
"Mali is neither Somalia, nor Afghanistan, nor an
'Africanistan.' ... We hope President Obama and Secretary
of State John Kerry are wise enough not to let analogy do
the work of analysis. ... The problems bedeviling Mali
are long-running and multi-faceted. They cannot be droned
out of existence. The best way the U.S. government can
help Malians realize their aspiration for substantive--
not just formal--democracy is to listen carefully, and
let them take the lead." - Gregory Mann and Bruce
Whitehouse
While the intervention by French and African troops has
restored a minimum of stability to the North of Mali, few
would disagree that the fundamental problems remain
unresolved and will not be resolved by international
military forces, whatever their configuration. The French
are reportedly eager to draw down their contingent, but
the shape of what will replace it is uncertain. And
measures ostensibly designed to restore democratic
governance, such as elections now planned for July, seem
likely to heighten rather to decrease the weaknesses of
the Malian state.
This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains (1) a joint opinion
piece by Gregory Mann and Bruce Whitehouse, cautioning
against mistakes such as an overemphasis on early
elections, (2) a statement from the International
Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and its affiliate in
Mali, (3) a background analysis by Bruce Whitehouse on
the 1-year anniversary of the coup, and, in the web
version of this Bulletin only (4) an English translation
of the executive summary of a recent public opinion poll
in Mali, covering residents of the district of Bamako.
Other sources of interest.
"Des sites et des comptes Twitter pour suivre le Mali et
l'Algérie,"
January 14, 2013
http://www.rue89.com / direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/cj82f2d
"Mali's Bad Trip: Field Notes From The West African Drug
Trade" By Andrew Lebovich, African Arguments, March 19,
2013
http://tinyurl.com/acsu6v2
Interview with singer Baba Sallah
http://tinyurl.com/c23qsa6 / http://greenglobaltravel.com
++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++
Mali: Listening Without Drones
By Gregory Mann and Bruce Whitehouse
African Arguments (http://africanarguments.org)
March 13, 2013
http://allafrica.com/stories/201303131117.html
National dialogue on Mali's future is essential and must
include both armed groups and those who did not
participate in uprisings.
Recent and still unconfirmed reports of the killings of
top leaders of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb underscore
tangible advances made by French and African forces in
rolling back the violent jihadist onslaught that began in
Mali over a year ago. Yet the hardest task lies ahead:
setting up a viable political system that all Malians can
live with. From vital partners like the US, which has
just deployed drones to neighboring Niger, this task will
require not high-tech solutions, but low-tech listening
to the Malian people.
U.S. policy to date--particularly a tone-deaf privileging
of counter-terrorism over good governance--has arguably
done more harm than good in Mali over the last decade. In
the context of the current crisis, we suggest three ways
that the US government can help. They require not boots
on the ground, but fine-tuned diplomacy.
First, don't rush elections.
The US government, bound by legislation barring aid to
any regime that ousted an elected predecessor, has long
been pressing for fresh elections, even while half of
Mali was under rebel occupation. Now that the country's
northern regions have been wrested--if incompletely--from
jihadist control, Mali's interim government has scheduled
polls for July. The country will not be ready, and
inhabitants of its vast northern regions will almost
certainly be disenfranchised. True, elections must
eventually be held, but doing so prematurely will confer
an uncertain mandate from a fractured electorate, paper
over deep rifts in the Malian state, and pave the way for
another crisis.
Any election creates winners and losers. Rapid elections
propelled by outside, institutional interests, rather
than by Mali's own political actors, are likely to create
more problems than they solve. What Malians need now is
cooperation, not competition.
Second, insist on national dialogue.
A space must be created in which Malians of all
backgrounds can discuss a way forward. Only respected and
familiar leaders will be able to negotiate with and work
in the interest of disaffected communities throughout the
whole country, but such a dialogue must be as inclusive
as possible. The table must truly be round: those who did
not take up arms need to have an equal place with those
who did.
As well as rebel leaders of various northern factions,
peace talks should include civil society leaders from
north and south alike. Like it or not, rebel leaders who
are not accused of crimes against humanity will have to
be included in such negotiations. By insisting on that
point, outside powers can give the government in Bamako
the political cover it needs to talk with its opponents
who are fellow citizens. Lasting peace in the Sahara
depends on addressing their legitimate grievances,
particularly those of nomads.
Third, support the government's initiative for truth and
reconciliation.
For generations tensions between nomadic Tuareg and other
ethnic groups have caused deep wounds that can only be
healed through a truth and reconciliation process. The
scope of this process should not be restricted to events
in northern Mali, but should encompass misdeeds committed
throughout the country, including by the previous
government and by the soldiers who overthrew it a year
ago. Culprits left out of this process may be targeted by
the International Criminal Court, which is now pursuing
its own investigations into crimes committed in the
country, but justice and forgiveness cannot be
outsourced.
Other things can be. Rebuilding Mali will require more
than just the restoration of electoral democracy. As one
of the poorest countries in the world, post-conflict Mali
will need economic assistance. Smart investments might
include roads and bridges that would better connect the
country internally and to its neighbors. In the North
especially, better infrastructure would reduce the cost
of living, improve food security, allow the state to
deliver services, and enable the region to export its
most valuable commodity, livestock. Renewable energy
installations would also help Mali to grow on its own.
The first step might be the hardest: to recognize that
Mali is Mali, and approach the crisis there on its own
terms, especially regarding peace, justice, and
governance. Mali is neither Somalia, nor Afghanistan, nor
an "Africanistan." After generations of human investment,
notably by Peace Corps volunteers and Fulbright fellows,
the US government is in a good position to know this. We
hope President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry
are wise enough not to let analogy do the work of
analysis.
We hope too that sending in the drones does not represent
another instance of privileging cheap, technically
sophisticated, and often violent interventions by remote
control over the longer, harder work of listening to and
engaging in dialogue. The problems bedeviling Mali are
long-running and multi-faceted. They cannot be droned out
of existence. The best way the U.S. government can help
Malians realize their aspiration for substantive--not
just formal--democracy is to listen carefully, and let
them take the lead.
Gregory Mann, historian, Columbia University
Bruce Whitehouse, anthropologist, Lehigh University
Additional comments by Gregory Mann, "Africa is a
Country," March 22, 2013
Brief excerpt:
"Whatever the case may be, for an exceptional moment in
January, French and Malian interests converged, and the
enduring popular support for the intervention suggests
that many people here agree with that assessment.
The two governments had shared enemies and — at least in
the short-term — shared interests. They fought an
alliance of jihadi Salafist fighters made up of AQMI,
MUJAO, Ansar Dine. For reasons internal and external,
Mali's army could not face them alone, in spite of a
common and comforting fairytale claiming that it could.
But if they shared enemies, the two countries did not
share the same objectives, much less the same war. The
question in the wake of French advances is how
dramatically those objectives will diverge.
Read full commentary
http://africasacountry.com/2013/03/22/welcome-to-mali/
For additional comments by Bruce Whitehouse, see excerpt
below as well as other postings on his blog Bridges from
Bamako http://bridgesfrombamako.com/
Africa: Mali - for an Articulated Intervention Based On
and in Favour of the Respect for Human Rights
18 March 2013
International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
http://www.fidh.org
Press Release
Since the adoption on 20 December 2012 of United Nations
Security Council's resolution 2085, approving the
deployment of an international support mission in Mali
(AFISMA) and the training on human rights of Malian
security forces, the situation has evolved. French and
Malian armies have engaged a military intervention and
have widely deployed in Northern Mali.
This evolution has involved reflection and debates within
United Nations Security Council, ECOWAS and African
Union, on the adaptation of mechanisms provided by
resolution 2085 to determine the procedure and the
structure of the various security forces and mechanisms
planned to support Malian authorities in the current
crisis.
Amongst the first decisions, States members of the
African Union, complying with ECOWAS' decision, approved
the sending of more military forces and the deployment of
human rights observers, in coordination with the African
Commission for Human and People's Rights (ACHPR).
In the meantime, Malian authorities adopted a roadmap for
the transition, scheduling in particular the holding of
general elections on 31 July 2013.
The donors' conference held in Addis-Abeba on 29 January
has agreed granting over 455 million dollars that will be
used to cover AFISMA's spending, restructure Malian
military and provide for humanitarian aspect of this
crisis. This amounts to half of the budget calculated by
ECOWAS for this occasion.
The European Union has committed to deliver humanitarian
assistance and deploy a mission in charge of contributing
to the training of Malian military, including on
international humanitarian law, civilians protection and
human rights. Furthermore, EU has planned financial and
logistical support for the deployment of AFISMA, the
gradual recovery of development aid, paired up with
concrete measures of assistance in the implementation of
the roadmap.
FIDH, its member organisation in Mali, AMDH, and UIDH
welcome commitments made by Mali and international
community for a solution to the crisis in Mali and call
them for the implementation of a genuine and effective
coordination of their interventions for the purpose of
ensuring the respect of international humanitarian law
and human rights, helping the strengthening of those
rights and contributing to the fight against impunity.
Resolving the conflict
FIDH, AMDH and UIDH call for the utmost vigilance on
still-existing risks of terrorist or acts of
destabilisation coming from armed groups, perpetration of
human rights' violations or political instability as a
result of these potential attacks in Mali and the subregion.
Our organisations call upon all stakeholders in
the region and international bodies to ensure that their
fight against terrorism complies with the respect of
human rights, launches democratic processes and goes
along with development politics able to combat.
extremisms
Financing
Our organisations welcome the results that came out of
the donors' conference. We call upon the international
community to quickly decide of the structure for the
coordination of their financial support to Mali. We also
encourage them to secure the remaining funds needed to
ensure a complete support to the stabilisation of Mali.
Composition, mandate and coordination of armed
interventions
As part of the deployment of military forces of many
countries and authorities, our organisations call for:
the implementation of a vetting mechanism to ensure that
no individual responsible for human rights violations is
incorporated in this framework;
an effective mandate and necessary operational means are
established to ensure the protection of civilian
population and human rights defenders;
a clear and unified command structure, integrating a
direct communication with civilian population to ensure
access of humanitarians and independent observers coming
from civil society to conflict-affected areas.
Training of military forces to human rights
Our organisations welcome decisions taken by Malian
authorities, and supported by the United Nations Security
Council, allowing the training of Malian military forces
on human rights and international humanitarian law. We
also welcome as the commitment made by the European Union
to contribute to this training through the deployment of
an EU Training Mission (EUTM). In this context our
organisations call for:
the United Nations, the African Union and the ECOWAS to
ensure that all troops deployed receive a training on the
protection of human rights and international humanitarian
law;
trainers to be legal experts with field experience of
prevention, monitoring or treatment of human rights
violations in time of armed conflict;
trainings to actually contribute, at each step of
interventions (planning, commanding, running and
monitoring); the establishment of guarantees allowing
prevention, monitoring, remediation and reporting of
violations human rights violations;
trainings to go along with regular public reporting (with
short intervals between reports to allow an effective
monitoring of operations) on training activities carried
out, measures taken and results achieved on human rights'
protection.
Human rights' observers
Our organisations welcome the announcement of the
deployment of United Nations and African Union observers
on the ground, in charge of investigating on the
evolution of the human rights situation in Mali. We
particularly call for these observers to:
be deployed in a sufficient number to cover the entire
territory and all operations;
work under a common management, in close cooperation with
trainers of military forces;
monitor, document and, if required, denounce human
rights' violations committed by all parties;
be able to investigate on human rights' violations that
occurred on the entire Malian territory, beyond
provisions made by resolution 2085;
accompany Malian authorities in their work of prevention,
documentation, repression and redress of human rights'
violations and in the preparation of the justice, truth
and reconciliation process as determined in the roadmap,
in close cooperation with the International Criminal
Court ;
grant a particular attention to gender-based crimes ;
work in close cooperation with civil society, in
particular Malian human rights' organisations.
Sanctions
To complete the battery of measures defining missions
granted to military forces involved in operations and in
order to reduce the risk of human rights violations, our
organisations call upon the United Nations Security
Council to announce that actors alleged to be responsible
for human rights violations and who would refuse to
cooperate with authorities and mechanisms for fighting
impunity, may be subject to individual sanctions.
Political roadmap
Our organisations welcome the adoption by Malian
authorities of a roadmap for the transition and the
commitment made to hold general elections in the near
future. We also welcome the support allowed by the
multidisciplinary presence of the United Nations in
Bamako and bilateral engagements taken by other States of
the international community, in favour of the
establishment of the rule of law and the implementation
of the roadmap for the transition.
In this context, FIDH, AMDH and UIDH urge Malian
authorities, with the support of the international
community, to immediately start the necessary
preparations for the organisation, observation and
certification of the announced general elections, in
order to hold free, independent and transparent elections
that would ensure the inclusive participation of the
Malian population, including refugees and displaced
people. These preparations particularly involve the
overhaul of the electoral register and the training of
independent observers.
Our organisations acknowledge, as written in the roadmap,
that a necessary part of the political transition in Mali
is the dialogue between parties in conflict. We call upon
authorities to establish a dialogue framework with all
legitimate representatives of Northern populations and
non-terrorist armed groups, in addition with local
elected officials and civil society.
We also call international community to support the
establishment of the Dialogue and Reconciliation National
Commission as provided for in the roadmap, giving
expertise and technical support to ensure that this
commission shall be representative, transparent and
inclusive.
International and independent monitoring of the evolution
of the human rights' situation
Lastly, our organisations call upon the United Nations
Security Council and Human Rghts Council, to establish an
international and independent monitoring on the evolution
of human rights in Mali. This mechanism would ensure a
follow-up of recommendations addressed by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to Malian
authorities, coordinate recommendations of all observers
deployed on the ground, support the Malian government in
the implementation of the roadmap and report to the
Security Council and Human Rights Council.
Mali's coup, one year on
Bruce Whitehouse
March 22, 2013
[Excerpts only. For full text, including in-line links
and figures, as well as other recent commentaries by
Bruce Whithouse, see http://bridgesfrombamako.com/]
It was a year ago this morning that we woke up in Bamako
to a changed reality. Soldiers at a barracks outside the
city had mutinied against their commanders, taken over
state broadcasting and the presidential palace, and
toppled the government of President Amadou Toumani Touré.
Yesterday a journalist with France24 asked me whether, at
the time of the coup, I had anticipated the depth of the
crisis that would follow. My answer was no. I remember
what it felt like, listening to gunfire breaking out
across the Niger River, a few hours later watching those
first images of soldiers in the ORTM studio announcing
the suspension of Mali's 1992 constitution. At the time
many of us hoped this episode would prove a short-lived
"hiccup" in Mali's democratic transition, followed by a
speedy return to normalcy. I don't believe I would have
predicted that Malians would largely acquiesce to the
junta; that 60 percent of Mali's territory would soon
fall to a coalition of separatist MNLA and Islamist
rebels; that the Islamists would later overpower their
secular allies and make northern Mali synonymous with
barbarity; that the Malian state and its leaders would
prove utterly impotent to protect their citizens or
reunify the country; or ultimately that France would
dispatch thousands of troops to Mali's soil.
None of this is to say, however, that Mali's coup arrived
out of the blue. The political crisis that has shaken the
Malian state to its foundations began long before those
soldiers mutinied and, in hindsight, warning signs
suggesting the failing health of Mali's democratic
experiment were visible all along.
Consider voter turnout. If Mali's democracy was so
vibrant, why did more than 60 percent of eligible voters
consistently stay away from the process? It's true that a
large part of Mali's population is rural and illiterate,
but this doesn't explain why voter turnout in Mali's
elections since 1992 was consistently the lowest in West
Africa. At a fundamental level, most Malians didn't feel
represented by their elected officials, and the problem
was growing worse. According to the Afrobarometer survey,
public satisfaction with Mali's democracy had been
falling for a decade by the time the coup took place.
Another warning sign was the spike in deadly vigilante
violence in Bamako, from mid-2011, as a growing number of
urban residents lost faith in the ability or willingness
of some of the state's most fundamental institutions —
the police and the justice system — to protect them from
criminals. I mentioned this phenomenon in a post a couple
of months before the coup, and returned to the subject in
greater detail last April.
As for the rebellion, insecurity is nothing new in
northern Mali. The latest insurgency (officially dubbed
"the renewal of armed struggle" by the MNLA) was launched
in mid-January 2012, but had been brewing long
beforehand, even prior to the fall of Muammar Qaddafi in
Libya the previous October and the subsequent return of
heavily armed Tuareg fighters to Mali.
Mali's coup and the chaos that followed were by no means
inevitable. President Touré's government was weak in
early 2012 — as events have proved — but it just might
have been able to limp through scheduled elections and
hand power to a successor. That successor might have been
able to contain the rebellion and reverse the Malian
state's decline. Of course, there's little use
speculating over how things might have played out
differently. My point is that the political crisis of the
last 12 months should not have come as a surprise, and
might possibly have been averted if Mali-watchers (myself
included) had been more attuned to the signs of trouble.
For 20 years we viewed Mali as a success story, and
became so heavily invested in that optimistic narrative
that we failed to make an accurate assessment of the
disappointments and risks.
An interesting poll conducted in Bamako last month by the
Friedrich Ebert Foundation (link to poll, in French, at
http://tinyurl.com/cpe6kmk; for an English translation
of the executive summary of the poll report, see below)
points to further evidence of popular alienation from the
political process. An overwhelming majority of
respondents feel that the country's political parties
pursue only selfish interests (table 4) ... Maybe the
only surprising finding here is that around sixty percent
of respondents actually trust their interim president and
prime minister (figures 1 and 2).
The same poll examines Bamako residents' attitudes toward
events in northern Mali. 98 percent of respondents
approve of France's ongoing military intervention (figure
10). They largely distrust the MNLA, and view the
exclusion of Malian troops from Kidal as "unacceptable"
(tables 11 and 12); moreover, 68 percent are completely
opposed to negotiating with rebels for peace (table 18),
though they do appear to support some kind of talks with
other representatives of northern populations (tables 19
and 21). They maintain strong support for the Malian army
(figure 13) and tend to be skeptical of accusations that
Malian troops have committed human rights abuses (table
13). More than three-quarters favor a permanent French
military presence in Mali (figure 17), and about twothirds
express favorable views toward a "permanent
American presence" in Mali (figure 16). By contrast,
opposition toward a UN peacekeeping operation runs fairly
high (tables 15 and 16).
...
On the eve of my departure from Mali last year, three
months after the coup, I posted a grim assessment of its
impact, writing that "the last 90 days suggest that
whatever problems Mali was facing on March 21, a putsch
was not the answer to them." Nine months later, my view
has not changed. But I have a little more hope now than I
did then for the country's future. If Mali's leaders can
use this crisis to confront the problems that brought
down the previous democratic experiment, if they can
include more of their fellow citizens in the process of
rebuilding the Malian state, they might just be able to
put their country back together and keep it together.
Such an outcome is certainly not inevitable, but it's
possible.
Mali-Poll 13-20 February 2013
March 12, 2013
For French original see http://www.fes-westafrica.org /
http://tinyurl.com/cpe6kmk
[unofficial translation by AfricaFocus. Note that the
poll was limited to the capital district of Bamako]
Summary
The coup d'état in March 2012 opened a period of
political and institutional security crisis in Mali
intervals marked by strong political tensions and a
search for durable solutions. Among these solutions the
country has transitionl institutions with two main
tasks: freeing the occupied northern regions and the
organization of elections. The results of a survey
conducted in November 2012 by the same institution
indicate among other things that the citizens of the
District of Bamako mostly trust certain transitional
institutions such as the Government of National Unity.
Opinions are rather mixed for the President and the
Interim National Assembly.
Since the completion of this survey, the political
situation has changed and the lines have moved on many
issues, including through military intervention and the
implementation of the military reconquest of the northern
regions, the cabinet reshuffle, the state of emergency,
and the ban on activism of political organizations
created after March 22, 2012. Certain options put forward
by citizens were confirmed.
The objectives of this second survey are: (1) to confirm
or repute some observations from the first survey, (2)
deepen the content of certain concepts such as national
unity, secularism of the state, (3) integrate new
parameters in the survey such as the causes of low
turnout, the conditions for reconstruction, etc..
Perception of crisis management and politico-institutional
security
Transitional institutions and provisions
The President of the Republic and the Acting Government
Acting enjoy the confidence of the majority of the
population. Two out of three citizens say they trust the
acting President of the Republic compared to a third in
November 2012, 61% of respondents say they trust the
Prime Minister and 60% the governmental team. In
contrast, less than a quarter of citizens know the names
of Deputies elected in their constituencies and more than
half of them say they are not satisfied with their work
at the National Assembly. Perception of the current role
of the former junta is mixed. A little over a third of
respondents think it is does not have responsibility for
anything currently; while less than half believe it deals
with military issues such as the reconquest of North and
one fifth think it is concerned with the the interests of
the junta itself.
For the vast majority of the population, political
parties are not involved in managing the crisis, and the
activities of political groups formed after March 2012
are intended only to create anarchy in the country,
satisfy personal interests and/or to oppose Malians.
Less than one in ten states surveyed were familiar with
the broad outlines of the Government roadmap. They almost
all approve its adoption before national consultations
and think that its contribution will be positive to the
management of the crisis.
The majority of respondents who say they know the outline
of the roadmap are hesitant about the need to organize
national consultations after the adoption of the roadmap.
About the upcoming elections, three quarters of
respondents want them to be organized after the total
liberation of the North and the return of displaced
persons, refugees and security. However, half of the
respondents thought holding electing was impossible for
July 2013 and not the civil registration files reinforce
this conclusion. .
The opinion of citizens on the Presidency of the national
electoral commission is mixed. The majority of citizens
disagree with the coupling of presidential and
legislative elections.
Finally, two-thirds of respondents explain the low
participation of people in elections by the lack of
credibility of candidates and their belief that their
vote has no effect on the improvement of their living
conditions.
Management of the military and political security crisis
The French military intervention is judged positively by
almost all of the population. This was also viewed
positively by three-quarters of respondents in November
2012. Similarly, the majority is favorable to a permanent
American or French presence in the northern region in
Mali.
The current role of the army in national defense is
viewed positively by the majority of respondents. The
majority does not believe the charges of violation of
human rights which are alleged against the army.
More than half of the citizens approve the role of
militias (Ganda Koy, Ganda Izo, etc..) In their fight
against the armed groups and for the security of northern
populations.
The role played by ECOWAS in managing the crisis is
considered positive by almost half of the surveyed
population. This proportion of the population has
increased significantly compared to the results of the
survey in November 2012. In contrast, half the population
disapproves of the failure to intervene in the management
of the crisis by Mauritania or Algeria.
Presence of UN peacekeepers in Mali, before or after the
liberation of the northern regions, is a subject of
disagreement among respondents. Half the men who
responded were opposed.
With respect to the international community, the
expectations of the population are that it should be
limited to to helping the Malian armed forces and
security forces fight against terrorism, protect the
borders, and fully free the North.
For a large part of Malian citizens, the activities of
MNLA are only for to defend the the interests of its own
members. Their rejection ([in agreement] with the MIA
[Ansar Dine]) of the entry of Malian troops into Kidal
is unacceptable.
Over two thirds of respondents are against negotiations
for peace in the North and advocate instead the use of
force. Proponents of negotiations were a little more than
half of the population in November 2012. They wish them
to be conducted directly with representatives of northern
communities (and not with the armed movements) and to
focus on the conditions for reconciliation of people and
to accelerate the development of the northern regions.
[For most respondents] the territorial integrity,
national unity and to a lesser extent the secular
character of the state are not negotiable.
Effects and impacts of the occupation of the North
The opinion of the majority of respondents is that the
occupation of the northern regions had no effect on
relations between the peoples of southern and northern
Mali in general. It is rather mixed on the relationship
between religious communities in Bamako (Muslim and
Christian). In contrast, more than half of the population
believe that the occupation has contributed to exacerbate
sectarian tensions in the north.
Role of religious actors
The involvement of HCIM [High Islamic Council of Mali] in
crisis management is much appreciated by people.
Similarly, more than half of the citizens approve the
role of the Ministry in charge of worship in the
cohabitation between religions and religious orders in
Mali.
Expected role of Technical and Financial Partners
The vast majority of citizens want a resumption of
economic cooperation and the strengthening of
humanitarian assistance. Nearly half expect assistance in
the organization of elections and one third expect
support for the return of refugees and displaced persons.
Role of civil society and media
Citizens expect civil society organizations to work for
social peace and national unity. They expect media
awareness of issues of the population affected by the
crisis and defense above all of peace and national
cohesion.
The majority of respondents believe that civil society
organizations have not adopted this attitude desired,
unlike the media, which has mostly been consistent with
the expected role.
Solutions for a sustainable management of the crisis
Citizens, in their vast majority, advocate improving
governance for sustainable management of institutional
and political crisis, followed by the establishment of
genuine democracy through the holding of transparent and
credible elections. Concerning the security crisis, most
recommended providing re4sourced to the armed forces and
security forces, recruitment and military training,
finally the reconciliation of the army with itself.
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