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AfricaFocus Updates: Sudan, Ebola, Mozambique
AfricaFocus Bulletin
June 19, 2019 (2019-06-19)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
AfricaFocus Bulletin normally contains material on one topic only,
as in bulletins earlier this year on Mozambique in January and March, Sudan in March
, and
Ebola in April. Each provides substantive excepts from current
material as well as links for ongoing coverage.
This bulletin is an
exception: updates on several topics in which there have been
significant new developments since the earlier bulletins. It is
also an experiment; how often I do this in the future will depend
on your reaction.
Go directly to: Sudan
Ebola
Mozambique
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Sudan
The overthrow in April of Sudanese dictator Omar el-Bashir opened a
period of hope, even though protesters continued to demand a
comprehensive shift to a civilian government. The brutal military
crackdown on June 3 brought a halt to this period, despite the
determination of protesters to find ways to continue their
struggle. As noted in the updates here, the international forces
at play included criticism from the international community, namely
the African Union and Western countries. But the most forceful
intervention came from Saudi and Emirati military and economic
support of the regime.
See brief excerpts and links to key updates below:
“Sudan Ousted a Brutal Dictator. His Successor Was His Enforcer,“ New York Times, June 14, 2019
KHARTOUM, Sudan — Once a camel trader who led a militia accused of
genocidal violence in Darfur, Lt. Gen. Mohamed Hamdan now sits at
the pinnacle of power in Sudan, overlooking the scorched streets
from his wood-paneled office high up in the military’s towering
headquarters.
From his office in the capital, Khartoum, he can see the site where
his unit, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, cleared thousands
of pro-democracy protesters in a storm of violence that began on
June 3. The heavily armed troops burned tents, raped women and
killed dozens of people, some dumped in the Nile, according to
numerous accounts from protesters and witnesses.
The blood bath consolidated the vertiginous rise of General Hamdan,
widely known as Hemeti, who by most reckonings is now the de facto
ruler of Sudan. To many Sudanese he is proof of a depressing
reality: Although they ousted one dictator in April, the brutal
system he left behind is determined to guard its power.
“We thought this might happen,” said Alaa Salah, 22, the woman
dressed in white who led chants from atop a car and brought the
world’s attention to Sudan’s revolution. “For years Hemeti killed
and burned in Darfur. Now Darfur has come to Khartoum.”
“Bloated bodies in the Nile show Sudan protesters were right to fear the arrival of Saudi and UAE money,” Independent, June 11, 2019
The Sudanese democracy demonstrators were the first to protest at
Saudi Arabia’s interference in their revolution. We all knew that
the Saudis and the Emiratis had been funnelling millions of dollars
into the regime of Omar al-Bashir, wanted for war crimes by the
International Criminal Court and now chucked out of power by a
Sisi-like military cabal. But it was the sit-in protesters who
first thought up the slogan: “We do not want Saudi aid even if we
have to eat beans and falafel!”
… the dozens of waterlogged bodies being dragged from the Nile
should focus our attention on the support which the Emiratis and
especially the Saudis are now lavishing upon the pseudo-
transitional military government in Sudan.
We should not be surprised. The frequent judicial head-chopping of
Saudi prisoners after travesty trials, then the chopped-up remains
of an executed Saudi journalist and now the decaying Sudanese
corpses sloshing along the longest river in Africa – along with the
Saudi-Emirati assault on Yemen and the subsequent slaughter –
possess a kind of gruesome familiarity. Political problems resolved
by cruel death.
…
The protesters want answers about the true nature of the
relationship between the Gulf states and two men: the “Rapid
Support Forces” commander, the frightening Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo –
aka “Hemeti” – and Abdul Fattah al-Burhan, the theoretical head of
the military council which took over the country after they
overthrew Bashir. Both men recently visited the Gulf states – and
the Sudanese who were camped out in their capital want to know why
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates promised $3bn (£2.7bn) in
aid to the transitional government.
Lt Gen Mohamed Hamdan ‘Hemeti’, the deputy chairman of Sudan’s Transitional Military Council (TMC) and commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia
Credit: Dabanga Sudan
“U. S. calls Sudan military crackdown ‘devastating,’ urges independent investigation,” Washington Post, June 14, 2019
The top U.S. diplomat for Africa pushed Friday for Sudan to carry
out an “independent and credible” investigation into a June 3
military crackdown on pro-democracy protesters that left scores
dead.
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Tibor Nagy described the
attack on a long-running sit-in near the military headquarters in
the capital, Khartoum, as “just devastating.”
Medical organizations linked to the protesters put the toll at
least 118, while the military-led transitional government has
acknowledged that at least 60 were killed when security forces
cleared the square.
…
He declined to specify what further measures the United States
might take and said the main U.S. focus is to support the mediation
between the protesters and the military council by representatives
from the African Union and neighboring Ethiopia.
“The Generational Gender Struggle in the Sudanese Revolution ,“ African Feminism, June 14, 2019
The April 11 deposing of former president Omar al Bashir from
power, by the will of the people who protested and marched
relentlessly, was executed by Bashir’s very own loyalist military
strongmen, in a hoax to gain power through a transitional military
council (TMC). They oversaw the killing of more than 100 people
and left as 700 injured in the recent attack on a sit-in and
paramilitaries carried out more than 70 rapes.
This despite negotiations started between the TMC and de facto
leader of the revolution, the Sudanese Professionals Association,
and the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) which comprised several
factions of the political and armed rebels sphere under the Freedom
and Change Declaration.
The pictures that came out of the negotiation meetings were starkly
different from those that carried the news of the revolution months
prior to that moment. There we were back to lack of trust in the
competence and capabilities of women in politics. This became clear
as the negotiating team was selected despite the criticism. A
total of 8 negotiators were selected, of these only one woman was
part.
Also
AfricaFocus Bulletin, March 11, 2019
http://www.africafocus.org/docs19/sud1903.php
Dabanga Sudan, June 14, 2019
https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-troika-to-meet-in-berlin-on-june-21
For daily updates
https://www.dabangasudan.org/en
Ebola
Ebola has now spread from the east of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo into Uganda. The debate continues over whether a new
declaration by WHO would help or would have the effects of
inspiring travel bans and other harmful consequences as occurred
during the West African Ebola epidemic. But two points are very
clear: (1)international funding and support is still falling short,
and (2) both international and national health responders have
failed to win the trust of local Congolese communities in the midst
of conflict, an essential component for effective action.
See brief excerpts and links to key updates below:
“WHO experts again say Ebola not global health emergency,” CIDRAP, June 14, 2019
A World Health Organization (WHO) emergency committee convened in
the wake of imported Ebola cases in Uganda said today that the
situation still doesn't warrant a public health emergency of
international concern (PHEIC), but they did express serious worries
about the threat to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and
its neighbors and over a lack of funds.
Despite surveillance efforts like these at the border of the two countries, Ebola has jumped from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Uganda.
Credit: Matt Taylor/World Health Organization
...
Committee members are deeply disappointed that the WHO and its
response partners haven't received enough funding and resources to
battle Ebola. Currently, $98 million is needed to support the
response through July, but so far health officials have received
only $43.6 million, resulting in a $54 million gap.
Mike Ryan, MD, the WHO's executive director of emergency programs,
said there has been very little funding available to help the DRC's
four closest neighbors prepare for imported Ebola cases—and there's
still a $27 million shortfall in that support.
Mosoka Fallah , “Radical ideas are needed to break the DRC’s Ebola outbreak. Here are some,” The Conversation, May 22, 2019
…
The critical, life-saving lessons learned from the West Africa
outbreak aren’t being implemented; though, admittedly, conditions
in the DRC makes some hard to replicate.
For example, one of the biggest takeaways from the 2014 epidemic is
that fear plays a major role in the communities where Ebola
strikes. In Liberia people were initially so afraid of health
workers that they resisted treatment and ignored orders not to
self-quarantine.
As one of the lead coordinators of the national response to Ebola
in Liberia, one of my main jobs was to ease the widespread fear. We
did so by engaging with local communities. We recruited them to
help in a number of ways, including being active case finders and
leading negotiations with hostile community members.
A lack of trust is evident from troubling reports that many are
resisting vaccination. We don’t yet know why. The resistance sits
side-by-side with peoples’ receptiveness to other Ebola treatment.
From my previous experience it suggests that health workers must
find a way to break through to clear the path for an effective
vaccination drive – and to ensure that opposition doesn’t quickly
grow into resistance to the overall response.
…
What can leaders of the response do?
We had to think outside the standard conventions of emergency response.
First, they can incentivise community leaders (chiefs, healers,
women, priests) on a fixed stipend to head the response in their
respective towns or villages. Doing this will lead to a network of
trusted messengers who can effectively communicate to a frightened,
confused people. We did this in Liberia. And it can be done in the
DRC, despite the challenges of war.
In Liberia we also incentivised a local gang that had been infected
by offering them illicit drugs. It was unconventional – there were
no rules for this kind of engagement – but it worked: we negotiated
a self-quarantine of 32 homeless gang members. We also offered food
to armed robbers in exchange for safe passage through a slum called
West Point.
Second, food can be used to incentivise community response and
volunteer self-quarantine. Food has historically being used as a
weapon of war, but we turned it around in Liberia and used it as a
force for Ebola containment. We did this successfully in
collaboration with the World Food Programme. We provided food to
entire villages where Ebola had occurred. Village leaders then
decided that for 21 days no one would leave their villages and no
new visitors would be allowed. By providing food and their basic
needs these local leaders became empowered to work with their
people to contain the outbreak.
Third, find all means necessary to incentivise the rebels and make
them a part of the response. A trusted third party – like the
Southern African Development Community, WHO or some other
organisation – must convince the national government to allow them
to meet the warring factions and give them the resources to take
steps in their territory.
...
“Resetting the Ebola response in Congo means trusting the people affected,“ New Humanitarian, May 24, 2019
Across the response, an enhanced strategy of community engagement
must deliver on repeated local requests for more in-depth knowledge
about Ebola, the response, and treatment procedures. Local actors
continue to affirm that improved information flows can de-escalate
more politicised views of Ebola. Communities suggest more
(facilitated discussion) forums in which they can ask questions and
receive further detailed information about the virus, its
treatment, vaccination, and response activities. Actors both
opposing the response as well as those supporting it call for
greater civilian access to laboratories and treatment centres in
order to build familiarity with procedures used. Given the
environment of distrust, granting more direct access will help to
overcome ‘fear of the unknown’ and can constructively dispel
misinformation.
Although the recent attacks are highly visible, communities
continue to make repeated attempts to communicate peacefully with
the government and national and international responders. Community
members circulate announcements and situation reports from the WHO
and other agencies via WhatsApp, demonstrating a determination to
keep apprised of response activities. This level of engagement is
positive and should be maximised. It should be the basis for the
reset.
Also
BBC, June 16, 2019 – with graphics
https://www.bbc.com/news/stories-48635969
For daily updates
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/infectious-disease-topics/ebola
AfricaFocus Bulletin, April 15, 2019
http://www.africafocus.org/docs19/eb1904.php
Mozambique
Hit by Cyclone Idai and Cyclone Kenneth earlier this year, both
central and northern Mozambique are still feeling the direct
impact. The country is burdened with some $2 billion in fraudulent
debt to global banks and bondholders, just ruled unconstitutional
by Mozambique´s constitutional council. And an insurgency in
northern Cabo Delgado province is being made more deadly by
repressive military responses to unrest based on a perfect storm of
underlying reasons for discontent. See brief excerpts and links to
key updates below, including to video and audio of a June 6 half-
day conference with outstanding panels on the insurgency in
northern Mozambique.
“Mozambique: Constitutional Council Rules Ematum Guarantee Null and Void,” AIM, June 4, 2019
Maputo — Mozambique's Constitutional Council, the country's highest
body in matters of constitutional and electoral law, on Tuesday
declared null and void all acts concerning the loan of 850 million
US dollars contracted by the Mozambique Tuna Company (Ematum) in
2013.
Also null and void "with all the legal consequences" is the loan
guarantee issued by the government of the time, headed by President
Armando Guebuza.
…
The loan took the form of the issue of 850 million dollars worth of
bonds, issued by the banks Credit Suisse and VTB of Russia, on the
European market. The proceeds were supposed to go towards
purchasing fishing boats and other equipment for Ematum, and for
coastal protection.
…
Furthermore, the loans to Ematum, and to two other fraudulent
companies, Proindicus and MAM (Mozambique Asset Management), are
now the subject of lawsuits both in Maputo and in the United
States. Key figures in the debts are under arrest, including
Guebuza's finance minister, Manuel Chang, who is under South
African police custody, three former Credit Suisse directors and
Jean Boustani, of the Abu Dhabi based company, Privinvest, which
became the sole contractor for the three fake companies.
The US indictment, based on a million pages of bank statements, e-
mails, transcripts of phone calls and other documents, makes it
clear that Ematum was a fraud right from the start. It was cooked
up by senior figures in Privinvest and Credit Suisse, and had
nothing to do with Mozambique's legitimate fishing needs. Instead,
the project, according to the US indictment, was "a pretext to
justify the maximum possible loan amount".
“Deputy Humanitarian Chief concludes visit to countries affected by Cyclone Idai and calls for increased support to tackle the effects of climate change,” OCHA, June 12, 2019
…
“While the impact of Cyclone Idai was different in the three
countries, this disaster gives us a clear picture of how the
effects of climate change are increasing the humanitarian needs of
people who are already extremely vulnerable,” said Ms Mueller. “The
climate crisis is hurting most those who have done the least to
create it.”
In Mozambique, which was affected by two consecutive cyclones, Idai
and Kenneth, the deputy humanitarian chief visited Beira, the port
city which took the brunt of Idai, and travelled to Dondo, where
she met with people who have been resettled after they lost
everything. “I am inspired by the incredible resilience of the
Mozambican people, who are already rebuilding their lives,” she
said. “However, I am deeply concerned for the months ahead, as food
insecurity is expected to rise due to the extensive damage to crops
and livelihoods. We must ensure that no one is left behind, and
that displaced people are resettled in a way that is safe,
dignified, voluntary, informed and durable.”
Ms Mueller welcomed the initial outpouring of support and
solidarity with Mozambique, but urged the international community
to do more. The Humanitarian Response Plan for Mozambique, that
calls for US$440 million including the response to Cyclone Idai and
Kenneth and the drought in the south, is only 34 per cent funded.
“Anadarko approves $20 billion LNG export project in Mozambique,” Reuters, June 18, 2019
U.S. energy firm Anadarko Petroleum Corp on Tuesday gave the go-
ahead for the construction of a $20 billion gas liquefaction and
export terminal in Mozambique, the largest single LNG project
approved in Africa.
The announcement, which occurred at an event in Mozambique, was
widely expected after Anadarko last month flagged the decision
date.
"As the world increasingly seeks cleaner forms of energy, the
Anadarko-led Area 1 Mozambique LNG project is ideally located to
meet growing demand, particularly in expanding Asian and European
markets," Chief Executive Officer Al Walker said in a statement
here
Anadarko has agreed to be taken over by Occidental Petroleum Corp.
Once that deal goes ahead, Occidental has agreed to sell assets
including the Mozambique LNG project to French oil major and large
LNG trader Total SA. Officials at Total were not immediately
available for comment.
Video and audio available of panels on Understanding Extremism in Northern Mozambique, CSIS, June 6, 2019. Video is on Youtube at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=34aJMFN2XuE]
Three out of 6 panelists were Mozambican. All panelists are real
experts with deep knowledge on the topic, providing different but
overlapping perspectives. No definitive answers - that´s the nature
of the reality they were dealing with. But very clearly put
background and analysis. And, for those concerned about the issues
elsewhere in Africa as well as Mozambique, there are many parallels
in the drivers of conflict and how multiplied by failures in both
national and international response. Whether key policymakers at
either levels will pay attention is another matter.
Panel 1: Examining Social, Political, and Religious Drivers
Featuring Dr. Alex Vines (Chatham House), Dr. Yussuf Adam
(Universidade Eduardo Mondlane), and Dr. Liazzat Bonate (University
of West Indies)
Moderated by Emilia Columbo
Panel 2: Exploring Regional and International Response Efforts
Featuring H. Dean Pittman (former U.S. Ambassador to Mozambique),
Zenaida Machado (Human Rights Watch), and Dr. Gregory Pirio
(Empowering Communications)
Moderated byJudd Devermont (Director, CSIS Africa Program)
Gregory Pirio, Robert Pittelli, and Yussuf Adam, “The Many Drivers Enabling Violent Extremism in Northern Mozambique,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, May 20, 2019
The armed Islamist movement in Mozambique’s northernmost province
of Cabo Delgado, known locally as “al Shabaab” (no direct relation
to the Somalian militant group) or “Swahili Sunnah” (the Swahili
path), among other names, is responsible for over 100 deaths,
destruction of property, and the displacement of thousands of
people. The group first gained attention with an attack on a police
station in October 2017. Inspired by the teachings of the late
radical Kenyan preacher Aboud Rogo, the group was seen as young and
brash—and at odds with the established Muslim Council in the
region. Failing to win over the Muslim leadership, the group went
on to establish its own mosques and madrassas and recruited from
local youth by playing up feelings of disaffection.
Since May 2018, the group’s attacks have become less discriminate
and more violent—to include beheadings. Numerous villages have been
attacked, with over 1,000 homes burned or destroyed. Militants,
moreover, are reported to have begun kidnapping women and girls.
...
Heavy-handed responses by Mozambican security forces following
extremist attacks have heightened distrust among local residents.
According to Human Rights Watch, men found in Cabo Delgado villages
by security forces have been rounded up and held in military detention without
due process. These security responses are alleged to have
contributed to further al Shabaab recruitment in the region.
The pattern of escalating violent extremist attacks followed by
indiscriminate security responses have played out repeatedly
elsewhere in Africa—Somalia, the Lake Chad Basin, the Sahel, and
the Maghreb. The situation in northern Mozambique, however, is
further complicated by a series of underlying factors—including
competition over land, resettlement, and distrust of local
political actors—that are fueling tensions and demanding a more
comprehensive response.
Also
“In the Wake of Cyclone Idai, the North Has a Climate Debt to Pay,” Foreign Policy in Focus, April 4, 2019
https://fpif.org/in-the-wake-of-cyclone-idai-the-north-has-a-climate-debt-to-pay/
AfricaFocus Bulletin, March 22, 2019
http://www.africafocus.org/docs19/idai1903.php
AfricaFocus Bulletin, January 8, 2019
http://www.africafocus.org/docs19/moz1901.php
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