|
Get AfricaFocus Bulletin by e-mail!
Format for print or mobile
USA/Africa: Build Back Better on Africa Policy
AfricaFocus Bulletin
November 30, 2020 (2020-11-30)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
“President Trump's overt contempt for Africans is encapsulated in
his famously crass remark about African countries. But the
principal damage to Africa has stemmed from his administration’s
broader policy choices, such as the disastrous rejection of the
World Health Organization (WHO) and the Paris climate accords;
harsh curbs on legal immigration and asylum; and gutting of gender
equality programs. … Nevertheless, the Biden administration should
not merely go back to the pre-Trump status quo. … We argue that an
even more fundamental questioning of U.S. Africa-related policy is
needed.” - Imani Countess and William Minter
As in all areas of the incoming administration's policy, there is
much uncertainty about what it will be and what self-imposed and
external restraints it will face. This AfricaFocus Bulletin does
not answer those questions with any assured predictions. The
outcomes will depend not only on the administration itself,
Congress, grass roots pressure, and the diplomacy of African
countries themselves as well as the impact of other global
developments.
This article contains the article cited above, which appeared first in Responsible Statecraft, laying out not policy predictions but rather an alternative framework for policy. It also contains brief excerpts and links to other analyses of the potential Biden policies, and another article also published in Responsible Statecraft, by Elizabeth Shackelford, who was a U.S. diplomat until December 2017 when she resigned in protest of the administration. She served in Somalia, South Sudan, Poland, and Washington, DC. Shackelford's article focuses on the failures of current U.S. policy on Ethiopia.
Another AfricaFocus Bulletin sent out today, and available on the web at http:///www.africafocus.org/docs20/clim2011.php, focuses on potential shifts in climate policy under the new administration.
For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on U.S. Africa policy, visit
http://www.africafocus.org/country/usa-africa.php
++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++
|
To build back better on Africa policy, the Biden administration needs new thinking on priorities
by William Minter and Imani Countess
First published in Responsible Statecraft on November 25, 2020
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2020/11/25/building-back-a-better-africa-should-not-mean-going-back-to-old-ways/
President Trump's overt contempt for Africans is encapsulated in
his famously crass remark about African countries. But the
principal damage to Africa has stemmed from his administration’s
broader policy choices, such as the disastrous rejection of the
World Health Organization (WHO) and the Paris climate accords;
harsh curbs on legal immigration and asylum; and gutting of gender
equality programs.
Most recently, Trump’s remarks supporting Egypt in its dispute with Ethiopia over the construction of a dam on the Nile River have inflamed tensions in a volatile region. And now his administration's failure to call for deescalation and dialogue in the conflict in Ethiopia's Tigray region is likely to have disastrous consequences in fueling expanded war.
Nevertheless, the Biden administration should not merely go back to the pre-Trump status quo. As noted by John Campbell of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Trump administration has made fewer changes to Africa policy than expected. Campbell calls for a “reset.” We argue that an even more fundamental questioning of U.S. Africa-related policy is needed.
The record of both Republican and Democratic administrations, over
more than six decades, has been mixed, ranging from destructive
interventions to neglect to—far less often—productive
collaboration with Africans on common goals. If the Biden mantra of
Build Back Better is to be applied to Africa, we need to think
about new frameworks to guide policy rather than retreading the
shibboleths of the past.
The new administration should abandon the temptation to offer lessons to Africa. Instead, the United States should strive to understand African realities and address problems in a spirit of collaboration and mutual learning. This requires rebuilding the capacity for diplomacy and also taking account of how other U.S. government agencies and institutions outside the foreign policy arena directly affect Africa's future.
The following guidelines are essential for not repeating the many mistakes of the past.
First, do no harm
1. Avoid counterproductive military engagements, a point also made by earlier commentators in Responsible Statecraft. Whether in the Sahel, Nigeria, or Somalia, counterinsurgency efforts and government repression have fueled rather than quelled Islamic insurgencies. Analysts are virtually unanimous that foreign intervention to counter the growing insurgency in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province would be a disaster.
There are no easy answers to such conflicts. But the U.S. priority must be to support multilateral initiatives in conflict resolution and peacekeeping, as well as humanitarian relief. Rather than assuming that Washington knows best, the incoming administration should heed advice from knowledgeable sources, such as the recent letter from over 80 African studies scholars on response to police brutality in Nigeria.
2. Do not subordinate Africa policy to a new cold war with
China. For decades, U.S. Africa policy was harnessed to the
Cold War with the Soviet Union. This led to disastrous
interventions in the Congo and to the de facto alliance with
apartheid South Africa. The competition with China in Africa is
economic rather than military. but a blinkered vision ignoring
Africa's own interests is self-defeating. It also misses the
opportunities for cooperation as well as competition with China.
U.S. policymakers should recognize that, despite the wide
disparities in size and power, African countries, like the United
States, must find their way in a multipolar world. This requires
managing opportunities for cooperation, as well as threats, from a
wide range of external powers, and is incompatible with simplistic
binary choices.
3. Do not impose the false gospels of austerity and privatization on African countries. In developed and developing countries alike, market fundamentalism, denying the essential role of government in promoting development, has failed to deliver. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have begun to admit this failure, but old guidelines are still applied to countries too weak to determine their own policies.
U.S. policymakers should instead learn from African thinkers such as Thandika Mkandawire and the economists at the Addis Ababa–based UN Economic Commission for Africa. They share the growing global consensus that state investment in public goods and strategic state leadership in development strategy are prerequisites for sustainable and equitable development. This thinking is reflected in a new co-authored book, African Economic Development: Evidence, Theory, Policy, available for free download from Oxford University Press.
U.S. policymakers should learn from African thinkers such as Thandika Mkandawire and the economists at the Addis Ababa–based UN Economic Commission for Africa. Pictured above from left to right are Thandika Mkandawire and the most recent executive secretaries of the UNECA, Carlos Lopes and Vera Songwe.
Then, think globally and work collaboratively
The United States and African countries face many of the same
global issues, and these must be addressed at multiple levels.
Coordination is complex and always imperfect. But collaboration is
essential, both with African countries and, to the extent possible,
with multilateral agencies and other external actors.
The U.S. contribution can be significant in three areas:
1. Global health: Despite lack of resources, African countries have done better than the United States and many European countries in coping with the Covid-19 pandemic. While they have not matched the success of the Asia Pacific region, they have benefited from early action and from proactive coordination by the WHO regional office and the Africa CDC.
The United States, which lags the world in recognition of the universal right to health, needs to put its own house in order. But it also has a responsibility to pay its fair share in supporting public health in African and other developing countries. As Covid-19 makes clear, that is the prudent as well as moral thing to do.
2. Climate change: Africa is the continent most vulnerable to global climate change, though it has contributed the least to causing it. Many African countries depend on fossil fuel exports. Much of the rural population relies on charcoal for cooking, contributing to the loss of tree cover. Fiscal resources for both mitigation and adaptation fall far short of the need.
The U.S. return to the Paris climate agreement will be only a first
step. Renewable energy is expanding rapidly in Africa and there is
enormous potential for additional expansion, drawing private and
public investment from the countries most responsible for the
problem. There is room for both the United States and China if they
are willing to work with African partners.
3. Tax justice: Tax evasion, tax avoidance, and illicit financial flows have eroded the fiscal capacity of African governments. African civil society as well as governments have called for international action. But success depends on action in the United States and other major financial centers, where global banks, accounting firms, and legal firms help secretive corporations and individuals hide financial assets.
Giant multinational corporations also avoid taxation by shifting assets to jurisdictions with lower tax rates. The internet giants Google, Facebook, and Microsoft, for example, avoided as much as $2.8 billion in taxes in 20 developing countries.
In the United States, legislative action is key to greater transparency, as advocated by the Financial Transparency and Corporate Accountability Coalition. But strong executive actions also have a role to play. Stemming illicit financial flows could have more impact on African countries’ fiscal capacity to meet their own needs than either aid or trade.
It is likely that the Biden administration’s Africa policy will
largely reflect continuity with previous administrations. But
Africa and the United States share common interests that are
increasingly visible, and this gives some hope that, with creative
diplomacy, greater humility, and attention to African concerns,
policymakers can move closer to mutually beneficial engagement.
The bottom line is that U.S. Africa policy will be most productive if U.S. policymakers are willing to learn and collaborate rather than to preach or dictate.
Other Commentaries on Biden Africa Policy
Center for International Policy Policy Brief
Africa Program, November 20, 2020
Biden Administration's US-Africa Foreign Policy Plan
This 2-page brief provides an overview of what is likely to happen. It also contains these specific suggestions under the title “What We Want to See.”
- Abandon the over-militarized approach to counter-terrorism and close all U.S. military’s Africa Command (AFRICOM) bases. Promote peaceful negotiated resolutions of conflicts in Somalia, Libya, the Sahel and Nigeria beginning with ceasefire agreements to protect civilians in the time of COVID19.
- Resolve Africa’s last colonial question by working through the United Nations and with the A.U. to re-establish a ceasefire between Morocco and the Polisario Front, and to implement the UN-backed referendum for the Western Sahara to achieve self-determination for the Sahrawi people.
- Become a reliable partner in Africa’s fight against COVID-19 and join the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) facility to ensure that African countries get equal access to a potential vaccine.
- Support Special Drawing Rights (SDRS) and debt cancellation efforts while supporting the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCTA).
- Rejoin the Paris Agreement and help Africa mitigate the effects of climate change through financing.
- Reverse the travel bans imposed by the Trump administration on citizens of Somalia, Eritrea, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania and Libya. Halt the deportations of Cameroonians and other Africans fleeing conflict. Provide protection for immigrants and refugees.
- Help African countries invest in the youth through job creation.
The Biden-Harris Agenda for the African Diaspora
https://joebiden.com/african-diaspora/#
“How a Biden administration will change US-Africa relations, “ by Yinka Adegoke
Quartz Africa, November 6, 2020
https://qz.com/africa/1929614/how-a-joe-biden-will-change-donald-trumps-us-africa-relations/
“U.S. Africa Policy Needs a Reset: Trump Didn’t Tear Up the Playbook, but It Still Needs to Be Rewritten, “ By John Campbell
Foreign Affairs, October 12, 2020
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2020-10-12/us-africa-policy-needs-reset
"Obama didn't deliver for Africa: Can Biden show black lives matter everywhere" by Vava Tampa
The Guardian, November 30, 2020
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/nov/30/obama-didnt-deliver-for-africa-can-biden-show-black-lives-matter-everywhere
**************************************************************
U.S. diplomacy is failing in Ethiopia, in new ways and old
by Elizabeth Shackelford
Responsible Statecraft, November 28, 2020
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2020/11/28/u-s-diplomacy-is-failing-in-ethiopia-in-new-ways-and-old/
Elizabeth Shackelford was a U.S. diplomat until December 2017 when
she resigned in protest of the administration. She served in
Somalia, South Sudan, Poland, and Washington, DC.
The conflict in Ethiopia emerges from a long and complex political
history and could easily spiral further out of control. U.S.
diplomacy today is under-resourced and uncoordinated, with its
leadership asleep at the wheel, leaving Washington poorly
positioned to help avert the emerging disaster. America’s blunt
diplomatic approach to Ethiopia historically, however, would
struggle to play a constructive role, too.
On November 4, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed kicked off a war
by sending troops into the Tigray region. Tigray is home to the
Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), a well-armed political
party representing an ethnic minority that makes up about six
percent of the Ethiopian population. Abiy asserts that the military
offensive was in response to an attack by TPLF forces on a military
base, but an ongoing communications blackout complicates efforts to
confirm facts on the ground, including allegations of widespread
human rights abuses.
The Ethiopian government has been quick to investigate ethnically
motivated attacks allegedly committed by the TPLF, including the
reported massacre of 600 civilians in the town Mai-Kadra, but its
access restrictions have prevented investigations into reports of
government forces targeting civilians. Meanwhile, Tigrayan
civilians in the capital Addis Ababa and across the country are
reportedly being harassed and detained, raising the alarming
possibility of a broader campaign of ethnic targeting. These
concerns are reinforced by the Ethiopian government’s
forceful repatriation of
Tigrayan officers serving in U.N. peacekeeping missions outside the
country, and fears they may face torture or even execution upon
their return.
The TPLF and central government have been at odds since Abiy’s
election in 2018, following the resignation of Prime Minister
Hailemariam Desalegn that ended 27 years of repressive TPLF rule.
Abiy is the country’s first prime minister from Ethiopia’s largest
ethnic group, the Oromo. Resolving the growing political tension
between the central government and the TPLF was always going to be
a challenge, but a deliberate and robust diplomatic effort to press
for transparent accountability and inclusion from the start would
have had far better chances of success than hasty efforts now to
stop the violence. Unfortunately, that has not been the modus
operandi of U.S. foreign policy, under this administration or prior
ones.
With the U.S. election underway, Abiy likely saw his last
opportunity to pursue a violent resolution to Tigrayan defiance
with minimal international pressure. American leadership here would
be meaningful, but under the Trump administration, Washington has
demonstrated little concern for human rights, stability, or the
welfare of civilians.
A Biden administration, on the other hand, would care about all
three and coordinate expertise and resources to demonstrate it. It
would understand the stakes and fear a turn towards mass
atrocities, given the harsh rhetoric and the conflict’s ethnic
nature. A Biden National Security Council would have elevated
attention to the conflict rapidly, facilitated by an NSC staffer
with expertise in the Horn and an appreciation for potential impact
in the broader region, from security in Somalia, where Ethiopian
peacekeeping forces play a major role, to Sudan, itself in a
fragile transition that could be complicated by conflict on its
border and the arrival of tens of thousands of refugees.
Well before the three-week mark, policy would be coordinated at the
highest levels across the interagency, with the direct engagement
of the secretary of state, the national security adviser, and
possibly the president himself. Under the Trump administration,
there has been no policy direction, and outreach has largely been
left to U.S. Ambassador Michael Raynor, whose default position has
unhelpfully been unquestioning support for Prime Minister Abiy.
That a National Security Council tweet calling for mediation is now
lauded as escalated engagement is a sad reflection of the state of
U.S. diplomacy today.
I feel confident this is how a Biden administration would respond
because I witnessed a similar mobilization with many of the same
players under the Obama administration when conflict broke out in
South Sudan in 2013, amidst harsh ethnic rhetoric and divisions. As
a U.S. diplomat in Juba, South Sudan, I saw firsthand the rapid
escalation, interagency coordination, and engagement.
I also watched this approach fail. Robust diplomatic engagement is
essential but not sufficient. How we engage and our history of
engagement matter too. Today’s crisis in Ethiopia has brought into
stark relief my question for the incoming foreign policy team:
based on the staffing decisions so far, we can rest assured this
team will be staffed with experienced professionals who care deeply
for our country and are committed to our diplomatic capacity — but
have they learned from our past mistakes? Will our foreign policy
be better, not just than Trump’s, but better than the foreign
policy that prevailed before that too?
For decades, our Africa policy has taken a blunt approach, quickly designating the good guys and the bad and painting each with a broad brush that demands unquestioning loyalty or enmity. This offers little room for nuance in our relationships and leaves us unprepared to engage effectively in the continent’s complex political and historical realities. For example, U.S. foreign policy is still beholden to leaders like Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Paul Kagame of Rwanda based on the decision a generation ago to deem these rebel leaders Africa’s “new generation.” Today, the United States remains a loyal friend of both, turning a blind eye for years to their many authoritarian transgressions. Accountability, transparency, and our credibility are all casualties of this approach.
Abiy has demonstrated this point on a particularly compressed
timeline. When he came to power in 2018, the United States was not
alone in rapidly anointing him savior. In less than two years, he’d
won a Nobel Peace Prize. We hung on Abiy all of the hopes for
reform and openness that we had bottled up for 27 years while
exhibiting enthusiastic support for Ethiopia’s prior repressive
regime. Abiy’s early days were promising, as he released political
prisoners, introduced political reforms, and made peace with
neighboring Eritrea. In our enthusiasm, however, we refused to see
the warning signs, as Abiy embraced many of the tools of repression
his predecessors utilized, treating his political enemies as
traitors, locking up critics, and obstructing transparency. These
trends are easier to discourage early on, when their scale is small
and the costs of a course correction much lower. The right
incentives and deliberate diplomatic engagement could have gone a
long way at that stage. By continuing to look away, however, we
helped ensure that what began as a bad trend adapted from Abiy’s
predecessor became the new government’s culture too.
America must start engaging Africa’s leaders for who they are and
what they do, not who we hope them to be. We must stop being so
afraid of risking access and relationships that we fail to put in
the hard work to ensure those relationships work for us and help to
elevate the values and conditions that promote long-term stability
and prosperity. This does not mean Washington should expect to
dictate the actions of our partners. Rather, it means we should be
honest about the implications of their actions, even when we fail
to shape them.
In the example of Ethiopia today, that doesn’t require that we
abandon support for Abiy to push for a power-sharing arrangement;
we can appreciate the need for a central government to defend its
authority against armed actors. At the same time, however, we can
remind Abiy’s government of the role its illiberal acts have played
in reinforcing the political and ethnic strife that helped fuel
this rebellion, and Abiy must understand there will be reputational
and assistance consequences for a war conducted in violation of
international humanitarian law. If Abiy is, as he claims,
conducting law enforcement activity against criminals and not an
ethnic group, we must press him to demonstrate that through
transparency.
The Biden administration has an opportunity for a fresh start in
Africa. It should set a new baseline in our relationships, grounded
in honesty and transparency, treating complex friendships with the
complexity they deserve, and investing heavily in the diplomatic
long game to make that approach productive.
AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with
a particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
Bulletin is edited by William Minter. For an archive of previous Bulletins,
see http://www.africafocus.org,
Current links to books on AfricaFocus go to the non-profit bookshop.org, which supports independent bookshores and also provides commissions to affiliates such as AfricaFocus.
AfricaFocus Bulletin can be reached at africafocus@igc.org. Please
write to this address to suggest material for inclusion. For more
information about reposted material, please contact directly the
original source mentioned. To subscribe to receive future bulletins by email,
click here.
|
