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Somalia: Rising Threats to Dadaab Refugees
AfricaFocus Bulletin
November 17, 2016 (161017)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
"The priority of donors and UN agencies should be on improving
conditions in Somalia, not succumbing to political pressure from
Kenya to speed up the pace of returns through monetary inducements.
Kenya faces very real and very serious security challenges. But it
is harmful and wrong to blame the Somali refugee population people
who themselves fled to Kenya seeking refuge from violence,
persecution, and turmoil at home." - Refugees International
Under intense international criticism, the Kenyan government has
announced a six-month delay in its plan to close down Dadaab, the
world's largest refugee camp. But this does not represent a change
in policy or a letup in the ongoing pressure for forced repatriation
of refugees from the country.
This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains excerpts from one recent report,
from Refugees International, on the pressures and of the conditions
of refugees who have already been forced to return to Somalia, the
country of origin of at least 330,000 of the camp's estimated
500,000 residents.
For the latest update from Amnesty International, which also
monitors the situation at Dadaab closely, visit
http://tinyurl.com/hedrcfp
For a short analytical article with extensive links to other
sources, see Neil James Wilson, "Shutting down Dadaab endangers
refugees," at http://tinyurl.com/gly9q99
For a wide range of ongoing news on Somalia visit
http://allafrica.com/somalia/
For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on Somalia and Kenya, visit
http://www.africafocus.org/country/somalia.php and
http://www.africafocus.org/country/kenya.php
For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on migration issues, visit
http://www.africafocus.org/migrexp.php
A book with an first-hand look at the world of refugees in Dadaab is
City of Thorns: Nine Lives in the World's Largest Refugee Camp, by
Ben Lawrence. 2016. http://amzn.to/2fZiFs9
I haven't had a chance to read it, but this is from the description
from the publisher.
"Situated hundreds of miles from any other settlement, deep within
the inhospitable desert of northern Kenya where only thorn bushes
grow, Dadaab is a city like no other. Its buildings are made from
mud, sticks or plastic, its entire economy is grey, and its citizens
survive on rations and luck. Over the course of four years, Ben
Rawlence became a first-hand witness to a strange and desperate
limbo-land, getting to know many of those who have come there
seeking sanctuary. ... In City of Thorns, Rawlence interweaves the stories of nine
individuals to show what life is like in the camp and to sketch the
wider political forces that keep the refugees trapped there."
And the New York Times Book Review says: "It is a portrait,
beautifully and moving painted. And it is more than that. At a time
when newspapers are filled with daily images of refugees arriving in
boats on Europe's shores, when politicians and governments grapple
with solutions to migration and erect ever larger walls and fences,
it is an important reminder that a vast majority of the worlds
refugees never get as far as a boat or a border of the developed
world."
++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++
Refugee Returns from Kenya to Somalia: "This is About Fear
Not
About Choice"
Refugees International November 3, 2016
[RI Senior Advocate Mark Yarnell and RI President Michel Gabaudan
traveled to Kenya and Somalia in September 2016.]
[Excerpts below. For full report, with documentation and
photographs, visit http://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2016/somalia]
The Kenyan government's threat to close the Dadaab refugee camp by
the end of November would not only endanger the lives of several
hundred thousand Somali refugees but has already caused irreparable
harm and damage.
With no alternative options, some refugees have been coerced into
repatriating to Somalia, where insecurity and an ongoing
humanitarian crisis continue. The United Nations Refugee Agency's
focus on expediting the pace of returns through a program that is
supported by donors and implemented in partnership with nongovernmental
organizations in the face of political pressure from
Kenya, promotes large-scale returns that are unlikely to be
sustainable. Development and reintegration initiatives in designated
areas of return in Somalia need time to take hold; and, in the
meantime, support for Somali refugees who remain in Kenya cannot be
abandoned.
"But what is my choice? This is about fear. It's not about choice."
Somali refugee at a Return Help Desk in Dadaab
The priority of donors and UN agencies should be on improving
conditions in Somalia, not succumbing to political pressure from
Kenya to speed up the pace of returns through monetary inducements.
Kenya faces very real and very serious security challenges. But it
is harmful and wrong to blame the Somali refugee population people
who themselves fled to Kenya seeking refuge from violence,
persecution, and turmoil at home.
Recommendations
The Kenyan government must lift its deadline of November 30, 2016,
for closing the Dadaab refugee camp, cease coercive efforts to
promote premature returns to Somalia, and assure refugees that they
will not be forcibly repatriated;
Beyond improving the quality of information provided at Return Help
Desks in Dadaab, the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) must
expand its information campaign with participation from Somaliabased
sectoral partners to share details about service
availability, livelihoods opportunities, and security conditions in
Somali areas of return through local radio messaging, social media,
and direct engagement with and outreach to refugees;
UNHCR must increase and extend post-return monitoring activities
through regular phone communication with returnees to gather
detailed information about the conditions and needs of returnees and
inform coordinated planning for reintegration programs;
As outlined in the Somali National Development Plan, international
donors and the UN should support the Somali government's strategic
goal to enhance the absorption capacity of basic services for
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugee returnees through
improved coordination mechanisms between humanitarian and
development actors;
International donors, including the United States, the United
Kingdom, and the European Union, should increase protection funding
for the Dadaab refugee camp and in areas of return inside Somalia;
Donors must increase humanitarian assistance for Somalia to close a
$500 million gap in funding the UN's 2016 Humanitarian Response Plan
and address urgent needs, particularly relating to food insecurity;
UNHCR's Cross Border Working Group must devise clear and transparent
terms of reference and expand its membership to include all relevant
actors. Additionally, the leadership of UNHCR Kenya and UNHCR
Somalia should make regular cross-border visits to each other's
field locations to inform programming and to improve coordination
between the two country teams.
Background
Kenya had long been a generous host to hundreds of thousands of
refugees from neighboring war-torn countries and those throughout
the region. On May 6, 2016, however, in a statement from the
Ministry of Interior, the Kenyan government announced that it was
ending its role as a host to refugees. Citing the "economic,
security, and environmental burden" of hosting refugees, the
government planned to close both the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps
in short order, and with immediate effect, disbanded the Department
of Refugee Affairs. The government soon backed off its threat to
close Kakuma, home to mainly South Sudanese refugees, but officials
publicly maintained their resolve to close Dadaab, arguing that the
existence of the camp represented a national security threat. On May
31, Cabinet Secretary for the Ministry of Interior and National
Coordination Joseph Nkaissery said, "The decision we made to close
the camp is explicit and final....The refugees must be repatriated
to their countries, and we hope to close the camp, latest November."
Despite softened rhetoric at times and international pressure to
lift the deadline for closing Dadaab, the Ministry of Interior's
Principal Secretary, Karanja Kibicho, reaffirmed the govern- ment's
plans in mid-September, stating, "Our timeline is November 30 for
the closure of the camp."
Previously, and particularly in the wake of attacks attributed to
the Somalia-based armed group Al-Shabaab, high-level Kenyan
officials have made camp closure threats that did not come to pass.
Following the infamous Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi in 2013,
then-Interior Minister Joseph Ole Lenku called for the immediate
closure of Dadaab. In March 2014, the Kenyan government blamed urban
refugees for insecurity in Kenyan cities and executed a crackdown by
security forces known as Operation Usalama Watch. Several thousand
refugees were forcibly, and sometime brutally, rounded up and
transported to the Dadaab and Kakuma camps (which officials
explained as a first step toward returning them to their home
countries), and at least 259 Somalis, several of whom had refugee
status, were deported to Somalia by plane. After an attack on
Garissa University in April 2015, an attack that left 147 people
dead, Kenya's Vice President William Ruto stated, "We have asked the
UNHCR to relocate the refugees in three months, failure to which we
shall relocate them ourselves."
Kenya faces very real and very serious security challenges, but it
is harmful and wrong to blame the Somali refugee population people
who themselves fled to Kenya seeking refuge from violence,
persecution, and turmoil at home. Importantly, Kenya will hold
national elections in 2017. Scapegoating refugees (a non-voting
population) by portraying them as threat to national security serves
political expediency, while tarnishing and punishing an entire
community of people.
In response to pressure from the Kenyan government to expedite the
pace of refugee returns to Somalia, UNHCR developed a revised Plan
of Action to account for a reduction of the population of Dadaab by
the end of the year by 150,000. This effort includes a population
verification exercise, provides a 'substantially enhanced'
individual return package, and bolsters community- based
reintegration support in Somali areas of return. 6 The Plan of
Action is for 'voluntary repatriation,' but with Kenya maintaining
its deadline for closing Dadaab and offering no alternative for
refugees who do not wish to return to Somalia, returns in this
context are at best induced and at worst forced.
Inside Somalia, the humanitarian situation is dire. According to the
United Nations, five million Somalis do not have enough food to eat,
including 300,000 children who are acutely mal- nourished. Poor
rainfall reduced the most recent harvest in south central Somalia by
about half, and weather patterns are expected to reduce rainfall and
cause drought during the current rainy season from October to
January. Further, while certain areas of Somalia have stabilized
over recent years, much of the country remains insecure as fighting
between Al-Shabaab and African Union peacekeepers (AMISOM) cause new
displacement and long standing clan conflicts continue. There are
currently more than a million Somalis displaced internally.
According to UNHCR's own Position on Returns to Southern and Central
Somalia, "Civilians continue to be severely affected by the
conflict, with reports of civilians being killed and injured in
conflict-related violence, widespread sexual and gender-based
violence against women and children, forced recruitment of children,
and large-scale displacement." From data recorded from January 2015
to June 2016, 564,000 Somalis were displaced internally a rate of
more than 1,000 people displaced per day. Most recently, tens of
thousands of people were forced to flee their homes due to fighting
in the city of Galkayo between forces loyal to semi-autonomous
regions of Puntland and Galmudug. And with national elections
scheduled for the end of this year, the situation across the entire
country is tense.
In September, Refugees International (RI) staff traveled to Kenya
and Somalia to assess the implications and impact of the
repatriation program from Dadaab.
Unsustainable Returns
" I constantly have returnees showing up at our office saying, 'I
have no money. I'm thinking about going back to Dadaab so my kids
can go to school.' The whole voluntary repatriation program needs to
be revised. " -Aid worker in Kismayo
Since UNHCR began implementing its voluntary returns program in
December 2014, around 33,000 refugees have repatriated to Somalia,
the majority arriving in Kismayo in the Jubaland region of south
central Somalia. Until 2012, Kismayo was controlled by Al-Shabaab
a non-state armed group that controls territory throughout much of
south central Somalia. The city of Kismayo is itself under the
control of the local Jubaland authorities, but Al-Shabaab maintains
a potent presence throughout the surrounding rural areas.
From December 2014 through April 2016, before Kenya made its Dadaab
closure announcement, returns were moving at a gradual pace about
13,000 people had repatriated to Somalia through the return program.
After the May announcement, UNHCR increased the monetary return
package, and in its appeal to funders, based on the revised Plan of
Action, foresees an additional 50,000 supported returns to Somalia
this year. In Kismayo, RI staff met with recently returned refugees
from Dadaab. Returning refugees receive $200 (U.S. dollars) per
person from UNHCR when they depart Dadaab and then another $200 per
person upon arrival at Kismayo. Additionally, refugee returnees
receive $200 per household per month for the subsequent six months,
as well as $15 per month for food. An allocation for housing and
education costs is planned by UNHCR but not yet implemented.
In discussions with RI, a group of women returnees described an
intense campaign by Kenyan government officials at the Dadaab camp,
as well as on local radio, to the effect that security in Somalia
had improved and assistance would be received upon arrival. This was
combined with propaganda on the imminent closure of the camp. Women
with school-aged children were particularly anxious and
disillusioned, as they found that beyond the financial package, they
were left to fend on their own in an environment that was very
challenging, with limited access to basic services. Shelter and
education were repeatedly raised as critical issues. One woman, a
mother of six, said, "They promised that it was safe and that we
would be helped, but I am not sure where to go. I have no shelter
and must rent a place, and there are no schools for my children."
Some of the women said that they are using their return package to
pay for rent and that they are worried about what they will do for
shelter once they package runs out.
One couple said they had invested the package money in buying a
small plot but had no funds for making a decent shelter. With
regards to education, all the parents RI interviewed were at a
complete loss on how to guarantee their children would not lose the
knowledge and the investment in education that they had acquired in
Dadaab. Some women stated that had they known what they knew now
about the lack for services and support available to returnees, they
would not have registered for return. Further, they said that they
were communicating this information back to friends and other
contacts in Dadaab.
Several of the men interviewed by RI said that they decided to
return home now rather than face a forceful eviction from Dadaab.
One young man, 18 years old, said that he wanted to return to Dadaab
to finish his education. "In Dadaab," he said, "I had education, I
had security, and I had water."
As noted above, south central Somalia is experiencing a humanitarian
crisis. Kismayo itself is home to more than 40,000 internally
displaced persons (IDPs), displaced due to conflict and food
insecurity, living in deplorable conditions in displacement camps
around the city. RI visited one of these camps to see first-hand the
dilapidated shelters and lack of adequate services. According to a
June 2016 study by the Jubaland government's refugee and IDP agency,
"The scale of displacement [in Jubaland], and the fact that the
region is still in the midst of a protracted war, has resulted in a
situation in which thousands of people, more than half of them
children and adolescents, are living under emergency conditions
where basic needs are not being met across health, food, nutrition
and protection sectors." The global acute malnutrition rates in the
IDP camps are just below 15 percent, the threshold which constitutes
a critical emergency.
Access to basic education is particularly problematic since years of
conflict led to a dilapidated education system with only private
and/or Quranic options available. The same study reports that only 7
percent of respondents completed primary education. Further, as in
other areas of Somalia, IDPs face the constant threat of eviction
because they do not have secure land tenure. They can be evicted
without notice and with no information on where else to go. They
also face incidences of harassment by local security forces,
according to an aid official interviewed by RI.
A UN official told RI that the greatest challenge for nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) working in Kismayo is gaing access
to populations in need. Aid workers can generally only travel and
work within a 10 kilometer radius of the city. During periods of
heightened insecurity, UN staff can be prevented from leaving the
AMISOM-guarded airport. During an NGO meeting, one aid worker said
that people are going hungry along the Juba River, but there is
limited aid access because the area is controlled by Al-Shabaab. An
additional challenge is the lack of funding for the humanitarian
response in Somalia. For 2016, the UN's humanitarian response plan
for Somalia is less than 40 percent covered, with a shortfall of
more than $500 million. Refugee returnees are expected to
sustainably 'reintegrate' into areas of Somalia that are still
facing humanitarian crises. According to a recent regional overview
report from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA), "Drought, flooding, disease outbreaks, evic- tions,
insecurity and lack of basic services drive humanitarian needs in
the Jubaland area."
In September, in the face of this reality, the Jubaland authorities
suspended the reception of returning refugees to Kismayo, citing
"severe humanitarian challenges." Indeed, a local government
official told RI that there is an urgent need for shelter, medical
facilities, and education programs to accommodate the returnees. He
said, "It's like Kenya and the UN are dumping refugees in Kismayo."
He also cited the lack of employment and livelihood opportunities
available and worries that non-state armed groups might attempt to
forcibly recruit returnees.
Aid officials reported that, at present, about 60 percent of refugee
returnees are finding accommodation in Kismayo town, 25 percent move
to the rural areas, and 15 percent are living in IDP camps. A key
concern is that after the monthly stipends from UNHCR and the World
Food Program (WFP) conclude six months after arrival in Somalia,
more returnees will be dependent on humanitarian support and will
seek shelter and assistance at IDP camps. This is worrying on many
levels. Existing IDP camps in Kismayo are already extremely
congested. Some refugees have already decided to return to Dadaab,
and more are likely to follow.
One aid worker told RI, "I constantly have returnees showing up at
our office saying, 'I have no money. I'm thinking about going back
to Dadaab so my kids can go to school.' The whole voluntary
repatriation program needs to be revised."
It is clear that, in addition to the involuntary nature of the
repatriation program, large-scale returns are unlikely to be
sustainable and the whole process could cause more harm than good by
adding to the existing humanitarian caseload in Somalia and
straining the fragile stability and development gains in certain
areas of Somalia. If local communities and governments in Somalia
are not in an adequate position to receive, absorb, and reintegrate
returnees, returns will not be durable. And durability requires
development and security to take hold in Somalia to the point where
returnees are not dependent on humanitarian aid after six months or
are forced to flee again because of violence. To its credit, the
Somalia Federal Government recently finalized a National Development
Plan for 2017 to 2019 that includes a detailed list of priorities
and strategic objectives for achieving durable solutions for refugee
returnees and IDPs. This includes protecting the rights of displaced
people and returnees, but also prioritizes securing access to land,
affordable housing, education, and vocational training. Further,
there is a particular emphasis on the need to create job and income
opportunities for youth IDPs and returnees that are integrated into
the broader social protection priorities of the Plan. Of particular
importance is the Plan's strategic goal to enhance the absorption
capacity of basic services for IDPs and refugee returnees.
At the same time, UN leadership is promoting a durable solutions
strategy that includes collaboration with development actors like
the World Bank, engagement with the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD), and direct support to local governments that are
on the frontline of reintegration activities. Further, the UN's
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General for Somalia
(DSRSG) appointed Walter Kaelin, a leading expert on internal
displacement, to lead the IDP Solutions Initiative a process aimed
at linking develop- ment and humanitarian interventions for IDPs to
promote durable local integration.
These development efforts should be supported. But to that end, UN
leadership must implement clear mechanisms for coordination between
these various development efforts, with the National Development
Plan at the center, and between development and humanitarian actors.
Though an Operational Solutions Platform has been devised by the
DSRSG, multiple aid workers told RI that there is ongoing confusion
about how the various initiatives fit together and how cooperation
between development and humanitarian actors can be operationalized
for all displacement affected populations including IDPs,
returnees, and host communities. Additionally, there is a need to
harmonize assessments of the conditions in areas of return. Joint
area based analysis, as promoted by the Regional Durable Solutions
Secretariat (ReDSS), is an important step toward this objective.
Very recently, the Jubaland government lifted its restriction on
allowing new returnees to arriving in Kismayo. In this context, much
more must be done to expand post-return monitoring. Refugees receive
cell phones and sim cards upon arrival in Kismayo, and they are
transfered their monthly return stipend via mobile phone banking.
There is some effort to contact refugees to inquire about their
situation (where they are living, how they are sustaining
themselves, etc.) but post-return monitoring efforts must be
expanded. Knowledge about the situation of refugees post-return must
be shared with shared with humanitarian and development actors
(including NGOs and local government authorities) operating in areas
of return to inform how best to tailor and focus reintegration
program, as well as apply lessons learned. Further, UNHCR's
Protection and Return Monitoring Network provides important data and
that should be shared more broadly and regularly throughout the
humanitarian and development community in Somalia.
Returns in Somalia will only be durable if conditions on the ground
allow for that. The priority of donors and UN agencies should be on
improving conditions in Somalia, not succumbing to political
pressure from Kenya to speed up the pace of returns through monetary
inducements.
Ultimately, no matter what kinds of plans and roadmaps are in place,
improvements on the ground must take hold before further large scale
returns take place, and all actors involved must be realistic about
the potential pace of progress in a context as volatile and insecure
as Somalia. At the moment, the push for returns from the Kenya side
is driving repatriation, rather than conditions on the Somalia side
of the border. As one aid worker said, NGOs are playing catch-up.
"People have started moving," he said, "but actors are still
planning." At present, the UN, supported by the international
community, is complicit in facilitating returns to the same kind of
deplorable conditions that caused refugees to flee their homes in
the first place.
[full report continues with section on the push from the Kenyan
government, with the cooperation of refugee agencies, to remove
people from Dadaab.]
AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with a
particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
Bulletin is edited by William Minter.
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