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Nigeria: Shapes of Violence, 1
AfricaFocus Bulletin
April 27, 2016 (160427)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
The realities of violence, whether in Nigeria, other African
countries, or indeed in rich countries such as the United States as
well, are often far more complicated than the stereotypes that often
prevail among those observing them from a distance. Thus, violence
in Nigeria is often simplistically characterized as "religious
conflict" between Muslims and Christians. A new collection of
empirical studies released this year by Nigeria Watch, based in
Ibadan, Nigeria, provides a more complex perspective, documenting,
for instance, that intra-Muslim conflict is more common that
conflicts between Muslims and Christians, and that much of the
conflict involving both Muslims and Christians is based on secular
rather than religious motives.
This AfricaFocus Bulletin, available on the web but not sent out by
email, contains excerpts from one of the chapters in this new
report, focused specifically on violence involving Christians and
Muslims in Nigeria. The full 216-page report is available at
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/37759
Another AfricaFocus Bulletin, sent out by email today and available
at http://www.africafocus.org/docs16/nig1604b.php, contains recent
press releases from Refugees International on violence by Boko Haram
in northeastern Nigeria and by Nigerian security forces in an
unrelated incident in Zaria, in north-central Nigeria.
Other recent articles with relevant background on Boko Haram in
particular include the following from the Washington Post and the
New York Times.
"Here's why so many people join Boko Haram, despite its notorious
violence," by Hilary Matfess, Washington Post, April 26, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/hqw6og4
"Failure to Share Data Hampers War on Boko Haram in Africa," by Eric
Schmitt and Dionne Searcey, New York Times, April 23, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/jzsmla7
"Women Who Fled Boko Haram Tell of Devastation and, Rarely, Hope,"
by Helene Cooper, New York Times, April 22, 2106
http://tinyurl.com/z48hplw
"Abducted Nigerian Girls Have Not Been Abandoned, U.S. Says," by
Helene Cooper, April 20, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/z4bj6md
"Boko Haram still a threat months after 'technical victory,' by
Bradley Klapper|AP, Washington Post, April 19, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/h3dfy48
"What's Worse Than a Girl Being Kidnapped?," by Adaobi Tricia
Nwaubani, New York Times, April 15, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/hcak5ch
"Boko Haram kidnapped 276 girls two years ago. What happened to
them?," by Kevin Sieff, Washington Post, April 14, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/zj57sxg
"Boko Haram Turns Female Captives Into Terrorists," by Dionne
Searcey, New York Times, April 7, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/jqyxw2d
"They were freed from Boko Haram's rape camps. But their nightmare
isn't over," by Kevin Sieff, Washington Post, April 3, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/zxcpob3
For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on Nigeria, visit
http://www.africafocus.org/country/nigeria.php
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Violence in Nigeria: A qualitative and quantitative analysis
Edited by Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos
Published by: African Studies Centre, Leiden, Netherlands
http://www.ascleiden.nl
French Institute for Research in Africa / Institut Français de
Recherche en Afrique (IFRA-Nigeria), University of Ibadan, Ibadan,
Oyo State, Nigeria http://www.ifra-nigeria.org
Full 216-page report available for download at
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/37759
Muslims, Christians and Religious Violence in Nigeria: Patterns and
Mapping (2006-2014)
Akinola Ejodame Olojo
Introduction
This paper is an attempt to sketch out and analyse the evolution and
diverse patterns of violent deaths involving Muslims and Christians
in Nigeria between 1 June 2006 and 31 May 2014. Although this
nationwide mapping offers representations of the broad spectrum and
character of Muslim-Christian religious violence over the eight-year
period in focus, it also includes the dynamics of violent deaths of
a non-religious nature involving Muslims and Christians. Our
assessment also considers the violent interaction between Muslim and
Christian groups in relation to other protagonists associated with
religious and non-religious issues. Without doubt, the religious
institutions of Islam and Christianity in Nigeria are major rallying
points for various social and political groups with disparate and
sometimes obscure agendas. In fact, the almost ubiquitous use of
religious pretexts in Nigeria has at several periods been
appropriated by 'non-conforming' groups to instigate violence and
inadvertently give the impression that religion is the paramount
source of violence in the country.
However, this study finds that while the factor of religion cannot
be entirely disregarded, particularly in light of the character of
recurrent crises in (northern) Nigeria, religious issues do not
represent the only cause of violent deaths involving Muslims and
Christians in the country. Religion as a causal factor must be put
in perspective and nuanced with other pertinent sources of violent
deaths, such as issues related to land and territorial claims,
ethnicity, and politics and elections, as well as community violence
and crimes involving Muslims and Christians. In addition, this study
finds that in cases where religion appears to be an underlying cause
of violent deaths, such incidents can also be reflected in clashes
between just one of the religious faiths and a non-religious
protagonist, or in fact occur within the same religious faith.
...
In this paper, reference to violent deaths does not exclusively
denote the act of perpetration of violence on the part of Muslims or
Christians. Rather, the context of our interpretation of violent
deaths refers to the involvement of Muslims and Christians also as
victims. It should also be noted that the period under examination
starts on 1 June 2006 and ends on 31 May 2014. Therefore, apart from
the full years in between (2007-2013), data analysed in relation to
either 2006 or 2014 should be considered in light of the stipulated
period when data collation and analysis started and ended.
Religion and violence in Nigeria
Violence in Nigeria has taken various forms over the decades, and
the data in this study depicts its wide-ranging character expressed
through the interactions between Muslims and Christians. Political
issues, especially those associated with the struggle for elective
offices and power allocation, remain a potent source of violence.
This state of affairs is often catalyzed by a lethal infusion of
interests rooted in deep socio-economic and ethnic concerns, some of
which may be legitimate and others spuriously held by different
actors and groups. In addition, the overall frequency of violent
deaths in Nigeria owes much to a combination of other causes such as
car accidents and crime. And certainly, not least, religious issues
appear to also reinforce the collective tally of fatalities,
particularly in terms of recurrence rates in regions such as
northern Nigeria.
Scholarly interpretations of this religious angle hold significance
because of the added perspective they bring to our assessment of
Muslim and Christian involvement in the trends of violent deaths.
However, in instances where violent deaths are not underscored by
religious issues between Muslims and Christians, or in cases where
violent deaths transpire between groups of the same religious faith,
it raises questions regarding the limits of certain theoretical
paradigms and how effectively their frameworks capture the violent
interaction between adherents of religious faiths in Nigeria. One
such paradigm pertains to the 'clash of civilizations', which
suggests that civilization identity, of which religion is a core
component, will be increasingly important in the post-Cold War
period. Samuel Huntington, the main proponent of this acclaimed yet
widely criticized civilizational thesis went further to assert that
the fundamental source of conflict and great divisions will be
cultural and that the fault lines between civilizations, being the
broadest level of cultural identity, will be the battle lines of the
future (Huntington 1996).
To a certain degree, some of the fundamental conflicts evident in
the era Huntington prognosticated about have indeed found some
expression along religious fault lines, and particularly in relation
to Islam in countries such as Nigeria. The academic literature is
also instructive in the way it guides our thoughts on the central
role of religion. Ellis and Haar (2007) describe religion as an
emerging political language whose pattern of interaction cannot be
ignored in the study of African politics. For Matthew Kukah (1993),
the process of political bargaining in Nigeria appears to
increasingly embody the factor of religion. Toyin Falola (1998)
pushes this further by underscoring the profundity of religious
attachment expressed by both Muslims and Christians and its
instrumentality in political life and leadership in Nigeria.
In the overall estimation of various scholars writing on religion
and politics in Nigeria, there appears to be an almost seamless
connection between several violent incidents from the 1960s through
the decades up to the current period. And at different phases in
this historical trajectory, the controversy between Muslims and
Christians over the definition and interpretation of 'secularity',
for instance, has offered opportunities for analysts to gauge what
they see as diametrically opposed platforms of Muslims against
Christians in Nigeria. A typical instance appeared in 1976 during
the drafting of Nigeria's Constitution and then again in 1986 on the
occasion of Nigeria's admittance into the Organisation of Islamic
Conference (OIC), which sparked off intense debates between Muslims
and Christians. The common thread of 'fundamentalism' that also runs
through these decades has often given way to militant expressions on
both sides of the religious divide in Nigeria. On the one hand, for
instance, northern Nigerian Christians, arguing self-defence, have
in the past justified the use of militancy to protect their lives
and defend their faith through the use of physical violence. On the
other hand, however, Islam appears to have gained a wider reputation
for militancy than Christianity, as clearly more cases of religious
violence involving Islamist groups are reported (Falola 1998).
The cumulative reality of these events appears to mirror the
classical model of a religious clash involving Muslims and
Christians in the country. Thus, when a superficial reading of the
prevailing Boko Haram crisis is carried out, the penchant to anchor
analysis exclusively on Huntington's discourse and assume the
reflection of a clash between a 'Muslim North' and 'Christian South'
is reinforced. Besides, Boko Haram itself purportedly calls for a
Sharia state, and the several incidences of violence instigated
against Christians or representations of Western civilization in
Nigeria tend to receive considerable media interest and hype both
locally and internationally. The overall impression of a
civilizational clash involving Muslims and Christians is also
strengthened in some way by the phenomenon of the 'youth bulge' in
Africa and particularly in the case of Nigeria where the demographic
structure is characterized by nearly three-quarters of the
population being under the age of 30 (Leahy et al. 2007). The
portrayal of such a population trend in a country where there is an
exceedingly large and mismanaged youth population invokes the notion
of how easily violent deaths can be a consequence of youth
vulnerability in the hands of radicalized (religious) groups. By
extension, it also becomes easy to understand how much analysis of
the violence involving Muslims and Christians in Nigeria maintains
intellectual currency within academic debates, policy circles, and
the sensational projection of the global media.
Beyond this, however, the connections between the aforementioned
variables are far more complex than what fits perfectly into a
single theoretical paradigm about a clash between religions. The
religious divide between Muslims and Christians should not be
overstated, because the monolithic perception held by many observers
of Islam and Christianity in Nigeria should be balanced with the
sense of caution expressed by scholars such as Pérouse de Montclos.
He draws attention to the need to recognize the divisions within
Islam as well as disruptive factors within the Muslim ummah, which
crises such as that related to Boko Haram underscore (Pérouse de
Montclos 2014). This kind of perspective holds merit as a safeguard
against speculative counter-arguments about an inter-religious clash
and also as a guide for other aspects of our study, which will
permit a fuller understanding of the idea of divisions or schisms
within religions such as Islam in Nigeria. Particularly in the third
part of this paper, an appreciation of this will emerge through our
statistical presentation of violent trends between rival groups
aligned to the same religion. However, before reflection on this, we
will proceed to present and analyse the distribution of data related
to the causes of violent deaths and its relationship to religious
and non-religious issues involving Muslims and Christians.
Frequency of violent deaths and their causes
Between 1 June 2006 and 31 May 2014, the absolute number of violent
deaths recorded by the Nigeria Watch database was over 61,000
(Figure 5.1). This staggering number is spread out over the period
examined in this study. Although an observable feature of this data
is the steady rise in the absolute yearly frequency of deaths from
2009 to 2013, a critical look at 2014 reveals a sharp increase in
the measure of absolute frequency just within a period of five
months. Furthermore, in less than a year's span, the aggregation of
violent deaths for the first five months of 2014 exceeds the
absolute frequency of violent deaths for each of the preceding
years, with the exception of 2013. Subsequent events confirmed this
alarming trend.
...
Beyond frequencies: Dimensions of violent death incidents
...
For each year, all the data generated is classified under six main
rubrics: Islamic group versus Christian group (religious issues);
Islamic group versus Christian group (non-religious issues); Islamic
group versus Islamic group (religious issues); Islamic group versus
Security forces (JTF, police); Islamic group versus Vigilante group,
Civilian JTF; and Other Violent Death Incidents involving Muslims
and Christians (Community violence). With reference to specific
incidents, where necessary we will analyse the data under each
rubric one at a time.
Islamic group versus Christian group (religious issues)
Under this rubric, we take into account the recurrence rate of
violent incidents with manifestations inspired by religious issues
involving Christian and Islamic groups. A total of 57 incidents are
identified, and 2012 represents the year with the highest rate of
this type of incident between June 2006 and May 2014. In comparison
with some other rubrics that possess higher frequencies of incidents
reflected in Table 5.1, this total figure of 57 is once again a
reminder of how religious issues do not represent the only cause or
pattern of violent deaths involving Muslims and Christians in
Nigeria. These religious incidents are nonetheless significant and
are mainly comprised of three forms of violent encounters: first,
attacks instigated by the Islamist group Boko Haram against
Christian groups, with churches being a prime target; second,
attacks through series of assassinations targeted at Christian
clerics; and third - although to a lesser extent than the first and
second forms - reprisal attacks by Christians against Muslims.
...
Islamic group versus Christian group (non-religious issues)
With 42 incidents between June 2006 and May 2014, the details under
this rubric attest to violent death dynamics typified by nonreligious
causes involving Muslims and Christians in Nigeria.
Although the non-religious causes may appear insubstantial in terms
of recurrence rates, their importance can still not be ignored.
Based on the data, they represent violent deaths connected with
issues such as election to political office. The years 2008, 2010,
and 2011 stand out in relation to these non-religious causes and, to
various extents, states such as Plateau, Kaduna, Kano, and Bauchi
bear witness to this. In Plateau State, for instance, November 2008
was a critical period for local government elections in Jos North,
where a tense political struggle for power pitched the People's
Democratic Party (PDP) against the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP).
...
Islamic group versus Islamic group (religious issues)
Our mapping study will not be complete without delving into the
dimension of the violent interplay between and among Islamic groups.
With a total of 60 incidents of intra-Islamic violent deaths, it is
vital to consider the character of these events. They are divided
into two broad categories: violent deaths due to clashes between
Sufi brotherhoods such as the Tijaniyya and groups such as the Yan
Izala; and, in the second case, violent deaths due to clashes
involving either of these Islamic brotherhoods (and sects) and Boko
Haram.
...
It was noted earlier that the second category of violent deaths
caused by intra-Islamic clashes refers specifically to attacks
instigated by Boko Haram against the entire cross-section of Islamic
groups in Nigeria. Similar to the desire of several of these Islamic
movements in the country, Boko Haram advocates a nationwide
application of Sharia. However, the line of disparity between these
Islamic groups and Boko Haram is drawn based on the aggressive modus
operandi which Boko Haram adopts. As a result, it is indeed the case
that the majority of these Islamic groups are in fundamental
disagreement with Boko Haram, and it is this point of divergence
that contributes to the provocation of violence. Consequently, while
2011 reflected the highest frequency of Boko Haram attacks against
several members of these Islamic groups and their mosques, 2012 was
replete with a record number of assassinations targeted at Islamic
clerics perceived as 'opponents'. ...
Islamic group versus the security forces
The security forces constitute what this study has so far described
as non-religious protagonists. Although not the prime concern of
this study, their role assumes some measure of significance owing to
their violent interaction with one of the major variables (Islamic
actors) examined in this paper. Thus, on the one hand we have the
Islamist group Boko Haram, and on the other we have the security
forces, comprised of members of the JTF, the Nigeria Police Force
(NPF), and the State Security Service (SSS), among others. In
addition, this rubric represents the highest number of violent death
incidents (418) with which one of our major variables (Islamic
actors) is connected. However, the lead-up to this high frequency of
incidents appeared inconsequential until 2009, when figures
(fatalities and incidents) began to accumulate.
It should be noted that among the several deaths that occurred in
2009, that of the former leader of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf,
marked a turning point in the level of violent encounters involving
the Islamist group and the security forces. ...
Islamic group versus Vigilante group and Civilian Joint Task Force
By mid-2013, when the Nigerian government imposed a state of
emergency in north-eastern states such as Borno, the formation of
what is now called the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) became very
visible amidst the violence instigated by the Islamist group Boko
Haram. Since 2013, the CJTF, comprised mainly of youths whose
families and communities have been ravaged by the state of unrest in
the North-East, has engaged Boko Haram in a number of violent
encounters. By way of counter-reaction, Boko Haram insurgents have
extended their scope of attacks beyond battles waged against the
state, religious clerics, and the government's JTF to engage members
of the CJTF in several clashes. Although the CJTF does not
constitute one of the leading variables of this study, their
contribution to the overall frequency of violent deaths resulting
from clashes with an Islamist group creates an entry point for them
into the framework of our mapping study.
...
Conclusion
Understanding the true character of Muslim-Christian violent deaths
between June 2006 and May 2014 requires knowledge of not only the
religious dimension of this linkage; intellectual inquiries must
appreciate also the cases of violent deaths inspired by issues
connected with ethnicity, crime, land, and politics. We have
established in this study that the essence of the violent
interaction between Muslims and Christians is not devoid of the nonreligious
factors highlighted. The statistics presented in this
paper have also illustrated that even in cases where religious
issues underlie causes of violent deaths, the associated incidents
can also reflect the involvement of non-religious actors.
Furthermore, our mapping demonstrates that religious causes of
violent deaths can in fact manifest between groups belonging to the
same religious faith. Within the context of geography, this paper
finds that beyond any other region of Nigeria, the northern part
embodies a preponderance of the violent interaction between Muslims
and Christians. Finally, beyond local dynamics, global media
perspectives consistently frame violence in Nigeria as largely
religious and between Muslims and Christians, rather than adopting a
more nuanced approach that enables a balanced interpretation of
events.
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providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with a
particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
Bulletin is edited by William Minter.
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